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Abstract 
The monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, 
which goes to make up compounds; by simple, we mean without parts. 
(Leibniz, Monadology) 
From its origins in antiquity the monad is a concept that has time and again beguiled and 
attracted philosophers. This thesis will argue that it is a concept that lives on in the work of 
Bruno Latour and that it continues to have a contemporary relevance, offering a way out of 
sterile debates rooted in Cartesian dualism – subject/object, interior/exterior, 
essence/accident, whole/part, mind/body – and an alternative to those traditions which 
privilege one side of the dualism over the other – positivism on one hand, postmodernism 
on the other. 
The present study charts the development of the monad through the modern period, 
beginning with the work of Gottfried Leibniz and, thereafter, its recurrence in the work of 
Gabriel Tarde, Alfred North Whitehead, and, finally, Bruno Latour. However, rather than 
simply sketching a chronological history of the monad this study takes as its starting point 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, or to use Latour’s preferred formulation, Actant 
Rhizome Ontology. Arguing that Latour’s work is best understood as being another 
instance of a monadological metaphysics that – contra Graham Harman – owes more to 
Whitehead than Heidegger, to Tarde than Nietzsche, to Leibniz than Spinoza; the thesis 
traces the genetic intellectual relations between Latour and his three co-monadologists. 
Latour himself frequently identifies Leibniz, Tarde and Whitehead as intellectual 
antecedents in his own work; in the spirit of Latour’s own Actor-Network Theory, this 
thesis takes a closer look at these claimed chains of association. 
The first chapter surveys Leibniz’s monadology and argues that, far from being an idealist, 
Leibniz was committed to a monism that recognized the materiality of simple substance 
through his corporeal ‘de Volder’ monad. This does not necessarily lead, as argued forcibly 
Pauline Phemister, to pan-psychism, as Leibniz anticipates William James’ 
‘depsychologized’ category of experience with his three level system of bare, soul and 
spirit monads, where only the spirit monads possess anything resembling a mind; however, 
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it takes Whitehead’s transformation of the monad into the actual entity to complete the 
break between experience and mind.   
The second chapter provides a close reading of Gabriel Tarde’s Monadology & Sociology, 
a work only made available in English in 2012. Latour has played a significant role in the 
rediscovery of Tarde, claiming his criminologist compatriot as an intellectual forefather; 
yet throughout the 20th century Tarde’s work quietly influenced continental philosophy 
through Giles Deleuze who, despite only ever mentioning Tarde parenthetically, borrows 
Tarde’s very own formulation for the title of Difference et Repetition. The chapter presents 
Tarde’s work as being an explosion of the Leibnizian monad where the universe is no 
longer reflected but literally embodied in each individual entity while at the same time 
diffused through the universe of monads by virtue of relations of possession. Taken 
together with his theory of repetition and imitation, his privileging of difference over 
identity, and his philosophy of having – his ‘echontology’ – Tarde’s monadology provides 
the foundations for a truly relational ontology; foundations which Latour will 
retrospectively claim for Actor Network Theory. 
The third chapter considers Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme as presented in Process and 
Reality. Whitehead resolves the ‘audacious fudge’ committed by Leibniz – the doctrine of 
pre-established harmony – through a complex and sophisticated realist metaphysical 
system, one held together by ‘creativity’. Whitehead’s categoreal scheme, his peculiar 
vocabulary, his reiterative method whereby ideas are presented over and over again in 
different contexts mirror the very metaphysical scheme he describes. This – along with his 
insistence on the atomic nature of time and the instantaneous emergence and realization of 
each ‘actual entity’ – lays the basis for Latour’s democratic ontology which, as well as 
famously according equality between human and non-human actors affords concepts the 
same ontological status as the thinker in whose mind they have been formed.  
The final chapter returns to the work of Latour himself to find the monad reassembled as 
the ‘actor-network’. Latour’s ontological scheme is discussed in detail with reference to his 
three antecedents, and his ontology is presented as a reiteration/renewal of the monad; an 
ontology that itself demands to be renewed each and every time it is deployed. Finally, the 
thesis argues that Latour pays insufficient heed to Whitehead’s understanding of 
abstraction with the result that, despite developing the idea himself, Latour fails to fully 
embrace the ontological reality of the abstract. This in turn leads to his preference for 
litany over critique and results in a philosophy with a great deal of descriptive power but 
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little or no transformational power. The ‘compositionist’ politics that emerge from Latour’s 
Actant Rhizome Ontology are ambiguous and utopian, and the thesis concludes by 
suggesting that more work is required to further Latour’s democratization of the monad, to 
include its radicalization, in pursuit of a monadology that provides an ontological basis for:  
…the genuine resolution of the conflict between man [sic] and nature and between 
man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, 
between the individual and the species. 
(Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844)
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Preface 
STUDENT: But that’s exactly my problem: to stop. I have to complete this 
doctorate. I have just eight more months. You always say ‘more descriptions’ but 
this is like Freud and his cures: indefinite analysis. When do you stop? My actors 
are all over the place! Where should I go? What is a complete description?  
PROFESSOR: Now that’s a good question because it’s a practical one. As I always 
say: a good thesis is a thesis that is done. But there is another way to stop than just 
by ‘adding an explanation’ or ‘putting it into a frame’.  
S: Tell me it then.  
P: You stop when you have written your 50,000 words or whatever is the format 
here, I always forget. 
(Latour, 2005, p.148) 
This thesis was drawn to its conclusion with the imminent arrival of my and my partner’s 
first child, a much more compelling reason to stop than a word count or a deadline: as the 
professor says, ‘Whatever the format is here’. But the question of ‘what is a complete 
description’ has accompanied the thesis from beginning to end. Originally conceived as a 
polemic against the technological determinism that was so dominant in discussions around 
the role of social media in the 2011 Arab Spring, my reading quickly took me far away 
from social network analysis and information theory. Regardless, events in that part of the 
world soon demonstrated the poverty of that analysis as the triumph of the ‘Twitter 
Revolutions’ gave way to the tragedy of military coups and civil war. The question of 
agency, however, was left unanswered. How do things change? Is the social a strictly 
human affair? What is the nature of the relation between individual and group, group and 
individual? When I act, what is it exactly that I am doing? 
I first encountered Bruno Latour in Bijker and Law’s Shaping technology/building society: 
studies in sociotechnical change. Latour’s essay, titled Where are the Missing Masses?, 
struck me as the most compelling – and most intriguing – account of sociotechnical change 
in the anthology, and the only one that hinted at its author having a theory with the 
potential to answer the questions that occupied my mind. From there I kept encountering 
Latour in the philosophy of technology and information studies literature, sometimes in his 
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own words, more often summarised by others. These articles and books generally took 
Latour as being of the STS (Science and Technology Studies) school, as someone who 
helped explain the interaction between humans and technology; whose ‘Actor-Network 
Theory’ allowed sociology to, not only think about the non-human, but incorporate it as 
well. But there were always hints of an expansive, less travelled hinterland to Latour’s 
work that lay beyond discussions of sleeping policemen and hotel keys. Reading 
Irreductions – the second part of Latour’s The Pasteurization of France, the first of 
Latour’s own books I read – confirmed this. ‘Leibniz was right to say that monads have 
neither doors nor windows’ (p.166); ‘If we thought that termites were better philosophers 
than Leibniz, we could compare a network to a termites' nest’ (p.171); ‘Contrary to 
Leibniz, in the movement of the watch there are also ponds full of fish and fish full of 
ponds.’ (p.201) – these aphoristic sentences punctuated a raw and gripping philosophical 
system completely, strikingly different from both the analytic philosophy I had studied in 
my undergraduate degree and the postmodern philosophy I had subsequently turned to in 
reaction. Leibniz was only vaguely familiar to me – usually dismissed in analytic textbooks 
as an idealist, denied even his claim to the differential calculus in favour of Newton – but 
reading his Monadology was similarly arresting and helped cement my feeling that Latour 
could just as easily be considered a monadologist as an STS theorist.  
As I continued to read through Latour’s publications, two other names recurred time and 
again in connection with the ‘monadological’ aspects of Latour’s work: Gabriel Tarde and 
Alfred North Whitehead, both of whom Latour enthusiastically claims as ‘forefathers’. 
However, in my reading, the only time I encountered the names of Leibniz, Tarde, 
Whitehead and Latour in the same sentence – described as ‘philosophers of 
“monadologies” and isolated from the rest of the ‘canon’ – was, of all places, in Risan’s 
2006 essay on cattle breeding and social democracy.1 Nevertheless, I had four theorists, 
united in their relation with Latour at one end and Leibniz at the other, working across 
three-hundred years, all with the monad – or a variant thereof – at the heart of their system. 
In the spirit of Actor-Network Theory, I had chosen my actors and now it was time to 
describe the unfolding of their monadalogies. 
                                         
1 In Risan, L. C., 2006. Whitehead’s Philosophy of Unities Explored in a Case of Social Democratic Cattle 
Breeding. Configurations, 14 (1-2), pp.127-156. Risan writes:  
The STS embrace of Whitehead is part of a move to rediscover some “grandfathers” in the Western 
history of ideas. Included are the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde (Latour uses the metaphor of 
“grandfather” regarding Tarde), the British philosopher Whitehead, and, as the (usually) first mover in 
this story, G. W. Leibniz. These are philosophers of “monadologies.” (2006, p.130) 
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Rather than attempt to extract common features from each writer’s system, reveal 
underlying social forces, or explain (as in ‘explain away’) the connections between them, I 
have approached this thesis as a hermeneutic exercise, an opportunity to trace and describe 
– and in doing so redescribe and redefine – the monadologies of each writer carefully and 
in detail. The result is to disclose the continuities – and discontinuities – between the four 
monadologists, to make them ‘visible’; to provide a map, not in the usual sense of the 
metaphor where the author actually means to provide a prescribed route, but in the sense of 
mapping a landscape, inhabited by the four pro/antagonists. In making the continuities and 
discontinuities visible, the intention is not to trip Latour up, to prove that he has not 
understood Leibniz or Tarde or Whitehead: instead, I am interested in mapping and tracing 
what Stengers calls the ‘adjunctions’– the accretion of ideas rather than the cancelling out 
of one idea by another.2 
While partly motivated by a frustration with texts which fail to properly take into account 
the complexity of the work of the philosophers they marshal as allies; the primary 
motivation is to try to use the methodology of Actor-Network Theory on itself and its 
antecedents3 – hence the vocabulary of ‘visibility’, ‘tracing’, ‘redescription’, ‘alliance’, 
‘taking into account’ and the like. Of course, the other significant inspiration is Deleuze’s 
series of books on the work of other philosophers, including Leibniz; his reading of 
Leibniz or Hume or Kant is always a rereading – description as redescription/redefinition. 
Yet, while Latour gives us a 21st century monadology with tremendous descriptive power – 
and one with which we can begin to approach questions like, how do things change? – I 
cannot help but be frustrated at what ultimately remains a politically agnostic philosophy, 
despite Latour’s utopian compositionist efforts. With Latour we can see how climate 
change is not simply composed of fossil fuel, oil companies and the weather, but is 
teeming with actors of all shapes and sizes, human and non-human. But can we really go 
along with Latour when he claims that we can get to Gaia through slow, careful description 
and composition alone? Can we not see that there are certain actors who are more to blame 
than others; that the present state of affairs is of more benefit to some than others; that 
some actors will resist composition? Demanding the emancipation of human beings from 
wage slavery or an end to the blind, profit-driven destruction of the planet – and, by 
                                         
2 As Walt Whitman wrote, ‘Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself. (I am large. I contain 
multitudes.)’ 
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necessity, recognizing the antagonism of labour and capital, of use and exchange value, of 
rapacious capitalist avarice and a fragile ecosystem – does not, as Latour likes to suggest, 
entail the bifurcation of nature. On the contrary, the bifurcation of nature is resolved by and 
through these demands. The strength of Latour’s work is in his decentralised, flattened 
ontology that, unlike the postmodernists, does not retreat to the margins. The weakness is 
his outright rejection of what Alain Badiou describes as the ‘Communist Hypothesis’. I 
have little time for Badiou’s unrepentant Maoism but I wholeheartedly agree when he 
writes: 
We know that communism is the right hypothesis. All those who abandon this 
hypothesis immediately resign themselves to the market economy, to parliamentary 
democracy—the form of state suited to capitalism—and to the inevitable and 
“natural” character of the most monstrous inequalities. 
(Badiou, 2010) 
My intention in this thesis is to lay the necessary ground work for the development of a 
monadology that has this hypothesis at its heart, harnessing the descriptive power of an 
Actant Rhizome Ontology to take a first tentative step from Latour’s liberal democratic 
ontology to a revolutionary democratic one. But to take this step we first need a map and, 
just as a cartographer must traverse the territory they are mapping – even if they now do 
this through satellites rather than on foot – we must traverse the monad of Leibniz, Tarde, 
Whitehead and Latour – always describing, redescribing, defining, redefining; only 
completing our descriptions when we stop describing. 
Marx’s thought runs through this thesis in much the same way as Tarde’s ideas run through 
the work of Deleuze,4 seldom mentioned but ever-present. Latour writes about putting 
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach back on its feet, reformulating it as: ‘Social scientists 
have transformed the world in various ways; the point, however, is to interpret it.’’ (2005, 
p.42) But, if, as Latour’s monadology maintains, by describing things we also change 
them, then Marx is still correct: the point is to change the world.    
                                         
4 See page 18 of this thesis. 
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Introduction 
A philosophy is more like … a person than a list of consistent statements, and for 
this reason it needs to be presented in the manner of biography, rather than as a 
chain of true and false utterances. 
(Harman, 2009, p.120) 
From its origins in antiquity5 the monad is a concept that has time and again beguiled and 
attracted philosophers. This thesis will argue that it is a concept that lives on in the work of 
Bruno Latour and that it continues to have a contemporary relevance, offering a way out of 
sterile debates rooted in Cartesian dualism – subject/object, interior/exterior, 
essence/accident, whole/part, mind/body – and an alternative to those traditions which 
privilege one side of the dualism over the other – positivism on one hand, postmodernism 
on the other. 
The present study charts the development of the monad through the modern period, 
beginning with the work of Gottfried Leibniz and thereafter its recurrence in the work of 
Gabriel Tarde, Alfred North Whitehead, and, finally, Bruno Latour. However, rather than 
simply sketching a chronological history of the monad this study takes as its starting point 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, or to use Latour’s preferred formulation, Actant 
Rhizome Ontology. Arguing that Latour’s work is best understood as being another 
instance of a monadological metaphysics that – contra Graham Harman – owes more to 
Whitehead than Heidegger, to Tarde than Nietzsche, to Leibniz than Spinoza; the thesis 
traces the genetic intellectual relations between Latour and his three co-monadologists. 
                                         
5 In his account of the life of Pythagoras, Diogenes Laërtius tells us that:  
Alexander also says, in his Successions of Philosophers, that he found the following dogmas also set 
down in the Commentaries of Pythagoras:-  
That the monad was the beginning of everything. From the monad proceeds an indefinite duad, which is 
subordinate to the monad as to its cause. That from the monad and the indefinite duad proceed numbers. 
And from numbers signs. And from these last, lines of which plane figures consist. And from plane 
figures are derived solid bodies. And from solid bodies sensible bodies, of which last there are four 
elements; fire, water, earth, and air. And that the world, which is endued with life, and intellect, and 
which is of a spherical figure, having the earth, which is also spherical, and inhabited all over in its 
centre, results from a combination of these elements, and derives its motion from them; and also that 
there are antipodes, and that what is below, as respects us, is above in respect of them. (Laërtius, D., 
1915. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, London: G. Bell & Sons, p.348) 
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Latour himself frequently identifies Leibniz, Tarde and Whitehead as intellectual 
antecedents in his own work; in the spirit of Latour’s own Actor-Network Theory, this 
thesis takes a closer look at these claimed chains of association. 
The first chapter surveys Leibniz’s monadology and argues that, far from being an idealist, 
Leibniz was committed to a monism that recognized the materiality of simple substance 
through his corporeal ‘de Volder’ monad. This does not necessarily lead, as Pauline 
Phemister argues, to pan-psychism, as Leibniz anticipates William James’ 
‘depsychologized’ category of experience with his three level system of bare, soul and 
spirit monads, where only the spirit monads possess anything resembling a mind; however, 
it takes Whitehead’s transformation of the monad into the actual entity to complete the 
break between experience and mind.  
Latour's earliest explicitly philosophical work, Irreductions, is peppered with references to 
Leibniz and his monads but, to borrow Tarde's own phrase which Latour quotes (2001, p. 
3), the monads Latour realises have come a long way since their father. For example, 
‘Leibniz was right to say that monads have neither doors nor windows, for they never 
come out of themselves. However, they are sieves, for they endlessly negotiate about their 
frontiers, about who the negotiators will be, and about what they ought to do.’ (Latour, 
1988, p. 166) And, 'no matter how far we go, there are always forms; within each fish there 
are ponds full of fish. Some believe themselves to be the moulds while others are the raw 
material, but this is a form of elitism.’ (1988, p. 161) As we will see, what both these 
quotes illustrate is the distance travelled from Leibniz’s conception of the monad. 
Recasting the monad as a ‘sieve’ illustrates the way in which Latour translates and 
transforms the Leibnizian monad; leading Graham Harman to describe Latour’s approach 
to Leibniz as an 'atonal remix' (2007, p. 39) or the 'edgy off-Broadway rendition of the 
Leibnizian philosophy.' (2007, p. 42)  
The second chapter provides a close reading of Gabriel Tarde’s Monadology & Sociology, 
a work only made available in English in 2012. Latour has played a significant role in the 
rediscovery of Tarde, claiming his criminologist compatriot as an intellectual forefather; 
yet throughout the 20th century Tarde’s work quietly influenced continental philosophy 
through Giles Deleuze who, despite only ever mentioning Tarde parenthetically, borrows 
Tarde’s very own formulation for the title of Difference et Repetition. The chapter presents 
Tarde’s work as being an explosion of the Leibnizian monad – another ‘atonal remix’ – 
where the universe is no longer reflected but literally embodied in each individual entity 
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while at the same time diffused through the universe of monads by virtue of relations of 
possession. Taken together with his theory of repetition and imitation, his privileging of 
difference over identity, and his philosophy of having – his ‘echontology’ – Tarde’s 
monadology provides the foundations for a truly relational ontology; foundations which 
Latour will retrospectively claim for Actor Network Theory.  
The last fifteen years have seen a series of works by Latour and various collaborators on 
Tarde's writings. From his political economy to his sociology, Latour has been engaged in a 
sustained attempt to uncover Tarde and bring his concepts to a wider audience. 
Languishing for over a century in the shadow of Durkheim, Tarde is being rehabilitated as 
the metaphysicist for the digital age. Tarde's flattened, one level sociology – his spheres of 
action, laws of imitation and repetition, refusal to countenance the existence of aggregates 
as something apart from their constituent parts – seems perfectly suited to Latour's 
language of networks and associations. Indeed, Latour cites Tarde as 'forefather' to Actor-
Network Theory and the originator of two key concepts championed by ANT: the 
irrelevance of the nature/society divide for the understanding of human interactions – in 
other words, the admission of non-human technological actants into any account of the 
constitution of agency, and the stifling effect of the micro/macro distinction on any attempt 
to generate society (Latour, 2001, p. 2). 6 Latour has spent considerable time imagining a 
20th century where Tarde is the dominant philosopher-sociologist, writing in The Science of 
Passionate Interests: 
Imagine how things might have turned out had no one ever paid attention to Das 
Kapital. A century later, the book would have been rediscovered and people would 
have been struck with amazement by its scope and audacity – an isolated, little 
understood work, without any scientific, political or social impact; a work that had 
generated neither disciples nor exegeses, and one that no attempts at application 
had come to transform. How different the history of the 20th century would have 
                                         
6  ‘It is truly surprising to see men of science, so stubborn in repeating at every turn that nothing is created, 
admit implicitly as though self-evident that relations between distinct beings can of themselves become 
new beings numerically added to the former.’ (Tarde, 2012, p. 35) Tarde argues that it is mistaken to 
conceive of social aggregates as resulting in the creating of a new being; for example, that from a social 
group a ‘collective ego’ can arise which is not metaphorical but real. Thus, the distinction between macro 
and micro is not a distinction between collective consciousness and individual consciousness but the 
distinction between individual agency and the aggregates into which the individual enters. In contrast, the 
social aggregate of Durkheimian sociology conceals the complexity of its composition by conceiving of it 
as a real social entity in its own right. It is, of course, possible to consider certain individuals – Tarde 
suggest the ministers of a State – as personifying or individualising the aggregate but they themselves are 
members of the aggregate and do not arise from the collective as separate beings. 
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been... 
(2009, p. 1) 
The third chapter considers Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme as presented in Process and 
Reality. Whitehead resolves the ‘audacious fudge’ committed by Leibniz – the doctrine of 
pre-established harmony – through a complex and sophisticated realist metaphysical 
system, one held together by ‘creativity’. Whitehead’s categoreal scheme, his peculiar 
vocabulary, his reiterative method whereby ideas are presented over and again in different 
contexts mirror the very metaphysical scheme he describes. This – along with his 
insistence on the atomic nature of time and the instantaneous emergence and realization of 
each ‘actual entity’ – lays the basis for Latour’s democratic ontology which, as well as 
famously according equality between human and non-human actors affords concepts the 
same ontological status as the thinker in whose mind they have been formed. Latour writes 
in his review of Isabelle Stengers’ Thinking with Whitehead, with his admiration of 
Whitehead clear to see, that: 
[O]nly Whitehead went far enough to explain why the first empiricism did not 
respect the cosmological and rationalist dimensions of the sciences. And contrary to 
all of his predecessors—Kant and Hegel—and contemporaries—Bergson, James, 
Husserl, and, of course, Heidegger—he did not try to impose limits to science, to 
overcome their limits, to feed on their weaknesses, but added another dimension to 
them. … Whitehead always digs further into what is given by the scientific activity 
and what is learned about the world in addition to what scientists say about their 
own work. 
(2002, p.6) 
The final chapter returns to the work of Latour himself to find the monad reassembled as 
the ‘actor-network’. Latour’s ontological scheme – as presented primarily in Irreductions, 
We Have Never Been Modern, and Reassembling the Social7 – is discussed in detail with 
reference to his three antecedents, and his ontology is presented as a tacit 
reiteration/renewal of the monad; an ontology that itself demands to be renewed each and 
every time it is deployed. Finally, the thesis argues that Latour pays insufficient heed to 
Whitehead’s understanding of abstraction with the result that, despite developing the idea 
                                         
7 This thesis is concerned with Latour’s work in relation to ‘Actor-Network Theory’ and not what Harman 
describes as his ‘secret system’, the parallel philosophical system he began work on in 1987 and unveiled 
in 2013 where the network is one of fourteen different modes of existence.  
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himself, Latour fails to fully embrace the ontological reality of the abstract. This in turn 
leads to his preference for litany over critique and results in a philosophy with a great deal 
of descriptive power but little or no transformational power. The ‘compositionist’ political 
economy that emerges from Latour’s Actant Rhizome Ontology is ambiguous and utopian, 
and the thesis concludes by suggesting that more work is required to further Latour’s 
democratization of the monad to include its radicalization, in pursuit of a monadology that 
provides an ontological basis for:  
[T]he genuine resolution of the conflict between man [sic] and nature and between 
man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, 
between the individual and the species. 
(Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) 
Harman is correct to say that presenting a philosophy is like writing a biography, but while 
most biographies are written at end of period of someone’s life, looking back; in writing a 
philosophical biography we have to ‘start in the middle of things, in medias res’ (Latour, 
2005, p.123). Indeed, the passage from which that quote is taken perfectly encapsulates the 
process of trying to pin down ideas: 
At best, we add an account to all those which are simultaneously launched in the 
domain we have been studying. Of course, this study is never complete. We start in 
the middle of things, in medias res, pressed by our colleagues, pushed by 
fellowships, starved for money, strangled by deadlines. And most of the things we 
have been studying, we have ignored or misunderstood. Action had already started; 
it will continue when we will no longer be around. What we are doing in the 
field—conducting interviews, passing out questionnaires, taking notes and pictures, 
shooting films, leafing through the documentation, clumsily loafing around—is 
unclear to the people with whom we have shared no more than a fleeting moment. 
What the clients (research centers, state agencies, company boards, NGOs) who 
have sent us there expect from us remains cloaked in mystery, so circuitous was the 
road that led to the choice of this investigator, this topic, this method, this site. Even 
when we are in the midst of things, with our eyes and ears on the lookout, we miss 
most of what has happened. We are told the day after that crucial events have taken 
place, just next door, just a minute before, just when we had left exhausted with our 
tape recorder mute because of some battery failure. Even if we work diligently, 
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things don’t get better because, after a few months, we are sunk in a flood of data, 
reports, transcripts, tables, statistics, and articles. How does one make sense of this 
mess as it piles up on our desks and fills countless disks with data? Sadly, it often 
remains to be written and is usually delayed. It rots there as advisors, sponsors, and 
clients are shouting at you and lovers, spouses, and kids are angry at you while you 
rummage about in this dark sludge of data to bring light to the world. And when 
you begin to write in earnest, finally pleased with yourself, you have to sacrifice 
vast amounts of data that cannot fit in the small number of pages allotted to you. 
How frustrating this whole business of studying is. 
(2005. p.23) 
There is a recursive nature to all monadologies whereby the past is something that is to be 
grasped at and represented, that is, quite literally made present again. The frustrating 
business of studying is the result of trying to corral the past into the present, like collecting 
water with a leaky bucket; we are engaged in the Sisyphean task of representing a past that 
is forever just out of reach. And we can talk about Latour’s influence on the Leibnizian 
monad as much as we can of Leibniz’s influence on Latour. Indeed, in the course of this 
present study, Leibniz, Tarde and Whitehead were all read through a Latourian lens and 
with Latour very much in mind. As a re-presenting we are also engaged in an act of 
redefining; the naming of parts is also the production of parts, as we sense in Henry Reed’s 
poem: 
This is the lower sling swivel. And this 
Is the upper sling swivel, whose use you will see, 
When you are given your slings. And this is the piling swivel, 
Which in your case you have not got. 
(Reed, 1942) 
The intended audience for this thesis is all those who work with and around the 
methodology and metaphysics – whether assumed or explicit – of Actor-Network Theory 
and its associated movements, including the likes of Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented 
Ontology. The prime motivation is to address a contradiction at the heart of ANT, one that 
has come to the fore in the past decade as we entered a period of compounding crises – the 
financial crash, global warming, mass extinction, runaway inequality and so on. That is, its 
ability to provide a detailed description of the way in which the social world (‘social’ as 
understood according to the principle of generalised symmetry) is composed and 
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recomposed by the plenitude of actants who constitute it; while at the same time, through 
its eschewal of critique and insistence on description rather than prescription, maintaining 
a political agnosticism that is nothing short of perverse in the face of the disintegration of 
the very world ANT has so carefully attempted to describe and compose. As Hegel writes 
in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘to blend judgement and comprehension in a 
definitive description is the hardest thing of all.’ (1977, p.3) Latour and his co-thinkers 
attempt to do away with the ‘judgement’ and in doing so lose the ability to make that 
‘definitive description’ of which Hegel writes. 
This leads to two projects that are intertwined through the thesis. The first is the attempt to 
conduct something of a historical anthropology on the concept of the monad, tracing the 
concept through a series of writers from the 18th century to the present day; concluding 
with the argument that Actor-Network Theory is best understood as being part of the 
‘monadological’ tradition that is constructed through the thesis. The second is to argue that 
we cannot do without critique. These come together in the final chapter, in a meeting of 
ontology and politics, in the notion of concrete abstraction: the idea that the abstract has 
what Marx would call a ‘spectral objectivity,’ or Deleuze a ‘virtualality’, which is to say 
ideal yet also real. This notion, it is argued, is indispensable if we are to reclaim critique – 
and with it the ability to intervene in the world – while also harnessing the descriptive 
power of Actor-Network Theory.  
The genesis of the thesis lies in the work of Bruno Latour and his, to use his one-time 
preferred formulation, actant rhizome ontology. The selection of authors – Leibniz, Tarde 
and Whitehead – is informed by encounters in Latour’s work. These three thinkers run like 
threads through Latour’s writing but their relation to one another, or their significance to 
the ontological foundations of actant rhizome ontology, is never quite brought out into the 
open. This thesis attempts to unpick these threads, examining each in detail, tracing the 
redefinition and redeployment of the monad through the centuries, before re-stitching 
actant rhizome ontology into the larger monadological quilt. The thesis is not intended as 
an intellectual history of Bruno Latour himself – hence no chapter on Michel Serres or 
Charles Péguy – but rather takes Bruno Latour’s actant rhizome ontology –a contemporary 
monadology, as this thesis will argue, set out in its most compelling form in Latour’s early 
work, Irreductions – as a starting point for the exploration of the monad. Again, for this 
reason, there is no account of the parallel system developed by Latour over the past four 
decades – announced with his 2013 publication, An Enquiry Into Modes of Existence – 
where Actor-Network Theory is but one of 15 modes of existence. Similarly, with its focus 
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on the monad, there is no room for Spinoza or Nietzsche; both of whom certainly have a 
place within the intellectual family tree of ANT, but not as monadologists.  
There are two other figures which cast a long shadow over the thesis, without being given 
chapters in their own right. The first is Giles Deleuze who has, to one degree or another, 
engaged extensively with the first three philosophers and is undoubtedly present in the 
work of Latour. However, Deleuze is no monadologist; like Bergson, he is a philosopher of 
the flux and generalised becoming, not the atomic monad – despite his efforts to reconcile 
the two in his 1992 monograph, The Fold. Nonetheless, his insights are indispensable and 
pepper the thesis throughout. The second is Karl Marx. ‘We will not be done with Marx 
until we are done with capitalism.’ (Pomeroy, 2004, p.21) We are far from done with 
capitalism, but capitalism looks increasingly like it is done with us; leaving behind a planet 
in ruin and vast swathes of the global population condemned to at best precarity and at 
worst abject poverty and misery. Latour says as much when he writes: 
[T]he elites have been so thoroughly convinced that there would be no future life 
for everyone that they have decided to get rid of all the burdens of solidarity as fast 
as possible – hence deregulation; they have decided that a sort of gilded fortress 
would have to be built for those (a small percentage) who would be able to make it 
through… (2018, pp.18-19) 
The left has a long track record of making such proclamations – think Rosa Luxemburg’s 
‘socialism or barbarism’, a phrase which she credits to Engels – but there is an urgency 
today in the growing climate crisis and the inability of the post-war political institutions to 
offer any kind of solution in the face of growing nationalism and a capitalist class intent 
only on self-preservation. As such, Marx is more relevant than ever; not the caricatured 
Marx of Althusser which Latour all too often raises as a political bogeyman, but Marx in 
all his complexity as encountered in careful readings of texts like Grundrisse and the three 
volumes of Capital. Such careful readings in the light of the actant rhizome ontology 
assembled in this thesis are for a future project but, for this work, Marx stands as a rebuke 
to Latour’s plea for patient composition and demonstrates the power of critique as both a 
destructive and, crucially, creative act. This is most evident in the final chapter where, with 
the return of the monad to the contemporary world, a greater sense of urgency to the 
writing is unavoidable. 
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There are a number of themes which recur through this thesis beyond the central arguments 
relating to the monad and to the rescue of critique; among them, free will and agency, 
abstraction and the concrete, the materiality and the ideal. These achieve more or less 
prominence at different points through the thesis and, of course, have been addressed by a 
wide range of authors not considered in this work. However, as the focus here is on the 
question of the monadological tradition and the role of critique, these authors are referred 
to only when they come into contact with that tradition. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that – in what could be considered to be historical 
materialism in action – the fact that the systems proposed by each of the authors treated in 
this thesis very much reflect the age in which they were formulated: Leibniz has his mill, 
Tarde the microbe, Whitehead writes in the early days of post-Newtonian physics, while 
Latour’s career traverses the emergence of the digital world. The next chapter of the 
history of the monad will undoubtedly reflect the world in which it finds itself; a world on 
the brink. 
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Chapter 1: Leibniz 
And then there are exasperated philosophers. For them, each concept covers an 
aggregate of singularities, and then they always need to have other, always other 
concepts. One witnesses a mad creation of concepts. The typical example is 
Leibniz. He never finished creating something new. 
(Deleuze, 1980)  
It is well known that Leibniz's work operates on many different levels: put simply, his 
writings vary in complexity depending on his intended audience. With relatively little 
published during his lifetime and a great deal of significant work buried in correspondence, 
tackling the Leibnizian text requires of the reader not simply an attentiveness to the text 
itself, but an awareness of to whom it was directed. His popular writings are not to be 
disregarded; on the contrary, they provide a degree of concision and clarity which makes 
them indispensable introductions to his thought, albeit in a truncated, simplified form 
which often pose more questions than they answer. For example, the Principles of Nature 
and of Grace (henceforth, the Principles) functions as a companion piece to the 
Monadology and as a popular introduction to Leibniz's mature metaphysics. It renders 
Leibniz’s metaphysics in broad brush-strokes, leaving the fine detail to the Monadology. 
This, as Deleuze notes, poses a problem for a student of Leibniz. However, the Principles 
should not be set aside in favour of the Monadology, but read in tandem to understand the 
stress placed by Leibniz on certain concepts and to note the portions of his thought which 
require greater elaboration in the Monadology. The Principles present a simplified account 
of Leibniz’s metaphysics and understanding their short, densely packed paragraphs 
requires the reader to attune to the level of Leibniz's system on which they are situated.  It 
is tempting to see in this method something of Leibniz's metaphysics itself: certain 
perceptions clouded and confused, others clear and distinct; all dependent on the subject’s 
point of view. In any case, the purpose of this chapter is to lay out the basic principles of 
Leibniz's metaphysics, beginning with his axiomatic concepts: the identity of 
indiscernibles, the principles of sufficient reason and the best of all possible worlds, pre-
established harmony, continuity, compossibility, the relation between mind and matter, 
before moving towards a summary of the monad – the thing onto which Latour 
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superimposes his actor-network – and a reconsideration of the reality of Leibnizian bodies. 
With due cognizance taken of the multiple levels on which Leibniz’s system operates, the 
central texts under consideration here are the Monadology and the Discourse on 
Metaphysics (henceforth, the Discourse), along with fragments from the Principles, 
Theodicy, New Essays on Human Understanding, correspondence between Leibniz and De 
Volder, and commentaries by Deleuze (1980) (1993), Garber (2004) (2005) (2009), Savile 
(2000), Saw (1954) and Woolhouse (1998), with a particular focus on Phemister’s 
monograph, Leibniz and the Natural World (2005). The aim is not to set a series of traps 
for Latour but to tease out the key concepts, examine the orthodox and heterodox readings 
of Leibniz, identify the principles with which it is impossible to dispense without also 
dispensing with the 'monad', so as to, when we return to the actor-network in Chapter 4, 
see the distance travelled and the obstacles traversed by the monad/actor-network.
The identity of indiscernibles 
Leibniz’s axiomatic concepts unfold from one another in a torrent of creation. Deleuze 
characterizes this as mad, insane; as a scream of everything must have a reason (1980). 
The concepts pile upon one another, multiplying furiously, interdependently, sustaining and 
justifying one another in a process which ends only with Leibniz’s death. Indeed, Leibniz, 
as Daniel Garber argues (2009, p. 387), dies before he manages to solve the problem of the 
relation between bodies and minds, but we can be almost certain that any such solution 
would require the generation of yet more concepts. Unlike Descartes’ parsimonious, 
austere foundation in the cogito, Leibniz moves backwards from the thinking subject to 
realise a whole suite of concepts upon which the notion of a thinking subject is dependent. 
In the paragraphs below we will attempt to separate out some of the key concepts in 
Leibniz’s metaphysics but, by necessity, these concepts will barge in on each other’s 
territory; they will overlap, pop up where they do not belong and certain among them will 
be reiterated time and again.  
The two key principles are the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient 
reason.  Let us begin then with the concept of identity. In the Discourse on Metaphysics 
Leibniz states, ‘No two substances are entirely alike, and differ only in number.’ (Leibniz, 
1998a, p. 60) This is restated in the Monadology as, ‘Indeed, every monad must be 
different from every other. Because in nature there are never two beings that are perfectly 
alike, and between which it is not possible to discover some difference which is internal, or 
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founded on an intrinsic denomination.' (Leibniz, 1998c, p. 269) The question of identity 
comes down to the, on the surface, banal formulation of: no two beings can have all their 
internal properties in common. Crucially, properties are restricted to those internal or 
intrinsic to the being ruling out relational states such as time and space – it is not possible 
for two beings with exactly the same properties to exist in two different places or at two 
different times. In the formal sense, the principle of identity is: A is A. Identity, then, takes 
the form of a proposition. A, the subject, is A, the predicate. An example: Caesar is Caesar. 
A formulation such as this is somewhat empty, it tells us nothing about the nature of Caesar 
nor does it commit us to Caesar’s existence. But consider the following passage from the 
Discourse: 
[W]hen the predicate is not expressly included in the subject, it must be virtually 
included in it. This is what philosophers call in-esse, and they say that the predicate 
is in the subject. So the subject term must always involve that of the predicate, in 
such a way that anyone who understood the subject notion perfectly would also see 
that the predicate belongs to it. This being so, we can say that the nature of an 
individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is 
sufficient to include, and to allow the deduction of, all the predicates of the subject 
to which that notion is attributed. 
(Leibniz, 1998a, pp. 59-60) 
The concept is no longer banal. We have moved from the reciprocal and tautological 
proposition, A is A, to something more significant and complicated. Take a simple 
example, borrowed from Deleuze (1980), of the triangle. ‘A triangle has three angles’, is a 
reciprocal proposition because it is impossible to conceive of a three angled thing which is 
not a triangle. However, the proposition, a triangle has three sides, is not reciprocal as it is 
possible to imagine a thing with three sides which is not a triangle. Yet, according to 
Leibniz, the predicate of having three sides is included in the notion of the triangle as a 
matter of logical necessity, because it is impossible to imagine a triangle which does not 
have three sides. The predicate and the subject are not identical but the predicate is 
included in the notion of the subject. When we consider a more complicated subject, like 
Caesar, we can see the implications of the idea that the predicate is included in the notion 
of the subject. In other words, for every predicate that can be attached to the subject, 
Caesar, that predicate or attribute is contained in the notion of the subject, Caesar, itself. 
So, crossing the Rubicon, overthrowing the Roman Republic, his assassination on the Ides 
of March; all of these predicates are included in the notion of Caesar. In fact, all the 
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propositions that, to quote Deleuze, ‘state relations, that state existences, that state 
localizations, and that, at the outside, exist, are in relation with, can be translated as the 
equivalent of the attribute of the subject.’ (1980) The consequence of this concept of 
identity is that the whole universe, past, present, and future, is logically contained in the 
subject, Caesar.8 In Leibniz’s own words, each substance ‘expresses, albeit confusedly, 
everything which happens in the universe, past, present, and future, and this has some 
resemblance to an infinite perception or understanding.’ (1998a, p. 61) We will return to 
the notion of confused expression and the resemblance to infinite perception later, but for 
now this brings us to Leibniz’s second axiomatic concept, sufficient reason.
Sufficient reason 
Let us begin by saying that sufficient reason is not the same as cause. Causal relations exist 
in the form of x is causally sufficient for bringing about y, and y for z, and so on. While x 
is the antecedent and y the consequent, both x and y can co-exist although we would say 
that x has a prior existence to y. However, to avoid infinite regression something is 
required to stand outside of the causal chain. In the Monadology, sufficient reason is 
formulated as ‘no fact could ever be true or existent, no statement correct, unless there 
were a sufficient reason why it was thus and not otherwise – even though those reasons 
will usually not be knowable by us'. (1998c, p. 272) Leibniz goes on to differentiate 
between two forms of truth: truths of reason where a thing is necessarily true and its 
opposite impossible – a triangle has three angles – or truths of fact, where truth is 
contingent and its opposite is possible – Caesar crossing the Rubicon. But, if crossing the 
Rubicon is included in the very notion of Caesar, it surely cannot be possible that Caesar 
does not cross the Rubicon. The answer for Leibniz is clear – Caesar’s actions were 
necessitated but not certain – but we will return to this shortly when we discuss free will. 
In the meantime, let us expand the concept of sufficient reason. Leibniz uses the example 
of a prince’s military victory in the Discourse to explain the necessity of something outside 
the chain of causal relations. If we were to explain such a military victory by reference 
only to the reaction of gunpowder to a spark, the particles of copper in the cannon and their 
movement, we would be attempting to explain the phenomena in terms of only the 
                                         
8  This lead Latour to speculate in Aramis that predicates could be programmed into software. Of course, 
this would necessitate infinite perception, an ability confined by Leibniz to God.  ‘For my part, I’d prefer 
a system more in conformity with that of Mr. Leibniz, one in which God’s creatures would contain the 
complete recapitulation of all possible actions. It would suffice to enter all predicates in the software.’ 
(1996, p. 63) 
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properties of matter involved. Instead, we must assert the role of the prince, in choosing his 
weapons, generals and strategy. Effects must correspond to causes, but there is an 
organizing intelligence which exists outside of cause and effect: in this case, the prince; in 
the case of the universe, God (Leibniz, 1998a, p. 73).9 From the Principles: 
[T]he sufficient reason, which has no need of any further reason, must lie outside 
that series of contingent things, and must be found in a substance which is the cause 
of the series: it must be a necessary being, which carries the reason for its existence 
within itself, otherwise we still would not have a sufficient reason at which we can 
stop. And that final reason for things is what we call God. 
(Leibniz, 1998b, p. 262)  
Now that God has been introduced, we are in danger of releasing a torrent of concepts. 
But, we can admit one more in order to fully explain sufficient reason, and that is the 
principle of contradiction. This seemingly benign principle states simply that A cannot be 
not A, which is to say that the proposition A & not A is a logical impossibility. Together, 
the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason serve to underpin all 
human reasoning10; with the principle of contradiction being a means of accessing 
mathematical or metaphysical truths, and sufficient reason being a means of accessing 
truths of fact (Carr, 1930, p. 18). So, to repeat what we have already established, ‘A is A’ is 
an eternal truth and cannot be ‘A is not A’, and there must be a sufficient reason besides a 
causal chain for Caesar to cross the Rubicon.  
There is an internal or inherent aspect of the principle of sufficient reason which Deleuze 
takes great care in drawing out. We can say that everything that is attributed to a subject is 
contained within the notion of the subject. The reason is the notion itself; all of a subject’s 
predicates and attributes inhere in the notion (Deleuze, 1980).11 In contrast, cause operates 
                                         
9  It would be remiss at this point – despite earlier promises not to indulge in setting traps for Latour – to 
pass over without comment what looks uncannily like an almost direct refutation of Actor-Network 
Theory’s principle method; a commitment to consider precisely these actants which Leibniz has cast 
aside. But it is important to recognize that, for Leibniz, metaphysics does not replace physics, but 
provides a foundation for physics. It is possible for Leibniz to maintain a version of the Hobbesian 
mechanistic account he held to in his youth, provided that it is founded upon a suitable metaphysics 
which Hobbes’ account lacks. This presents a considerable challenge to Latour and will necessitate a 
significant redefinition of the monad. 
10  Sufficient reason is not the same for the infinite monad (God) as it is for the rational soul monad 
(humans). 
11  In The Fold, Deleuze makes the distinction between attribute and predicate. He writes, ‘Perceptions as 
included predicates, that is, as inner properties, were replacing attributes. Predication was of the domain 
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between the subjects and so is not inherent in the expression of the notion of the subject: A 
acts on B which, in turn, acts on C, and so on. Sufficient reason is an internal relation, 
which allows for the co-existence of all subjects, even those not yet actualized; causation is 
an external relation. And when we say that crossing the Rubicon is contained in the notion 
of Caesar, we open the notion of Caesar to the whole universe: from that single event pours 
an infinite succession of past events that bring us to the crossing of the Rubicon; and an 
infinite succession of future events that are contingent on the crossing of the Rubicon. 
Balanced on any given point in time is the sum of past and future events; it is, as Leibniz 
writes in the Monadology, the interconnection of all matter in the plenum. Every subject 
contains within it the notion of the whole universe from its own point of view, which leads 
us to the topic of the next section, perspectivism, for at this point the flood gates can no 
longer remain closed. So, with these two great principles, we must let ourselves be carried 
along by the torrent of Leibniz’s concepts.
Perspectivism 
By now it should be clear that Leibniz’s concepts are deeply interwoven; they hang 
together interdependently like a web rather than moving along the points of a line. 
Leibniz’s system is architectonic, a notion Deleuze plays with to great effect by 
characterizing Leibniz’s philosophy as a Baroque house (1993). But having left off from 
sufficient reason with the idea that every subject contains within it the notion of the whole 
universe, it is necessary to explain how then each subject retains its distinct identity. 
The crossing of the Rubicon is particular to Caesar, or, at least, the notion of Caesar. But it 
also is contained within the notion of you and me. If, contained within the notion of me is 
the totality of the universe, then that includes Caesar crossing the Rubicon. All of us 
contain the same predicates – past, present and future – in the notion of ourselves. How, 
then, are we different? The answer is offered by Deleuze: 
What makes me = me is a point of view on the world. Leibniz cannot stop. He has 
to go all the way to a theory of point of view such that the subject is constituted by 
                                         
of having, and was resolving the aporias of being or attribution.’ (Deleuze, 1993, p. 125) This forms part 
of his argument for the necessity of the body on which the monad is dependent for its existence. 
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the point of view and not the point of view constituted by the subject. 
(1980) 
Leibniz outlines this notion of point in view in more detail in the Principles, stating that a 
monad is distinguished from all others by: 
…its perceptions (that is, the representations of the composite, or of what is 
external, in the simple), or its appetitions (its tending to move from one perception 
to another, that is), which are the principles of change. For the simplicity of a 
substance does not in any way rule out a multiplicity in the modifications which 
must exist together in one simple substance; and those modifications must consist 
in the variety of its relationships to things outside it – like the way in which in a 
centre, or a point, although it is completely simple, there are an infinity of angles 
formed by the lines which meet in it. 
(1998b, p. 259) 
This is rendered in the Discourse as: 
[T]hey all express the same phenomena, their expressions do not therefore have to 
be perfectly alike; it is enough that they are correlated – just as a number of 
spectators believe they are seeing the same thing, and do in fact understand each 
other; even though each one sees and speaks according to his point of view. 
(1998a, p. 67)  
We are getting closer to the monad here but still have some way to go. It is not difficult to 
see why Deleuze describes Leibniz’s system as like a fever dream; the concepts are 
awkward to pin down as they pile on top of one another, overlapping, flowing into one 
another. To return to the point of view, we must now define what this totality of the 
universe consists in. As Ishiguro writes: 
Even a simple substance perceives the whole world from its point of view, and 
expresses the world. It also subsists through time. This means that an enormous 
number, if not an infinite number of predicates is true of it. The notion of any 
individual substance is far from simple. What then could the simplicity of a 
substance consist in? 
(1998, p. 535) 
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A number of spectators may see the same thing from a different point of view – this is not 
difficult to understand – but they will not necessarily see Caesar crossing the Rubicon, 
even though this too is contained in the notion of themselves. Again, an apparently banal 
concept is not all that it seems. Firstly, the subject does not precede the object – the point 
of view – but the reverse: the point of view constitutes the subject. And what is viewed is 
not what is in front of the subject at any given time, but the totality of the universe. 
Simplicity, in answer to Ishiguro’s question, consists in totality; in the unity of the simple 
substance’s point of view. The totality of the universe is viewed in a confused and 
obscured manner as petites perceptions. In other words, the universe is contained within 
the notion of the subject but only a portion of it is clear and distinct to the subject. Leibniz 
returns time and again to the example of waves (1998a, pp. 85-86) (1998b, p. 264). By the 
sea, one can hear the sound of a wave but one does not hear the sound of every droplet of 
water. Each droplet exists and is perceived but only as a minute perception; the minute 
perceptions come together to form a single perception which is clear and distinct to us; that 
is, the sound of the wave. This clear and distinct perception is named an ‘apperception’ by 
Leibniz. 
Compossibility 
The totality of the universe exists in the notion of the subject. The totality of the universe is 
expressed from the point of view of the subject. A portion of this is expressed clearly and 
distinctly, the rest is confused and obscure. But the point of view constitutes the subject, 
not the other way around. So, the point of view rather than the subject expresses the totality 
of the universe which is contained within the notion of the subject. There is, therefore, no 
reason for external reality; Leibniz as an idealist is all but confirmed. But Leibniz has no 
room in his system for a universal mind as Spinoza’s monism maintains. Subjects, as we 
have seen, are individual, expressing the same world albeit from different perspectives. 
And Leibniz is no occasionalist (Garber, 2004, pp. 7-8) (Woolhouse, 1998, p. 34); God 
does not intervene at each moment to bring about the harmony of the world expressed by a 
particular subject with the world expressed by all other subjects. This is not a problem for 
truths of essence, truths which are true at all times: 2 + 2 = 4, for example. But it is a 
problem for contingent truths: for example, Caesar crossing the Rubicon. Truths arrived at 
by sufficient reason are fundamentally different from truths arrived at by the principle of 
contradiction. For a truth of fact to be so it is not enough that it is possible – or, inversely, 
impossible – but it must be compossible with the world in which it is held to be true. In 
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other words, Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon, but not in this world. In this 
world, crossing the Rubicon is contained in the notion of Caesar; to not cross the Rubicon 
is not impossible in itself but it is incompossible with this world. It is worthwhile 
emphasising that the notion of compossibility is not reducible to contradiction. The two are 
quite distinct. Contradiction applies to only truths of essence and the crossing of the 
Rubicon is most certainly not a truth of essence, it is not contradictory in itself. 
There are, then, an infinite number of worlds in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, in 
which the Roman Republic was not overthrown and so on.12 But there is only one world 
that has been actualised. So, the question remains: why does the world where Caesar 
crosses the Rubicon exist and not another? Leibniz writes, in the Monadology: 
Now, since there are an infinite number of possible universes in the ideas of God, 
but only one can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice God makes, 
which determines him to choose one of them rather than another. And that reason 
can only be found in the suitability, or the degrees of perfection, that these worlds 
contain; each possible world being entitled to claim existence in proportion to the 
perfection it embodies. 
(1998c, p. 275)  
Perfection, in the Leibnizian sense, has a number of implications. In the Discourse, Leibniz 
states that perfection is, ‘that which is simultaneously simplest in theories and the richest in 
phenomena.’ (1998a, p. 58) In the Monadology he writes that, ‘one created thing is more 
perfect than another to the extent that we find within it what serves to explain a priori what 
happens in the other' (1998c, p. 274), while Garber states that the mind, according to 
Leibniz, ‘passes to a greater degree of perfection insofar as it has clearer perceptions.’ 
(2004, p. 8) Perception, in this case, accords with the first two definitions as, ultimately, 
the selection of the world to be actualized is made by God. And this brings us to the 
principle of the best of all possible worlds.
                                         
12  This idea of possible worlds bears resemblance to idea of modal realities in contemporary metaphysics. 
As Simon Duffy writes in Deleuze and the History of Mathematics, ‘Post Poincaré, the infinite series of 
states of the world is no longer contained in each monad. There is no pre-established harmony. The 
continuity of the states of the actual world and the discrimination between what is compossible and what 
is incompossible with this world is no longer pre-determined. The logical possibilities of all 
incompossible worlds are now real possibilities, all of which have the potential to be actualized by 
monads as states of the current world.’ (2012, p.59) 
36 
 
The principle of the best 
How does God choose which of the infinite number of possible worlds to bring into 
existence? By choosing the best of all possible worlds. This concept was too much for 
Voltaire. Already sceptical of the monad – ‘Can you really believe that a drop of urine is an 
infinity of monads, and that each of these has ideas, however obscure, of the universe as a 
whole?’ (Voltaire, 2009, p. 434) – the principle of the best has long been a source of mirth 
and derision. But there is more to the notion than boundless optimism and the goodness of 
God. Consider the three readings of perfection above, none of which have any inherent 
moral content. Leibniz’s God, in his metaphysics at least, is present through necessity, 
ensuring compossibility, continuity, and pre-established harmony. But this does not fully 
answer the question of what constitutes the best of all possible worlds. To do so we must 
examine Leibniz’s God in more detail. 
Woolhouse writes, 
[E]ven in the conceptual complexities of Leibniz’s metaphysical analyses, God 
does not figure as a merely added-on extra. He fills certain crucial roles and is there 
for good reasons. Doing away with God would require showing that, to the 
contrary, the roles he plays are actually dispensable, or else would require some 
other ways of filling them.13 
(1998, p. 41) 
God, unlike you and me, has a clear and distinct perception of the universe in its totality. In 
this sense, God is omniscient, having a complete perception of all petites perceptions. 
Leibniz writes,  
[I]f we consider carefully the interconnectedness of things, we can say that in the 
soul of Alexander there are for all time remnants of everything that has happened to 
him, and marks of everything that will happen to him – and even traces of 
everything that happens in the universe, although it is only God who can recognize 
                                         
13  Contrast this with Latour’s suggestion: ‘Once God is taken out of Leibniz’s monads, there are not many 
other ways for them but to become, on the one hand, spheres and, on the other, networks.’ (2009b, p.139) 
We will see, soon enough, the difficulties of Latour’s proposition. 
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them all. 
(1998a, p. 60) 
So, while we all have infinite perception – in the sense that the notion of ourselves contains 
the totality of the universe, most of which is clouded and confused to us – only God has 
infinite apperception. In this, we resemble God (1998a, pp. 60-61). However, while truths 
of essence are accessible to us through reason, there are limits on our access to truths of 
fact as we are unable to apperceive the universe in its totality.  
God is not omnipotent: not even God can act counter to the truths of essence which are true 
of necessity and governed by the principle of contradiction, ‘without any regard to the free 
will of God or of created things.’ (1998a, p. 65) So God, for our purposes, belongs to the 
realm of truths of fact and sufficient reason. In fact, God is the sufficient reason 
(Woolhouse, 1998, p. 42) and the final cause14 by virtue of containing within itself the 
sufficient reason for its existence (Leibniz, 1998b, p. 262). In this sense, God’s existence is 
an absolute necessity but God’s decision to create the universe is a hypothetical necessity. 
However, once created it becomes an absolute necessity that this universe be the best of all 
possible worlds; leading Savile to describe Leibniz’s system as, ‘an intricate set of 
interrelated hypothetical necessities… absolute and hypothetical necessities elegantly 
nested within each other.’ (2000, p. 87)  
The best of all possible worlds, returning to Leibniz’s notion of perception, can be said to 
be simply that which has the simplest laws and the greatest quantity and variation of 
phenomena. The principle of the best of all possible worlds is contained within the 
principle of sufficient reason: God’s reason – the sufficient reason – for choosing this 
world is that it is the best. Thus, the actual world, the world we inhabit, is the best of all 
possible worlds because it is the world which God chose to actualise. Russell interpreted 
this as being a rather empty proposition: this world is the best because it exists. But 
Leibniz’s concept of perception shows that there is more at work here. It is impossible to 
separate the principle of the best from considerations of identity, sufficient reason, 
compossibility – in fact, it is impossible to separate it from all of the concepts discussed so 
far. If every predicate is contained within the notion of the subject, then the fact that these 
                                         
14 The final cause is one of four types of causality identified by Aristotle in Volume 5 of his Metaphysics. 
They are: the material cause, e.g. that bronze is the cause of a statue, to use Aristotle's example; the 
formal cause, the form something will take e.g. the shape of the statue; the efficient cause, that from 
which the change begins e.g. the sculptor of the statue; and the final cause, 'that for the sake of which a 
thing is', e.g. creating the statue in the name of beauty. 
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predicates exist and not others, is down to their being compatible with the best of all 
possible worlds. They are the best possible because they are, at the very least, compatible 
with the concept of sufficient reason, and to be compatible with the principle of sufficient 
reason is to be moved – in the sense of the final cause – by God, making it the best 
possible by definition. They conform to the laws Leibniz identifies and from these laws 
flow the infinite richness of phenomena. The sense in which Leibniz’s system is self-
sustaining is now clear. God does not stand above or apart from this system but is a 
necessary part of it – the only being who can apperceive all of the predicates contained 
within every subject and the only being who can set the system in motion by virtue of 
being the final, sufficient reason. 
The notion of the best as being the maximum compossible richness of phenomena gives 
rise to a whole series of conclusions developed by Leibniz concerning the theological 
nature of God15 – God’s moral goodness and wisdom – but, as this is an account of 
Leibniz’s metaphysics, we will leave this to one side in order to consider the implications 
of the best of all possible worlds, and the preceding concepts, to the notion of free will. 
Free Will 
[A]ll these contingent propositions have reasons why they are so rather than 
otherwise – or alternatively (and this is the same thing), that they have a priori 
proofs of their truth which make them certain, and which show that the connection 
of the subject with the predicate in these propositions has its foundation in the 
nature of each. But they do not have necessary demonstrations, because those 
reason are only based on the principle of contingency or of the existence of things, 
that is, on what is or what appears the best among a number of equally possible 
things. 
(Leibniz, 1998a, p. 65)  
Leibniz draws a distinction between what is certain and what is necessary. As we have 
seen, truths of essence are necessary but truths of fact are not. We have also indicated that 
the concept of compossibility is irreducible to contradiction. So, it is not correct to say that 
                                         
15  Woolhouse suggests that God may be dispensed with if we consider that the best of possible worlds 
brings itself into existence ‘through an urgency or pre-tension to exist.’ (1998, p.43) In other words, that 
the predicates which conform to the principle of perfection are internally predisposed to manifest 
themselves. 
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crossing the Rubicon is necessary. Nor is it correct to say that crossing the Rubicon is 
necessary due to its negation – not crossing the Rubicon – being incompossible. But, for 
the same reason of compossibility, it is correct to say that Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon is 
certain. Again, we can follow Russell and interpret this as stating that Caesar’s crossing the 
Rubicon is certain because Caesar did cross the Rubicon. But Leibniz argues that Caesar’s 
crossing the Rubicon is certain at all times, both before and after the event. We can turn to 
Leibniz’s Theodicy for another concept, inclination: ‘I am of opinion that the will is always 
more inclined towards the course it adopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to 
adopt it. That it will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary.’ (1985, p. 147) 
However, this inclination is formal in nature; if the course to which the will is inclined is 
certain then free will seems to be a mere technicality. However, this distinction between the 
possible and the compossible means that free will, even as a technicality, does have a place 
within Leibniz’s system; although it does not feel very much like free will. 
Phemister approaches the question from a different angle which brings to the fore our next 
concept, the principle of pre-established harmony. She argues – an argument we will return 
to towards the end of this chapter – that free will exists in rational beings when the will 
corresponds most closely to the corresponding action of the body (Phemister, 2005, p. 
254). This requires clear and distinct perception on the part of the mind but includes those 
perceptions which are obscure. To explain, the mind16 expresses everything which occurs 
in the body, although the majority of these perceptions will be confused. When a mind 
expresses these bodily movements clearly and distinctly we have something approaching 
freedom, even though the majority of those minute movements will be obscure. For 
example, when opening a book, the will to do so corresponds with the bodily movements 
necessary to realise the will; even though the tiny muscle movements required to grasp the 
pages are performed without our conscious awareness. This certainly feels more like free 
will inasmuch as the will to open the book clearly corresponds with the opening of the 
book. But the opening of the book is still certain; it still unfolds from the predicates already 
present in the notion of the subject.17 
                                         
16 'Mind' hereafter should be read as the ego-monad, director-monad, or rational soul monad – in other 
words, the apperceiving monad. 
17 Alternatively, there is Max Beerbohm’s model from Zuleika Dobson: 'You must not imagine that they [the 
Gods] think out and appoint everything that is to befall us, down to the smallest detail. Generally, they 
just draw a sort of broad outline, and leave us to fill it in according to our taste.' 
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There is at least one more possible understanding of free will in Leibniz’s system, although 
it may be no more satisfying than the previous two suggestions. Free will can be 
understood, like space and time in the Leibnizian system, as being relational. In other 
words, as all of my future actions are currently obscure even though they are contained in 
my notion, it will appear to me that each action I perform is the result of my own free will. 
In the same way that, for Leibniz, space and time do not exist in the Newtonian sense as, 
respectively, a kind of absolute container in which things are placed and a linear succession 
of events; free will exists as a relation to the predicates of which we are conscious. If we 
were conscious of all the predicates contained in the notion of ourselves we would realise 
that our future actions are pre-determined but as we are only conscious of a portion of 
these predicates we labour under the illusion of free will. That illusion, however, is no 
empty space: it is the arena of all our moral deliberations and convictions. There is 
something terrible in this construct. It allows us to experience a whole host of moral 
feelings but without the agency to freely determine our own actions. Our actions can 
engender guilt, pride, shame, satisfaction but they unfold unstoppably in directions already 
made certain. In other words, moral agency becomes a retrospective appraisal of actions 
we were always going to perform.
Pre-established harmony 
Before moving on to explicitly discuss the relation between mind and matter – touched on 
above in relation to Phemister’s take on Leibnizian freedom – there are two more concepts 
which require explanation. The first is pre-established harmony. In the Discourse Leibniz 
writes, ‘So God alone produces the connection or communication between substances: it is 
through him that there is reality in our perceptions.’ (1998a, p. 84) The notion of pre-
established harmony is most commonly used to explain the correspondence of the mind 
and body; as per the example above, how the will to open a book corresponds with the 
physical process necessary to realise this will. But pre-established harmony governs all 
causal relations.18 It is the mechanism through which the totality of the universe which is 
contained within the notion of one subject corresponds with the totality of the universe 
expressed by another. It ensures that, while each subject has its own perspective which 
constitutes it as a subject, the phenomena perceived are the same for every subject though 
the phenomenal content is distinct. In other words, there is one world which is perceived, 
                                         
18 Pre-established harmony is subject to further discussion at the end of this chapter and, as we will see, 
governs more than just causal relations. 
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albeit from an infinite number of perspectives. And, crucially, this one world is multiplied 
as many times as there are subjects as it is contained within the notion of each subject. 
From the Discourse again, ‘the universe is multiplied as many times as there are 
substances, and in the same way the glory of God is redoubled by so many quite different 
representations of his work.’ (1998a, p. 61) Pre-established harmony ensures that each of 
these universes correspond with one another. If we run ahead again to mind-matter 
relations, Leibniz describes this construction of a common reality in a letter to de Volder in 
1704: 
[M]oreover, matter and motion are not so much substances or things as phenomena 
of perceivers, whose reality is situated in the harmony of perceivers with 
themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers. 
(Lodge, 2009, p. 465) 
There is no direct interaction between subjects. Each subject relates solely to a universe 
which exists in the notion of itself. The subject, as we will see when we arrive at the 
monad, is windowless; nothing can enter into the notion of a subject for all its predicates 
are already present. When God, as the sufficient reason, sets the chain of intra-substantial 
causal relations in motion, God ensures that all of the predicates contained within the 
notion of each subject correspond and are compossible with all of the predicates contained 
within the notion of every other subject.19 In other words, from the very beginning, each 
subject comes pre-programmed to express only what corresponds and is compossible with 
what is expressed by every other subject. In this way we can have both a common reality 
and an infinite number of enclosed, self-sustaining, autonomous subjects.
Continuity 
The principle of continuity now comes to the fore. In fact, we can revisit the principle of 
the best of all possible worlds and add to our notions of perfection that of continuity. The 
best of all possible worlds is a world where there is no discontinuity, where contingent 
                                         
19  Woolhouse (1998, p. 49) again suggests that God can be replaced arguing that it is possible to conceive 
of harmony as a matter of representation and expression. How this would work is not elucidated but it 
would seem to necessitate either some form of interaction between subjects or a kind of inherent tendency 
within subjects to represent and express a universe in accordance with the representations and expressions 
of other subjects. 
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propositions follow on one from another and where the subject and predicate are 
reciprocally connected. Returning, again, to Leibniz’s statement in the Discourse:  
[A]ll these contingent propositions have reasons why they are so rather than 
otherwise – or alternatively (and this is the same thing), that they have a priori 
proofs of their truth which make them certain, and which show that the connection 
of the subject with the predicate in these propositions has its foundation in the 
nature of each. 
(1998a, p. 65)  
These a priori proofs are not, as we have already established, necessary but they are 
certain inasmuch as each successive proposition can be deduced from all of the previous 
propositions if one is able to, like God, apperceive the totality of the universe. This results 
in Leibniz’s famous maxim, from the New Essays on Human Understanding, ‘nature never 
makes leaps.’ (2005, p. 7) There can be no break in the causal chain; to paraphrase from 
the Discourse, everything must happen in accordance with its antecedents (1998a, p. 65). 
Where a break does occur, you have a different substance; to quote Savile, ‘Spatio-
temporal continuity is thus a condition of substance identity.’ (2000, p. 95) Nature does not 
leap because it does not have to: everything is present in the monad, ready to unfold. 
Continuity requires a series of minute differences which connect one proposition to the 
next. We can say that there is a causal link between Caesar crossing the Rubicon and the 
creation of the Roman Empire. But to link the two requires a chain of inter-linking minute 
differences lest there be a leap. And to ensure that even these minute differences do not in 
themselves constitute a leap they must be rendered as ‘infinitely small relations.’ (Deleuze, 
1980) We can see traces of Leibniz the mathematician here in the resemblance between the 
notion of infinitely small relations and the notion of the infinitesimal in his differential 
calculus. In Leibniz’s calculus, ‘the infinitesimal has not extension, but it cannot be 
reduced to nothing, since there is a continuum between any given magnitude and zero.’ 
(Schwebel, 2012, p. 597) These infinitely small relations are the same in that they cannot 
be reduced to nothing but they do not have extension. Thus, we can have continuity rather 
than a series of minute leaps. This is of great significance in terms of contingent truths, 
truths of existence. Whereas truths of essence inhere in the notion of the subject – in other 
words, they are logically necessary – truths of existence are connected to a subject in a 
continuous, unbroken succession. That allows us to say that a truth of existence is certain, 
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even though it is not necessary. Deleuze terms these infinitely small relations ‘evanescent 
differences’ (1980); differences that tend to disappear, thus ensuring continuity
Mind and matter 
So far, we have worked around the issue of the relation between mind and matter without 
directly engaging it. Yet, to move toward a successful explication of the monad the 
question of mind and matter and their relation must be addressed.  
There are two main schools of thought on this question. The first, orthodox reading of 
Leibniz – long established and represented by most of the commentaries cited here – is 
idealist: material reality is a phenomenon which appears to have extension but in fact is, as 
all of reality is, made up entirely of simple mental substances. The second, heterodox 
argument – represented here by Phemister (1999) (2005), Arthur, and Lopston – maintains 
that Leibniz is committed to a ‘material universe of bodies’. (Lopston & Arthur, 2006)  
Leibniz’s view of the relation between mind and matter changes considerably over the 
course of his life. The young Leibniz engaged extensively with Hobbes and, whilst 
rejecting both his materialism and atheism, he did absorb aspects of Hobbes’ thought into 
his own work; perhaps most notably the role of memory in distinguishing between the 
perception of inanimate bodies and animals (Ross, 2007, pp. 30-31). According to the 
orthodox reading, Leibniz’s metaphysics move steadily away from Hobbes towards an 
idealist position; the immaterial monads are established as the fundamental building blocks 
of reality in his later years following on from a middle period where he is committed to the 
primacy of corporeal substance. But, as Garber notes, bodies never disappear from 
Leibniz’s writing, even after 1700 and his turn to the monad (2009, p. 387). According to 
Garber – and here he departs from the two main schools of thought, although he does 
incline towards the idealist position – it is impossible to assign to Leibniz either the title of 
idealist or realist as Leibniz’s metaphysics are in a state of flux right up to his death in 
1716. 
There is reasonably strong evidence for both main positions, a fact which perhaps lends 
credence to Garber’s middle-road. On the one hand, the idealist can point to Leibniz’s 
1704 letter to De Volder where he writes, 
44 
 
Indeed, considering the matter carefully, it should be said that there is nothing in 
things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. Moreover, 
matter and motion are not so much substances or things as the phenomena of 
perceivers, the reality of which is located in the harmony of perceivers with 
themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers. 
(Lodge, 2009, p. 465)  
While, on the other, Arthur and Lopston point to the Monadology, highlighting Leibniz’s 
apparent commitment to matter, motion, bodies, and causation between bodies in the 
following passage: 
Everything is full, which means that all matter is interconnected. In such a plenum, 
every motion has some effect on distant bodies, in proportion to their distance. For 
each body is affected by the bodies that are in contact with it, and in some way feels 
the effects of everything that happens to them, but in addition, through those bodies 
with which it is in direct contact it also feels the effects of all the bodies with which 
they are in contact, so that this communication extends indefinitely. As a result, 
every body is affected by everything that happens in the universe… 
(Lopston & Arthur, 2006, p. 4) 
And, of course, Garber can cite both passages to confirm his own view that this is simply, 
‘Leibniz in his metaphysical workshop, trying out different ways of connecting the two 
pieces of his world, both of which must find their places in his final story.’ (2009, p. 387) 
For the purposes of this text, we will follow Phemister’s lead (2005, pp. 2-3) – as, indeed, 
we have done implicitly throughout this chapter – and avoid attempting to provide a 
developmental account of Leibniz’s work. The purpose here is not to attempt to chart the 
development of Leibniz’s thought – as has been done admirably by Garber and others – but 
to present an overview of his metaphysics which can be scrutinised in the context of 
Latour’s ancestral claim. 
In considering mind and matter in Leibniz’s work, let us begin at the end with the fifth and 
final point of Leibniz’s five-fold ontological schema: corporeal substance. For Descartes, 
corporeal substance is simply a question of extension. Anything which has breadth, length, 
and depth qualifies as a body. Unlike the mind, which is defined by individual 
consciousness, corporeal substance has no identity; it is just sections or slices of extended 
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matter.  Leibniz disagrees. For extension to exist, there must first exist something which 
can be extended. Therefore, according to Leibniz, the property of extension is neither 
simple nor self-evident, as it would seem it is to Descartes. Instead, it is relative to that 
which is extended, namely, the body itself. To put it another way, Leibniz’s body is an 
intricate aggregate of distinct parts rather than a continuous stretch of homogeneous matter, 
sliced or sectioned (Phemister, 2005, p. 57).   
For the definitive statement of Leibniz’s corporeal substance we must turn to his 20 June 
1703 letter to De Volder where he writes: 
I therefore distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy, i.e., the soul; (2) matter, namely, 
primary matter, i.e., primitive passive power; (3) the monad completed by these two 
things; (4) the mass, i.e., the secondary matter, i.e., the organic machine, for which 
innumerable subordinate monads come together; and (5) the animal, i.e., the 
corporeal substance, which the monad dominating in the machine makes one. 
(Lodge, 2009, p. 438)  
Here, in contrast to Descartes, Leibniz imbues the corporeal substance with the notions of 
unity and identity. Indeed, unity and identity are one and the same thing: being qua being, 
in Leibnizian ontology, is equated with discernibility and oneness. The corporeal substance 
– point (5) in the above ontological schema – draws the aggregate into a unified whole; and 
the identity of this composite arises from the individualizing element or the dominating 
monad which, in the case of the human being, is the mind (Savile, 2000, p. 71). 
And what of matter? Matter – point (2) – does not exist purely as extension. It has, in 
addition to extension, impenetrability and inertia. Together, impenetrability and inertia 
constitute primitive passive power. This passive power is required to prevent the possibility 
of one body setting another body in motion through collision without any corresponding 
decrease in its own motion. According to Leibniz, the total force of motion in existence is 
constant; if one thing speeds up another must slow down. For example, if a tennis ball in 
motion collides with a stationary tennis ball, the latter is set in motion while the former is 
slowed down. This stands in opposition to the Cartesian view of matter as extension where 
one body is able to set another in motion without any corresponding decrease in motion, 
entailing a disparity of cause and effect and an increase in the total amount of motion in 
existence. However, matter as passive force cannot exist alone and must be accompanied 
by an active force, also known as the entelechy or substantial form. If passive force 
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accounts for the resistance of bodies on collision then active force accounts for their being 
in motion in the first place. This active force is required because it is only through the 
distance that a body has travelled – that it has occupied a series of different places at 
different times – that we are able to tell it is in motion. From one instant to the next there is 
no difference between a body in motion and a body at rest. The active force provides an 
essential force of movement which allows us to make the distinction between motion and 
rest (Woolhouse, 1998, p. 22).  
The immediate question is, how do these five points fit together? According to Garber, we 
must read the above letter to De Volder as a fundamental break from Leibniz's previous 
view that corporeal substances – the soul and the body together – are the basic units of 
reality. Instead, the corporeal substance is distinct from the simple substance, the monad. 
These simple substances are non-extended and are the basic unities in which reality is 
grounded. Matter or primitive passive force is now merely phenomenal. The simple 
substance, the monad, is still imbued with passive and active force but it is a mind-like 
substance which has no material reality. This leaves corporeal substances as composites of 
monads centred on a simple, mind-like unity (Garber, 2004, p. 2).  
Phemister provides an alternative reading. Corporeal substances are immaterial but they 
possess material bodies whose materiality is not merely phenomenal. Phemister cites a 
passage from Leibniz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte, On What is Independent of Sense 
and of Matter, where he argues that the soul does not exist apart from the body but as 
something more than the body. In other words, the immaterial substance is not the soul in 
isolation but the soul attached to the body. Therefore, an immaterial substance is one which 
is not wholly material rather than one which is wholly immaterial. The corporeal 
substance, being the unity of the substantial form and matter – matter conceived as 
extension and impenetrability – is an immaterial substance because it cannot be explained 
solely by a mechanical account of the world. The consequence of Phemister’s reasoning is 
that we can no longer hold to the interpretation of immaterial substances – i.e. monads – as 
bodiless: we can conceive of them as embodied unities.  
The road is open to interpret the true immaterial substances in Leibniz's philosophy 
as the created monads that exist as animated corporeal creatures. Indeed, corporeal 
substances, as  animals, fish, trees, plants and anything that possesses its own life 
force, being indivisible (albeit the possessors of divisible bodies) unities per se, are 
in many ways, as he admitted to Bernoulli, the best and most accessible examples 
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of monads. The most obvious kinds of indivisible unities are living creatures, such 
as fish and sheep and worms, or generally, corporeal substances. 
(Phemister, 2005, p. 76)  
While Garber's account sees the five-fold ontology with the monad – point (3) – as the 
substance upon which reality is grounded; Phemister sees the five-fold ontology as literally 
folding into the corporeal substance.20 We will return to have a closer look at Phemister's 
work shortly but now we must finally confront the monad. 
Monads 
The term ‘monad’ does not originate with Leibniz but towards the end of his life it became 
the name by which his entire philosophical system – the monadological system – became 
known. From the Greek monas, meaning unit or unity, and first employed by the 
Pythagoreans as the principle from which numbers are generated, it was first adopted by 
Leibniz in 1690 to denote his conception of simple substance (Rescher, 1991, p. 46). The 
definitive elucidation of Leibniz's monad is to be found in the Monadology. The text begins 
with the following statement: 
1. The monad, of which we will be speaking here, is nothing but a simple 
substance, which enters into composites; simple, meaning without parts. 
(Leibniz, 1998c, p. 268) 
From this principle unfolds – in a dazzling exercise of logical reasoning – a whole series of 
notions, one from the other, building on this first definition of the simple substance. For 
thirty short paragraphs the monad is constructed and refined before the Monadology bursts 
out from these simple substances to account for God, the principles of truth, the relation 
                                         
20 As an interesting aside, Schwebel provides an account of Hermann Cohen's understanding of Leibnizian 
substance in her paper on Walter Benjamin's reception of Leibniz. Cohen argues that substance is the 
actualisation of the infinite in the monad; that substance is grounded in the 'constitutive activity of 
thought'. This thought takes the form of a pure intensive function, an infinitesimal degree of activity from 
which 'any given quantity can be generated.' The infinitesimal, lacking extension but being greater than 
zero, replaces the material atom. It is not reached by endless subdivision but it is 'the generation of reality 
from a constructive method, just as the curve of a circle can be plotted through the continuous application 
of a function.'  In other words, reality is constituted by a continuity of infinitesimal degrees of activity. 
Thus, says Cohen, did Leibniz establish, without even realising it himself, the priority of law over 
substance (Schwebel, 2012, pp. 597-599).  
48 
 
between mind and body and all the other key philosophical concepts we ascribe to Leibniz. 
It is worth quoting in full the next five paragraphs of the Monadology: 
2. And there must be simple substances, because there are composites; for the 
composite is nothing but a collection, or aggregatum, of simples. 
3. Now, in that which has no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor 
divisibility is possible. And so monads are the true atoms of nature; in a 
word, the elements of things. 
4. There is also no dissolution to be afraid of, and no conceivable way in 
which a simple substance could come to an end naturally.  
5. For the same reason, there is no way in which a simple substance could 
begin naturally, since it could never be formed by composition. 
6. Thus we can say that monads can only ever begin or end all at once: that is, 
they can only ever begin by creation, and end by annihilation; whereas what 
is composite can begin and end bit by bit. 
(1998c, p. 268) 
Together, these six arresting paragraphs constitute the opening salvo with which the 
monads' arrival is announced. In these sentences we discover the monad as unextended, as 
a unity, as capable of entering into a series of relations with other monads to form 
composites, and as existing continually and contemporaneously with one another. Monads 
have no spatial extension yet they have infinite temporal extension for they, having no 
parts, occupy no space and, having no beginning or end beyond the beginning and end of 
time itself, exist at every point on the temporal continuum. The monad is thus constituted 
as the substance upon which time and space depend: their existence creates time, their 
formation into composites creates space.21  
                                         
21 As an aside, Mumford takes an interesting and critical view of the Cartesian baroque conception of space 
and time which is relevant to Leibniz as he is, according to Deleuze at least, the philosopher of the 
baroque: ‘If the earlier painters demonstrated Cartesian mathematics before Descartes, on their system of 
co-ordinates, the general sense of time likewise became more mathematical. From the sixteenth century 
on the domestic clock was widespread in the upper-class households. But whereas baroque space invited 
movement, travel, conquest by speed – witness the early sail wagons and velocipedes – baroque time 
lacked dimensions: it was a moment-to-moment continuum. Time expressed itself, not as cumulative and 
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And within the monad itself there exists only perception and appetition. All matter and 
motion, as we saw earlier from Leibniz's 1704 letter to De Volder, is phenomenal; it is the 
product of the monad's perception, a perception that only occurs within the monad itself 
and has no access to external reality (Lodge, 2009, p. 465). This, of course, leaves the 
possibility open that there is no external reality. But while a Berkeleian solipsism is 
certainly a logical metaphysical possibility, it can be safely ruled out by an appeal to the 
best of all possible worlds: in the choice between a single monad and an infinitude of 
monads, God would have to choose the latter on the basis of the greatest degree of 
variation and quantity. And the principle of the best can again be invoked to maintain that 
the relations a monad perceives within itself ought to correspond with external relations 
between monads; it is surely better this than our perceptions being reflections of nothing. 
God is therefore obliged to ensure that the reflection of the world of monadic relations is 
actually a reflection of an external world, filled with monads, and not a fiction. As 
previously discussed, it is the notion of correspondence that ensures each windowless 
monad is perfectly in sync with every other monad, that every set of internal perceptions 
within every single monad corresponds. The monad is not blind, its lack of windows does 
not entail a lack of light, a state of permanent inner darkness, but rather it means that each 
monad contains within itself everything that will ever happen to it, every perception and 
appetition, every memory, thought and feeling, from the beginning of time to eternity. 
Having finally arrived at the Monad, we can see how much of its nature we have already 
described in previous paragraphs. The monad emerges almost fully formed from the 
panoply of concepts we have been struggling to pin down. It is not for nothing that John 
Cowper Powys has the eponymous Wolf Solent utter the words, 'I see you read Leibniz, 
Miss Makalite … Don't you find those “monads” of his hard to understand?' Still, before 
we further complicate matters with a return to Phemister, we will briefly look at the 
organisation of the monad. 
There are three types of monad: bare; soul or animal soul; and rational soul or spirit. The 
bare monad is capable only of perception and appetition, and confused perception at that. 
For example, inanimate objects are aggregates of bare monads – they perceive inasmuch as 
they stand in relation to other monads, albeit in a confused manner where they are unaware 
                                         
continuous, but as disjunctive: it ceased to be life-time. The social mode of baroque time is fashion, 
which changes every year; and in the world of fashion a new sin was invented – that of being out of date. 
Its practical instrument was the newspaper, which deals with scattered, logically incoherent “events” from 
day to day: no underlying connection except contemporaneity.’ (1942, p.92) 
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of these perceptions, and have appetite insofar as these relations change.22 The soul monad 
is able to perceive, possesses appetite, and has memory. A dog, for example, is governed by 
a dominant animal soul; it is able to perceive with a degree of clarity that allows it to know 
that hunger is sated by eating food or that pleasure is had by chasing the cat. This 
understanding is gained and consolidated through repetition. And this points towards the 
fundamental distinction between the animal soul and the rational soul, namely, 
apperception; the ability to reflect on perceptions, to possess self-consciousness, and to 
access general laws, such as the laws of mathematics. The apperceiving rational soul 
monad is the highest form of monad and is possessed only by human beings. All bodies in 
the world are an aggregate of monads and all living bodies – plant, animal, and human – 
have a dominant monad which oversees and directs that aggregate. For myself, I am a 
collection of bare and soul monads, directed by an ego-monad in the form of the rational 
soul monad. Certain parts of me are self-regulating, my heart beats without my direction 
and so we can say that my heart has its own animal soul monad with its own set of bare 
monads under its direction. However, it is still subordinate to the notion of me, as 
contained within my rational soul monad. When, one day, my heart ceases to beat and the 
rest of my parts begin to disintegrate, my rational soul monad will persist albeit without its 
body and thus unable once more to perceive distinctly the rest of the world, as it was 
before my birth.23 The monads which make up my subordinate aggregate are in a constant 
process of coming in to and falling out of relation with one another, but the notion of me, 
as contained in my rational soul monad, is constant and exists from the moment God 
created the world of monads and will continue to exist until God decides to destroy the 
world of monads.  
And so here we have a brief sketch of the monad as the immaterial substance, the building 
block of reality and the well from which springs all phenomena. The monad is irreducible 
but everything else, matter, extension, motion, is reducible to the monad. Leibniz the 
idealist is confirmed in this, the interpretation of Leibniz's metaphysics which holds the 
immaterial monad as the only true substance. But we will now turn to Phemister's 
interpretation, as developed in her Leibniz and the natural world. In it she posits the 
corporeal substance rather than the immaterial monad as the basic unit of reality. What 
                                         
22 As we will soon see, for Tarde, and even for Leibniz himself, this is not quite the whole story as even 
inanimate objects are made up of animate stuff in the form of chemical chains, electrons etc. 
23 Which brings to mind the quote, attributed to Mark Twain, that, 'Annihilation has no terrors for me, 
because I have already tried it before I was born—a hundred million years—and I have suffered more in 
an hour, in this life, than I remember to have suffered in the whole hundred million years put together.' 
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follows is an extended discussion on the key tenets of Phemister's thesis which will re-
evaluate the underlying assumptions we have thus far taken as axiomatic. The significance 
of this will soon become clear as what Phemister proposes, in arguing that Leibniz does not 
reject the reality of material bodies, may in fact provide the missing link between Latour's 
'relational materiality' and Leibniz's monadology. 
Corporeal substance and the material reality of bodies 
We will begin not with Phemister but with Garber. Remember that for Garber the idea that 
Leibniz can be confirmed as either an idealist or as committed to a material reality is 
problematic. For Garber, we cannot be certain that Leibniz's apparent commitment to 
idealism towards the end of his life was indeed his settled view on the matter. Leibniz is in 
his 'metaphysical workshop' making use of whatever ideas fit the task at hand. However, 
Garber does advocate, in agreement with the usual Anglo-American reading of Leibniz, 
that while the middle period of Leibniz's work is characterised by a commitment to 
corporeal substances as simple substances, this commitment is abandoned in the late period 
when Leibniz shifts to an idealist position of affirming the immaterial monad as the only 
possible simple substance. We can see from his essay, Leibniz and Idealism, the sort of 
corporeal substance orientated view he considers Leibniz is committed to in his middle 
period: 
The pain I feel when I am pricked by a pin, when I am acted upon, is a confused 
expression in my mind, my soul, my substantial form, but in the texts that I have 
been examining, Leibniz makes no suggestion that this is an event that does or 
could happen without the body. It is the corporeal substance, soul and body that is 
acted upon, that suffers, but it is the mind that feels the pain.24 Insofar as a mind has 
confused expression, it must have matter: the confused expression, on this reading, 
is the mark of the embodiment of the soul. 
(Garber, 2005, p. 105) 
The difference between Garber and Phemister is that, while Garber believes this position 
has been abandoned by Leibniz by the time he comes to write the Monadology, Phemister 
                                         
24 Of course, as W.G. Sebald points out in The Emigrants, pain is a curious sensation as it ultimately negates 
itself: ‘I gradually understood that, beyond a certain point, pain blots out the one thing that is essential to 
its being experienced – consciousness – and so perhaps extinguishes itself; we know very little about 
this.’ (2002, p.170) 
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argues that the corporeal substance view is indispensable and it persists as a foundational 
concept in Leibniz's work right up until his death.  
Phemister's Leibniz and the Natural World is a remarkable attempt to re-read Leibniz 
without any trace of Cartesianism. She argues that many of Leibniz's letters and published 
works were tailored to contemporaries who were committed to the Cartesian principles, 
and were written in such a way as to be acceptable and understandable to them. The result 
is a body of later work which is, on first glance, full of concessions to the Cartesians, but 
on closer inspection is a careful attempt to express a very different kind of metaphysics 
without ruffling the feathers of the Cartesian dominated philosophical establishment. 
Leibniz, after all, is the consummate diplomat; among his many life's works was the 
ambition to reconcile the Catholic and Protestant churches through a shared theology, 
developed by himself. This can lead Phemister, on occasion, to speculative leaps along the 
lines of, 'what Leibniz really meant to say was...', but when the emphasis shifts from 
speculating on what Leibniz really meant to scrutinising his system through an exhaustive 
close reading of texts written throughout his life, what emerges is a convincing and 
arresting challenge to the orthodox idealist reading of Leibniz. 
Let us start by restating the basic Cartesian argument which Phemister's Leibniz stands in 
opposition to. Descartes holds that mind and body are independent from one another. The 
mind can exist without the body – like Goethe’s Homunculus – and is the only indivisible 
substance in nature. Descartes' mind is possessed only by human beings, there is no room 
for animal souls or the soul-like bare monads. According to Phemister, Leibniz, on the 
contrary, is closer to the Aristotelian view that the substantial form is the combination of 
the entelechy, that is the soul, and primary matter (Phemister, 2005, pp. 21-22). With this in 
mind, we must not view the Leibnizian simple substance through the lens of the Cartesian 
mind. Descartes’ mind requires no matter, whereas Leibniz's hylomorphic substance can 
only be completed though the union of primary matter and mind, or, to put it another way, 
primitive passive power and the entelechy.  
Phemister takes her definition of the monad from the five-fold ontological system in 
Leibniz's correspondence with De Volder. To recap, this system distinguishes between: 1) 
the primitive entelechy; 2) primary matter, or primitive passive power; 3) the monad, 
completed by 1) and 2); 4) secondary matter, comprised of subordinate monads, also 
known as the organic body; and 5) the complete corporeal substance, unified by the 
dominant monad. The relation between each of these parts is key. For the orthodox 
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Leibnizian scholar, Robert Adams, in the De Volder correspondence the monad is 
completed by the unity of the entelechy and primary matter, while the corporeal substance 
is comprised of the monad and the organic body which are two distinct substances. This 
separates the monadic substance from the corporeal substance and stands the two 
substances in relation to one another. Phemister objects, writing that: 
[T]he relation of the De Volder monad to the complete corporeal substance is best 
 understood, not in terms of the relation of one substance to another different 
substance, but as a relation of one substance to itself. The De Volder monad is the 
foundation from which the complete corporeal substance springs. The complete 
corporeal substance is the De Volder monad, together with its modifications (its 
perceptions, appetitions and organic body) … the truly complete De Volder monad, 
in its created state, is always a corporeal substance. 
(2005, p. 39) 
To frame it in Deleuzian language, from the union of the dominant entelechy and primitive 
passive force unfolds the corporeal substance. However, Leibniz's five-fold ontology is not 
to be read as a step-by-step recipe, but rather states the elements which are required for the 
corporeal substance to become actual (2005, p. 50). Each of the elements entails the others, 
they unfold from one another; as well shall see, there can be no bodiless monad nor can 
there be a monadless body. 
We will now turn to primary matter. Primary matter is not the same as physical matter. Its 
other name, which Leibniz uses interchangeably, is primitive passive force, and this 
perhaps provides a better sense of its nature. It is the inertial substance which is to be found 
in everything and which provides the counterpoint to the entelechy, the primitive active 
force: primary matter is to the entelechy what resistance is to motion. Primary matter is 
homogeneous, it exists as the same stuff everywhere, and provides continuity. It has no 
form, quality, or quantity. On its own, it has no extension. It is completed by the entelechy 
and the entelechy is completed by it. The entelechy gives it form. The Aristotelian 
understanding of primary matter requires the entelechy in order to give individual things 
their differentiated existence. For example, the substantiality of both the table and chair is 
underpinned by primary matter. But for these two objects to be differentiated they require 
form. The table and the chair take a different form and are therefore different objects. For 
physical extension to occur, primary matter must be imbued with a series of entelechies. 
Where there exists more than one entelechy in primary matter, there exists extension. This 
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multiplicity of – that is, more than two – entelechies within primary matter constitutes 
secondary matter. Phemister's Leibniz differs from Aristotle in that Aristotle understands 
form as accidental or secondary. Phemister does not argue the contrary – that extension in 
primary matter is essential – but instead contends that primary matter's extension is 
something between accidental and essential. To explain, for primary matter not to be 
extended, God would have to destroy all entelechies in existence but one. The result would 
be the existence of only one substance and thus no extension. But without God's 
intervention there can be no naturally occurring event which can prevent the multiplicity of 
entelechies in primary matter and thus secondary matter and extension. Primary matter's 
extension is therefore a natural necessity even though its non-extension is a metaphysical 
possibility (2005, p. 48). When the dominant monad – the monad as the fusion of the 
entelechy and primary matter – is combined with the aggregates of subordinate monads 
which constitute its organic body, we get a complete corporeal substance. But the relation 
of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads is not one of a whole to its parts. As we 
have seen, primary matter is by necessity imbued with a multiplicity of entelechies, thus 
the completion of the dominant monad by primary matter is the completion of that monad 
by a primary matter that is already diffused with subordinate entelechies. In the case of 
inanimate objects, there is no dominant monad; there is simply an aggregation of 
substances. But when there exists a dominant monad, it is this monad which transforms the 
aggregate of subordinate monads into the secondary matter of the organic body, and so the 
corporeal substance comes into being. To illustrate the point, consider the difference 
between a rock and a human being. A rock is not a substance. Break a bit off a rock and 
you get two rocks. It is an aggregate of substances but there exists no dominant entelechy 
to hold it together as a single substance. A human being, in contrast, is a substance. If you 
cut my hand off you do not get two of me. While I am also made up of a multiplicity of 
substances, there exists a dominant monad which unites these substances into an organic 
body and so completes the corporeal substance (2005, pp. 45-52). The subordinate 
entelechies within my organic body are not parts of my corporeal substance but they are, to 
quote Phemister, ‘‘immediately required’ by the organic body and, we may infer, by the 
corporeal substance too since it requires the organic body.’ (2005, p. 51) 
So, primary matter is the same everywhere. The same primary matter completes the 
dominant monad as completes the subordinate monads. But for the entelechy the opposite 
is true. Where primary matter is homogeneous, each and every entelechy is unique, being 
the thing which grants form to individual substances. Phemister raises the question of how 
we might then conceive of the relation between the dominant and subordinate monad. Her 
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answer is that while they cannot be the same they must be similar. In other words, they 
must have partial sameness, they must produce, 'a discrete repetition in which the things 
repeated are similar in kind but not identical. Each dominant entelechy is discretely 
repeated by the similar but non-identical, subordinate entelechies in its organic body.' 
(2005, p. 61) The relation of partial similarity between the dominant and subordinate 
entelechies – and, indeed, between the subordinate entelechies themselves – is expressed 
by the dominant entelechy having a clearer, more distinct perception of the subordinate 
entelechies. In other words, it is their similarity that ensures the dominant entelechy 
expresses its subordinate entelechies more clearly than it would the entelechies belonging 
to other organic bodies (2005, p. 61). As we will discuss in the next chapter, this notion 
will be of great importance to Tarde who argues that it is only through the presence of 
similarity between any being and ourselves that we are able to understand it. Indeed, it is 
this notion which underpins Tarde's, and later, to a certain degree, Latour's, argument that 
we must, in effect, simultaneously naturalize sociology and sociologize nature (Tarde, 
2012). 
However, each subordinate entelechy also possesses its own organic body which is 
included in the larger organic body belonging to the corporeal substance. Similarity and 
clarity of perception is not enough to secure the relation of these organic bodies to the 
corporeal substance as a whole. For example, I may clearly perceive my own hand as a 
result of it being governed by a subordinate entelechy similar to my own dominant 
entelechy, but that is not necessarily the case when it comes to my less clear perceptions of 
the infinitesimal movements of each individual muscle and tendon. In fact, we can go 
further and say that I have a clearer perception of an entelechy belonging to a different 
organic body – say your dominant entelechy – than I do of the movements and activities of 
my own organic body at a cellular level. So, we must identify something beyond 
perception which binds all of the subordinate entelechies and their attached organic bodies 
within my own organic body; and that something is derivative force. Derivative force is 
that which ensures all organic bodies within any given part of my body are all compelled to 
act in accordance with the impulse of my dominant entelechy. Derivative force operates by 
the repetition and diffusion of the dominant entelechy’s essence or nature through its 
organic body. Again, primary matter takes centre stage as the conduit for this repetition – 
being the same everywhere and necessary for the completion of any entelechy – and, in a 
roundabout way, guarantees the natural, real extension of the material body. Phemister, 
taking her analysis to its logical conclusion, posits a plurality of corporeal substances as 
those things which are repeated and diffused in extension (Phemister, 2005, pp. 61-64).  
56 
 
Phemister’s reasoning requires some explanation. Leibniz distinguishes between 
comparison and concurrence: comparison is a relation between ideal things, it guarantees 
compossibility or incompossibility and belongs to the domain of sufficient reason; 
concurrence, on the other hand, is the relation between actually existing things, it belongs 
to the domain of the causal chain. For two things to exist concurrently, to co-exist, they 
must be sense perceivable. And to be sense perceivable they must exist as actualised beings 
rather than mere concepts. If, as we have already discussed, the organic body is naturally 
necessary for the completion of the monad – thus becoming the corporeal substance – then 
it is this sense perceivable extended body which secures the co-existence of monads within 
their ultimate expression as corporeal substances. Without organic bodies, monads cannot 
co-exist; the monad can be conceived but not perceived. But united with its organic body 
within the corporeal substance, the monad can be both conceived and sense perceived 
through its organic body. What we are striving towards here, and what allows Leibniz to 
rescue God’s existence, is a distinction between essence and existence. God cannot be 
sense perceived but God’s existence can be inferred through God’s essence. The existence 
of God can be proven by Leibniz’s ontological argument: the non-contradictory notion of 
God.25 Similarly, possible beings in possible worlds cannot be sense perceived but their 
existence can be inferred from their essence; however, this inference can only be 
established by God who has a complete knowledge of the world from beginning to end and 
is able to discern the best of all possible worlds at all times. This is a form of modality 
where all possible beings exist but only those which God chooses as the best possible are 
actualised. Thus, we can maintain both the completeness of the monad – as the unity of 
entelechy and primary matter – and the completeness of the corporeal substance – the unity 
of the monad and the organic body. The latter is complete as a concept, whereas the former 
is complete as an actual created being. Moreover, the corporeal substance is the basic 
constituent unit of reality as it is the natural necessary expression of the monad; the 
corporeal substance is, in other words, the necessary realisation or actualisation of the 
monad (2005, pp. 67-72). We can now look back at Phemister’s description of the 
embodied monad, quoted in the ‘Mind and Matter’ section of this chapter, and better 
understand the reasoning underpinning her assertion that the ‘most obvious kinds of 
                                         
25 Anselm’s ontological argument takes the form: 1) God is, by definition, the greatest of all conceivable 
beings; 2) God exists in our minds as an idea; 3) Any being which exists in reality is greater than a being 
which exists only in the mind; 4) If God only exists in our mind, we can conceive of a being greater than 
God, that is, a being that also exists; 5) There can be no being greater than God as God is, by definition, 
the greatest of all conceivable beings; 6) Therefore, God exists. Leibniz develops Descartes version of 
Anselm’s argument – that a supremely perfect being which did not exist would constitute a contradiction, 
as existence is one aspect of perfection – by introducing the notion of coherence to argue that supreme 
perfection can exist in a single being. 
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indivisible unities are living creatures, such as fish and sheep and worms, or generally, 
corporeal substances.’ (2005, p. 76) 
The consequence of Phemister’s interpretation is that when we return to Leibniz’s famous 
fishpond metaphor in the Monadology26, we must now conceive of the fish which is full of 
smaller fish - which, in turn, is full of even smaller fish, and so on – as corporeal 
substances which are themselves full of corporeal substances. Phemister encourages us to 
read this metaphor literally, to take Leibniz at his word that every animal is composed of 
animal-like substances. To put it another way, the aggregate body is not an aggregate of 
mind-like substances but an aggregate of other similar aggregate bodies; an aggregate of 
corporeal substances. To quote Phemister in full: 
In claiming that each fish has smaller fish within its own body, Leibniz is drawing 
attention to the similarities that hold among the substances in any one organic body 
or corporeal substance. … ‘Fishness’ is repeated in the fish’s body. The active and 
passive primitive forces that comprise its dominant De Volder monad are repeated 
and diffused throughout its organic body. In inanimate objects, such as milk, all 
components share the same character but no primitive active force or entelechy is 
dominant; in animate objects, the repetition and diffusion takes its lead from the 
dominant entelechy and primary matter (that is, from the primitive forces or De 
Volder monad). These modifications and the modifications of the subordinate De 
Volder monads ensure a repetition and diffusion of active and passive derivative 
forces also. Each and every body is formed through the repetition and diffusion of 
both primitive and derivative forces. 
(2005, p. 93) 
The result is a plenum, where within the spaces between each individual fish exist still 
more ponds full of fish. Corporeal substances are necessarily contiguous; nature’s 
abhorrence of vacuums means there is no space between corporeal substances, although 
these substances differ in size and relation with one another. The fish then becomes like a 
matryoshka doll: each doll is a corporeal substance embedded within a larger corporeal 
                                         
26 In §67 of the Monadology Leibniz writes: ‘Every portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full 
of plants and like a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant, every member of an animal, and every 
drop of the fluids within it, is also such a garden or such a pond.’ 
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substance, the key difference with the Russian doll being that when you open each doll you 
find not one but an infinite plurality of smaller dolls.  
However, there remains the question of relation. According to Leibniz’s principle of 
homogeneity, only things which are of the same nature can stand in relation as parts of a 
whole. As the corporeal substance is indivisible, we must establish how exactly the 
plurality of fish within the individual fish are related. The corporeal substances themselves 
– the fish, and the fish within the fish – cannot take the form of parts to the whole as they 
are indivisible, and so cannot be divided into parts which have the same nature as the 
whole. But the organic body is divisible. So, the smaller fish must aggregate to form the 
organic body of the larger fish’s corporeal substance. However, they cannot be an 
aggregate of corporeal substances as the corporeal substance and the organic body are not 
of the same nature. Nor can the organic body be comprised of souls for the same reason. 
Therefore, the organic body must be the result of an aggregate of the organic bodies 
attached to the smaller corporeal substances. For example, both the individual fish and the 
smaller fish embedded within it are corporeal substances, but the organic body of the fish 
is comprised of the organic bodies of smaller fishes. It is only the organic body that can 
qualify as a part, not the corporeal substance as a whole. Corporeal substances are 
embedded within corporeal substances and constitute the basic unit of reality but they do 
not relate as parts to a whole (2005, pp. 98-100).27 While the divisible organic body can be 
compared to the infinite matryoshka doll, the fish as a corporeal substance is better 
understood with reference to M. C. Escher’s Circle Limit III.28 In Escher’s pattern, the 
number of fish increases exponentially from the centre but all fish have an equal 
hyperbolic area and occupy the same hyperbolic plane. In hyperbolic geometry, the space 
around any point increases exponentially; when hyperbolic space is created as a physical 
model – as in the crocheted models of Dr Daina Taimina – the result is a crenelated and 
folded surface.29 One could conceive of the indivisible living being – the corporeal 
                                         
27 Here we can see hints of Tarde and Latour’s notion that, contrary to the popular saying, the whole is 
always smaller than its parts..Leibniz provides a possible basis for this statement – which we will 
examine in more detail later – by ruling out the relation of corporeal substances as one of parts to wholes, 
allowing for a flattened, non-hierarchical conception of the relation between corporeal substances or 
actor-networks/actant rhizomes. 
28 Escher’s woodcut can be viewed here: http://www.mcescher.com/gallery/recognition-success/circle-limit-
iii/  
29 Hyperbolic geometry is a non-Euclidean geometry whereby space has a negative curvature and is shaped 
like a saddle, in contrast to Euclidean geometry where space has zero curvature and is shaped like a flat 
sheet of paper. The significance of hyperbolic geometry is that it contradicts Euclid’s fifth postulate 
which states that: for any point x which stands in relation to a line l, there is only one possible line which 
can be drawn through x which will not intersect with l. Because of the negative curvature of a hyperbolic 
plane, an infinite number of lines can be drawn through x which will not intersect with l. In 1997, Dr 
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substance – as the centre point of a hyperbolic model, enfolded by an exponentially 
increasing number of other indivisible living beings.    
We can conclude by turning to the example of the human body. When we die, we do not 
split into parts. As corporeal substances united by a dominant rational soul monad, we are 
indivisible and persist as a corporeal substance from the beginning to the end of time. What 
changes is the constitution of our organic body. Throughout our life our corporeal 
substance contains a relatively large organic body comprising of smaller organic bodies. 
When these smaller organic bodies break down our organic body is divided. These 
divisions will, eventually, result in death but the core of our body – reduced, according to 
Leibniz, to a minute point – will persist as part of our corporeal substance. To quote 
Phemister: 
Apparent death is the separation of the person (or corporeal substance) from the 
larger part of their physical body. A visible and divisible corpse is left behind. The 
corporeal substance itself, however, comprising the core body and indestructible 
soul, remains a living, indivisible (although now to all practical purposes invisible) 
being. 
(2005, p. 99) 
If we follow Phemister’s treatment of Leibniz further, we will see that the primacy of 
corporeal substance can also be used to avoid any problem with the composition of the 
continuum. In simple terms, the problem arises when we attempt to hold to both the notion 
of substance – i.e. things that exist as separate beings from one another – and the notion of 
the infinite divisibility of any extended thing. This would not be a problem if we take 
extension to be merely phenomenal but, of course, Phemister’s project is to establish the 
opposite, non-idealist interpretation of Leibniz. Phemister begins her argument with 
Leibniz’s distinction between the real and the ideal. Take the difference between the 
mathematical point and the physical point. The mathematical point simply marks the limits 
of a particular line. It is itself unextended. No number of mathematical points alone can 
generate extension, for the mathematical point is dependent upon the existence of a line: in 
other words, the whole comes before the parts. On the contrary, the physical point is 
extended. A series of physical points does result in extension, the series generates a 
                                         
Taimina created a model of a hyperbolic surface using crochet, thus creating the first practical physical 
model of hyperbolic space. Her extraordinary creations can be viewed here: 
http://theiff.org/oexhibits/oe1e.html     
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physical line: the parts come before the whole, in another foreshadowing of Tarde and 
Latour. When the mathematical line is sectioned between points, it is not actually divided 
but simply delimited. The physical line, however, can be divided into points. And so, for 
the ideal, divisions are indeterminate; whereas for the real, divisions are determinate (2005, 
pp. 106-109). Corporeal substance provides the bridge between these two realms in a 
manner similar to that described in the previous paragraph: 
On the one hand, the continuum is divisible into determinate indivisibles, where the 
indivisibles are the living creatures Leibniz claims are everywhere in matter. On the 
other hand, each living creature has an organic body that is composed of parts, 
which parts … are other aggregate organic bodies. The fact of these bodies and the 
bodies of which they are composed ensures that the continuum is divided to 
infinity. Each indivisible animal has an organic body and this organic body is itself 
infinitely divisible into other corporeal substances, into true unities, each of which 
is again an indivisible, but which is also again the source of further division of the 
extended world through the division of its organic body in turn, and so on, ad 
infinitum. 
(2005, p. 117) 
In other words, extended divisible matter – in the form of the organic body – and 
unextended indivisible substances – in the form of the De Volder monad plus the organic 
body – co-exist and are co-dependent within the corporeal substance. ‘Bodies, as Leibniz's 
writings suggest, are both aggregates of monads and aggregates of corporeal substances.’ 
(Phemister, 1999, p. 78) Thus, we can say that I am indivisible while maintaining that my 
organic body can we broken down into parts, parts which are themselves corporeal 
substances which possess their own divisible organic bodies. It is, to borrow Russell’s 
apocryphal interlocutor’s phrase, corporeal substances all the way down, with organic 
bodies providing the divisible extended matter at each level.30 This account accommodates 
both the existence of indivisible unities and the infinite divisibility of extended matter. 
                                         
30 The ‘turtles all the way down’ anecdote is of unknown provenance and variously attributed to Bertrand 
Russell and William James, among others. From Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time: ‘A well-
known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture on astronomy. … At the 
end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: “What you have told us is 
rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise.” The scientist gave a 
superior smile before replying, “What is the tortoise standing on?” “You’ve very clever, young man, very 
clever,” said the old lady. “But it’s turtles all the way down!” 
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With primary matter fulfilling the role of the homogenous continuum, we can – as 
Phemister (2005, pp. 115-116), Deleuze (1993), and even Leibniz himself in his dialogue 
Pacidius to Philalethes do – conceive of the continuum as a sheet of paper, folded 
innumerable times to create divisions or envelopes which form distinct substances, albeit 
substances all constituted from the same continuous sheet of paper. Within each substance 
are folded still more substances and so substances can retain their unity while being in the 
constant state of motion of being folded, unfolded, and refolded. It is this motion which 
prevents these divisions from being merely conventional; conventional in the sense that we 
can arbitrarily designate names to different portions of the same matter. When the parts of 
an object move in the same manner we distinguish it from another object, in the same way 
that we can, to borrow Phemister’s example, distinguish between the juice in a glass and 
the glass itself; both move but their movement is sufficiently different from one another to 
qualify as being two distinct entities (Phemister, 2005, pp. 124-125). And this impulse to 
move comes, of course, from the substantial form – the dominant entelechy – and is 
manifested in the body through the principle of pre-established harmony. Therefore, the 
continuum can be understood as being made up of infinitely divisible aggregates of 
corporeal substances while still fulfilling the necessary criteria for being real, as these 
corporeal substances themselves are unities which exist prior to the whole and create the 
whole through their aggregation (2005, p. 127). 
By now it is clear that the dual character of the corporeal substance – both real and ideal, 
extended and indivisible – has become, in Phemister’s hands, a powerful tool with which 
we can dismantle many of the orthodox readings of Leibniz’s late philosophy, and with this 
in mind, let us turn to the windowless monad. Remember that perceptions are the reflection 
of a plurality of substances within a single substance, the monad, and appetition is the 
movement from one perception to another. Perception is the actualisation of primitive 
passive force, while appetition is the actualisation of primitive active force. When one 
substance perceives another we can say that the substance expresses the substance it 
perceives. This expression denotes a relation between the two substances (2005, pp. 134-
136). The dual nature of the corporeal substance now comes into play. Though perception, 
as a state, belongs to the monad of the corporeal substance rather than the organic body; 
and though that perceptual state is necessarily an internal quality – it is still windowless, 
after all – it corresponds to an actualised relation between the two organic bodies of the 
substances which stand in an expressive relation to one another. As the mind cannot exist 
without the body, it is necessarily the case that whenever a monad perceives, there is a 
corresponding relation between organic bodies. In other words, while the organic body 
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cannot be said to perceive, the corporeal substance can. Internal perception requires an 
external relation and vice versa (2005, p. 142). Only a few of these perceptions are clear 
and distinct, the vast majority are perceived confusedly and indistinctly as minute 
perceptions. But these minute perceptions are crucial as they, to quote Phemister, ‘are 
essential to the harmony of all things with one another, ensuring that there are no gaps in 
the perceptual continuum any more than there are gaps in the material continuum.’ (2005, 
p. 145)  
However, there is more to say about bodies. Phemister identifies three competing traditions 
which are relevant to this discussion: spiritual phenomenalism; monadological 
phenomenalism; and corporeal substance phenomenalism. Spiritual phenomenalism is 
simply the assertion that bodies exist as phenomena in the mind but have no external 
reality. All perception happens within the mind of the perceiver and is confined to their 
mind, finding no corresponding object in the external world. Monadological and corporeal 
substance phenomenalism share in the belief that there is some corresponding reality 
external to the mind of the perceiver. They differ in that monadological phenomenalism 
grants a reality to external substances through the unification of aggregates through acts of 
perception – in other words, aggregates of incorporeal substances are unified into a single 
substance by virtue of their being perceived as such – while corporeal substance 
phenomenalism contends that, as we have seen, these aggregates are themselves composed 
of corporeal substances and so are not dependent on perception for their existence. In other 
words, they do not have to be aggregated through perception to become real (2005, p. 165). 
Quoting from Leibniz’s New System, Phemister argues that, while he acknowledges that 
internal phenomena have the character of ‘appearances or well-ordered dreams’, they do 
relate to ‘external things’. (2005, p. 167) These external things, according to corporeal 
substance phenomenalism, are the external objects which are expressed by the perceiving 
substance and are held in some relation to the physical body of the same perceiving 
substance. Thus, we must conclude that the perceiving substance is not simply an 
immaterial monad but a corporeal substance, an embodied monad whose physical body 
interacts with other physical bodies; interactions which are then expressed internally as 
‘appearances or well-ordered dreams’.    
We can better understand that interaction when we consider our relation to our own bodies. 
If I look at myself in the mirror, I see an abstraction, a phenomenal reflection which does 
not betray the multiplicity of entelechies imbued throughout the extended matter. The same 
holds true when I look at another person. They appear phenomenally, inasmuch as my 
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sense-perception does not allow me access to anything beyond their organic body. But, our 
phenomenological experience of living as embodied beings does allow us to feel and 
experience our bodies as essential aspects of our own existence – in Look’s words, ‘the 
body of a particular dominant monad becomes itself essentially an intentional object of that 
dominant monad.’ (2002, p. 398) Our own experience attests to the truth of corporeal 
substance phenomenalism, in that our aggregated organic bodies and our monadic selves 
are united in our experience as living beings. We cannot ‘be’ without our bodies. As 
Phemister writes, ‘Our own organic bodies are aggregates, but they are not aggregates 
from which we might walk away at will.’ (2005, p. 180) If we follow Leibniz in rejecting 
solipsism, we are led towards a multiplicitous experiential account of being: a natural 
world bursting at the seams with experiencing beings. This is, in effect, a form of pan-
psychism. Whitehead is right to note that the Leibnizian experience, with its ‘belief’ and 
‘desire’, is ‘too closely allied to the notion of consciousness’, (Adventures of Ideas, p.234) 
but there is an anticipation of the Jamesian category of depsychologized experience31 
inasmuch as Leibniz is careful to distinguish between different levels of experience 
through the differentiated monad: bare, soul and ego. Certainly, the claim being made is 
that we inhabit a world of experiencing beings, from the stone all the way up to the human 
being, but there is no sense in which there is a psychological aspect to the existence of a 
stone, or, indeed, any kind of mind – though as Whitehead remarks, ‘If we desire a record 
of uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record its autobiography.’ (PR, p.15) At 
best, the stone can be said to have a mind-like character and this is what should make us 
hesitate to label Leibniz as an all-out pan-psychist.  
We will conclude our treatment of Phemister’s work with a discussion of the importance of 
derivative forces and pre-established harmony. Let us begin with a quick sketch of the 
derivative forces. Derivative forces are necessary in order to link the substantial form with 
                                         
31 Most notably outlined in his essay on Consciousness, the final paragraph of which reads:  
Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the 
stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for 
what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The I think 
which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the I breathe which actually does 
accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intracephalic muscular 
adjustments, etc., of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology), and these increase the 
assets of consciousness, so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception; but breath, which was 
ever the original of spirit, breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am 
persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as 
consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in 
the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are. (James, W., 1904. ‘Does Consciousness 
Exist?’ Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1 (18). Available at http://fair-
use.org/william-james/essays-in-radical-empiricism/does-consciousness-exist#e1s8n1 Last 
Accessed 23 February 2019.) 
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the resistance and motion of the physical body, the principle of ‘acting and being acted 
upon’ (Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1704; quoted in Phemister, 2005, p. 190). The 
derivative forces, as their name suggests, derive from the primitive active and passive 
forces. Derivative passive and active forces translate the will of the primitive passive and 
active forces into the actual movement and resistance of the body when it comes into 
contact with other bodies. These derivative forces limit the primitive forces, determining 
the quantity of motion or resistance in any given moment and, in so doing, actualise the 
primitive forces in the physical world. We cannot appeal to the primitive forces to fulfil 
this role because they are constant, permanent and concerned with the general form. The 
derivative forces, on the other hand, are momentary, particular and concerned with the 
specific instance or event. For an example by analogy, we can think of the primitive forces 
as being like computer code – a set of instructions and rules along the lines of if x then y, 
and so on – while the derivative forces are the actual execution of each step of the code. 
The derivative forces propel the body through time and space by executing each successive 
command derived from the code contained in the primitive forces. In other words, 
derivative force is the instantaneous, particular moment in each step of the unfolding of the 
general plan.  
As indicated in the paragraph above, each derivative force constitutes a limitation or 
modification of the primitive force, inasmuch as it actualises the specific instance. But, 
there remains the question of how exactly the primitive forces – which belong to the 
monad – find themselves modified by the derivative forces, which belong to the aggregate 
body. Phemister’s solution is to appeal to the notion of the actualised or complete monad. 
Remember that the monad is completed by the addition of an organic body within the 
corporeal substance. Only through the addition of the organic body can a monad become 
actual. As derivative forces are to be found in the organic aggregate body, they can only 
come into being when the dominant monad comes into being. Thus, the corporeal 
substance makes possible the modification of the primitive forces by the derivative forces. 
The derivative forces are actualised along with the actualisation of the dominant monad in 
the corporeal substance; and each successive instance of the corporeal substance’s 
existence through time and space is an instance of derivative force (2005, p. 198).  
The significance of the derivative forces can be appreciated when viewed alongside the 
principle of pre-established harmony. Derivative forces explain the motion and resistance 
of bodies when impacted upon by other bodies. But, according to the principle of pre-
established harmony – a principle which, as Phemister points out, Leibniz intended to be 
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applied to both bodies and monads32 – this impact is not the cause, the impetus to motion 
or resistance is actually internal to each body, despite any appearance of interaction or 
collision between bodies. So, for the bodies to co-exist in pre-established harmony rather 
than interact, the collision of one body with another must occasion an internal impetus to 
motion or resistance.33 This internal impetus is provided by the derivative forces. There is 
something intuitively true about this – to quote Phemister, ‘Animals and plants appear to 
initiate movement in their own organic bodies and they seem to do so without undue 
influence from external sources. The plant turns towards the sun; the dog runs after the 
stick.’ (2011, p. 51) Even inorganic aggregates appear to be constantly in motion, a motion 
which comes from the mobility of their parts and the presence of the derivative forces. 
Therefore, each instance of apparent interaction between bodies is simply the unfolding of 
the corporeal substance through time and space – the succession of instantaneous 
derivative forces. The corporeal substance, therefore, moves itself; through the 
modification of the primitive active forces by the derivative active forces. It also limits 
itself through the passive forces which curtail motion. When a body appears to act on 
another with the effect of its losing speed, for example, this is not the result of the collision 
but of the derivative active forces limiting the active impetus to motion according to the 
pre-established harmony of co-existent bodies (Phemister, 2005, pp. 203-204). To put it 
another way, the various forces – derivative and primitive, passive and active – act in 
concert, pushing and pulling the corporeal substance through time and space. 
We can now begin to draw all of the above into a coherent account of the embodied, 
perceiving agent. Unfolding within the corporeal substance is a dual process of 
modifications. On the one hand, derivative passive force is the modification of the 
primitive passive force, actualised in the external physical realm of bodies as resistance; 
and derivative active force is the modification of the primitive active force, actualised as 
motion. While on the other hand, confused perception is the direct modification of 
primitive passive force, internal to the perceiving mind-like substance; and distinct 
perception and appetition are the modification of primitive active force. Appetition is 
included alongside distinct perception as the harmony between mind and body is the 
harmony between the desires of the mind and the motions of the body. Thus, there is a 
                                         
32 See Leibniz’s Specimen Dynamicum and Tentamen Anagogicum, cited in Phemister, 2005, p.203. 
33 Aggregate bodies do physically collide but the resulting motion is an internal dynamic, in the same way 
that a body resists motion through its own internal inertia. There is no transfer of force from one body to 
another as this would imply an intermingling of primitive forces; an impossibility in Leibniz’s system due 
to the windowless nature of each substance.  
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correspondence within the corporeal substance between the mind and the body where 
primitive passive force is modified as confused perception and derivative passive force, 
expressed as resistance; and primitive active force is modified as appetition and distinct 
perception, along with derivative active force, expressed as motion (2005, pp. 213-217). 
We therefore have a series of harmonic levels: the harmony between perception/appetition 
and derivative forces within the organic body; the harmony between perceptions and 
appetitions within the monads; the harmony between the motion and resistance of bodies; 
the harmony between the systems of final causes and efficient causes; and, finally, the 
harmony between the kingdoms of grace and nature (2005, p. 224). These last two levels 
require some explanation. The harmony between efficient and final causes correlates the 
world of agency and the mind’s desire with the mechanistic, causally determined physical 
world. As rational, apperceptive beings, we are aware of these systems of efficient and 
final causes. We are also conscious of our own desires and agency and, as such, sense that 
there is some relation between our will and our actions (2005, p. 227).34 Most of the time, 
this relation is guaranteed by God, who sets up the universe in such a way that our desires 
will correspond to activity in the physical world. We have, in this sense, free will to the 
extent that God organizes the universe so that it will correspond with our desires. When the 
world fails to correspond with our desires, it is, in some way, another expression of the pull 
between activity and passivity. This pull or tension is also evident in the relation between 
our mind’s will and our body’s material reality. Phemister describes this relation in a 
passage which is well worth quoting in full: 
As self-conscious and responsible minds, we stand aside from the mechanical 
determinations of bodies, but as embodied minds, we are subject to the effects of 
the mechanical and physical changes wrought on our bodies by the external 
material world. Yet we cannot be the one without the other. We need our bodies and 
their ability to interact with the bodies of other creatures in the world outside if 
those very volitions that serve to extricate us from the determinist, mechanical 
                                         
34 Psychologically speaking there are, of course, times when we are more acutely aware of the causal chain, 
as Sartre describes in this anecdote: ‘More than twenty years ago, one evening as he was crossing the 
Place d’Italie, Giacometti was knocked down by a car. Injured, his leg twisted, he was at first aware, in 
the lucid faint into when he fell, of a kind of joy: ‘At last something’s happening to me!’ I appreciate his 
radical attitude: he expected the worst; this life which he loved to the point of never wanting any other 
had been upset, perhaps smashed by the stupid violence of chance: ‘So,’ he thought, ‘I wasn’t born to be a 
sculptor or even to live; I was born for nothing.’ What excited him was the menacing order of causes 
suddenly unmasked and imposing on the lights of the city, on men, and on his own body, flattened in the 
mud, the paralysing aspect of a disaster: to a sculptor, the Kingdom of the mineral world is never far off. I 
admire this will to welcome everything. If you like surprises, you must like them to this extreme; even to 
those rare lightning-flashes which reveal to its lovers that the earth was not created for them.’ [emphasis 
added] (pp.144-145) 
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system are to be efficacious. Our bodies, similarly, require the active lead and 
direction afforded by the mind or soul. The body needs the mind or soul as the 
source of active force that grounds its motion. Hence, the existence of the body is 
necessary for the soul to exercise its desires and volitions and the existence of the 
soul or mind is required by the body as its principle or source of motion. 
(2005, p. 231)  
The final harmony, grace and nature, provides a moral dimension to the agency granted to 
rational beings by the previous four. The theological aspect is beyond the scope of our 
present discussion, but morally we can readily appreciate the consequences of the concept 
of the necessarily embodied corporeal substance. Far from being two distinct, separable 
realms – one moral, the other natural – the result of embodiment is an interwoven, 
interdependent world where nature depends on grace for its moral objectives, and grace 
depends on nature for their realisation. To quote Phemister once more:  
Leibniz has laid bare a reason for the awkward affliction that lies at the heart of the 
human condition whereby the human being is, on the one hand, outside and even 
above the natural, while on the other hand, essentially part of the natural world and 
inseparable from it.’ 
(2005, p. 234) 
This strikes at the heart of the enlightenment dualism between the rational mind and 
deterministic scientific reality and suggests a co-constitutive role for both mind – with its 
agency, morality, and reflective capacity – and matter, the completion, actualisation and, 
indeed, perfection – in the sense of the maximum possible variety and order – of the 
mental world through physical expression in material reality. Maximum variety is 
guaranteed by the limiting primitive passive force which confines and bounds the active 
force of each substance to various degrees – primitive passive force is what differentiates 
us from God, who possesses no passive force, being incapable of anything other than 
distinct perceptions. Maximum order is ensured through the ‘mutual representation of all 
by all.’ (2005, p. 242) This notion becomes an embodied monadic perspectivism, whereby 
each substance perceives the entire world from its own point of view, but does so through 
the direct perception of its own organic body, and the indirect perception of other 
substances through the perception of the changes that occur in its body as a result of the 
bodies of other substances. The organic, aggregate body is thus the essential link to 
external reality, providing indirect perception of other beings. Of course, as we already 
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know, these perceptions vary in quality, from the minute or petites perceptions, through 
sensible perceptions to the apperceptions of rational beings. And their counterpart, 
appetition, is similarly stratified: beginning with the insensible inclinations, moving 
through the sensible urges, and culminating in the conscious volition of rational beings 
(2005, pp. 246-247). These two work together: every perception is motivated by a 
matching appetition – to return to a previous example, the bundle of minute perceptions 
which form the perceived sound of the wave are mapped on to a symmetrical bundle of 
insensible appetitions, which motivate these perceptions.  
It is important to restate this as it is in the minute perceptions and insensible appetitions 
that we find the greatest barrier to the notion of rational human agency. Every conscious 
distinct perception is made up of innumerable confused minute perceptions. Every rational 
volition is similarly made up of innumerable insensible inclinations. Ultimately, then, what 
motivates us is a wave of insensible proclivities of which we are completely unaware. 
What appears to us as a free choice – the rational volition – is, in actual fact, a bundle of 
unconscious inclinations. The active force, manifest in rational volition, is completely 
dependent on the limiting passive force which both restricts and underpins our ability to 
perceive distinctly and, correspondingly, consciously desire (2005, p. 251). But despite 
this, our rational volitions are real and do constitute free will. By embodying the monad, 
we ensure that there is a direct relation between the will of the mind and the activity of the 
body in the external world. We know this to be the case from our earlier discussions of the 
three-fold relation between primitive and derivative force, appetition and perception, and 
motion and resistance. When all aspects of the three-fold relation work together in 
harmony – in other words, when the rational volition of the mind matches the motion of 
the body – we are at our most free (2005, p. 254). But even in such an instance, our free 
volitions and conscious perceptions are still collections of insensible urges and confused 
perceptions. Even typing these words, my will to move my fingers is translated in my 
hands as innumerable minute movements of which I am completely unaware. Like an echo 
down a tunnel or ripples in a pond, from my rational volition emanates an infinite series of 
sensible urges, fading to insensible inclinations; motivating increasingly confused 
perceptions at each point on the series. However, we can still rescue freedom. If we allow 
ourselves – as rational, perceiving beings – the ability to choose which of the insensible 
perceptions and appetitions we use to construct our rational volitions and distinct 
perceptions then we can reconcile free agency with the passive force which limits our 
ability to act and perceive clearly (2005, pp. 259-262). It is a question of focus; we can 
choose to ignore the multitudinous minute perceptions of the droplets of water in the wave 
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and instead turn our attention to the series of confused perceptions which constitute the 
conscious perception of the cry of the seagulls. Given the intertwined, interdependent 
relationship between appetition and perception, by changing the focus of our perceptions 
we can change the content of our appetitions. The resultant modification of our primitive 
forces means that this process of refocusing is actualised in the world through the 
derivative forces which bring about the varying degrees of motion and resistance in our 
bodies. The embodied agent is thus inclined but not necessitated and our mind’s will is 
mirrored in our body’s activity.      
* * * 
We have now come to the end of our discussion of Leibniz. By traversing Leibniz’s key 
metaphysical concepts, before retracing our steps with Phemister as our unorthodox guide, 
a particular rendering of Leibniz has emerged – one well suited to the social monadology 
of Tarde and the process philosophy of Whitehead. We will see in subsequent chapters how 
Leibniz’s successors negotiate the plenum of monads, bodies and corporeal substances; 
which concepts are embraced, which are modified and discarded; and how well the kernel 
of Leibniz’s metaphysics, the monad, survives its intellectual travels. But, for now, we 
have the embodied agent, inclined but not necessitated, substantial but actualised in 
physical reality; ready to be translated, enrolled, and associated. With Phemister’s 
innovations supplanting orthodox Leibnizian idealism with corporeal substance 
phenomenalism, we do not have to undertake a Feuerbachian dialectical inversion, there is 
no Marxian discovery of the ‘rational kernel within the mystical shell’; we already have at 
our disposal an agent in the world, the corporeal substance. 
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Chapter 2: Tarde 
In reality, we judge beings to be less intelligent the less we understand them, and 
the error of thinking the unknown to be unintelligent goes hand in hand with the 
error … of thinking the unknown to be indistinct, undifferentiated, and 
homogenous. 
(Tarde, 2012, p.24) 
Gabriel Tarde is back. The long overlooked and neglected theorist whose work languished 
in obscurity for almost a century is enjoying a renaissance for which there are few 
parallels. Of course, thinkers fall in and out of favour but seldom has there been such a 
dramatic fall and rise in renown. Born in 1843 in Dordogne, Tarde studied law before 
becoming a magistrate and judge. He entered academic life with a critique of the work of 
Italian criminologists Lombroso, Garofalo and Ferri, three scholars who argued that 
criminality was biologically and racially determined (Scott, 2007, p.174). However, despite 
rejecting their biological determinism, their search for social and behavioural laws started 
Tarde on his own course of research and launched a career that would culminate in Tarde 
being awarded chair of Modern Philosophy at the Collège de France. From this lofty 
position, he was assailed and eventually usurped by his younger provincial colleague 
Émile Durkheim. History would remember Durkheim as the founder of modern sociology 
but Tarde was quickly forgotten, vanquished by the victors of the turn of the last century 
battle to establish sociology as a respected and rigorous discipline.35  
The difference between Tarde and Durkheim’s approach to the question of the social is 
stark. In popular thought, Tarde is the theorist of the individual while Durkheim is the 
theorist of society. However, this simplification obscures more than it reveals. Brighenti 
writes that, ’a stark dualism between ‘all’ and ‘each’ is the very signature of the 
Durkheimian foundation of sociology’, noting the reflection of Durkheim’s theory in 
                                         
35 There is an irony is this, identified by Niezen, inasmuch as:  
One of the key questions on which Tarde’s approach to social influence was based concerned why a 
particular innovation, conceived at the same time as hundreds of others, would spread abroad while 
the rest would be forgotten. In other words, Tarde’s system of thought convincingly describes the 
causes and conditions of its own marginalization. (2014, p.43) 
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Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous statement ‘the pression immense de l’esprit de tous sur 
l’intelligence de chacun (‘the immense pression of the spirit of all on the intelligence of 
each’)’ (2014, p.47).  In opposition, Tarde, during a 1904 debate, asked his rival: 
Does Mr. Durkheim think that social reality is anything other than individuals or 
individual acts or facts? If you believe that, I understand your method, which is 
pure ontology. Between us is the debate between nominalism and scholastic 
realism. I am a nominalist. There can only be individual actions and interactions. 
The rest is only a metaphysical entity, mysticism.  
(quoted in Czarniawska, 2009. p.2) 
For Tarde to accuse Durkheim of mysticism is a remarkable reversal of a charge oft-
levelled at Tarde by Durkheimians throughout the 20th century. But, it is this question of 
the existence of society as an entity in itself that defines the disagreement between the two, 
and it is Tarde’s nominalism which so appeals to contemporary theorists like Bruno Latour. 
In his Actor-Network Theory ‘textbook’, Reassembling the Social, Latour writes: 
Against his younger challenger, he [Tarde] vigorously maintained that the social 
was not a special domain of reality but a principle of connections; that there was no 
reason to separate ‘the social’ from other associations like biological organisms or 
even atoms; that no break with philosophy, and especially metaphysics, was 
necessary in order to become a social science; that sociology was in effect a kind of 
inter-psychology; that the study of innovation, and especially science and 
technology, was the growth area of social theory; and that economics had to be 
remade from top to bottom instead of being used as a vague metaphor to describe 
the calculation of interests. Above all, he considered the social as a circulating fluid 
that should be followed by new methods and not a specific type of organism.  
(2005, p.13) 
And cutting to the heart of the matter, Latour writes: 
The shibboleth that distinguishes their attitudes is not that one is “for society” while 
the other is “for the individual actor.” (This is what the Durkheimians have quite 
successfully claimed so as to bury Tarde into the individual psychology he always 
rejected.) The distinction is drawn by whether one accepts or does not accept that a 
structure can be qualitatively distinct from its components. In response to this test 
73 
 
question, Durkheim answers “yes” for both kinds of societies. Tarde says “yes”, for 
natural societies (for there is no way to do otherwise), but “no” for human societies. 
For human societies, and for only human societies, we can do so much more. 
(2010c, p.149) 
We will see what more we can do in due course, but first a few words on Tarde’s return to 
prominence.36  
Tarde’s rediscovery began in the early 2000s after the publication in French of the first 
four volumes of the Oeuvres de Gabriel Tarde in 1999. The appearance of these volumes 
and the sensation they caused led to 1999 being dubbed ‘Tarde’s Year’ in the edition of the 
Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines which was devoted to his work (Alliez, 2004, 
pp.50-51) and the coining of the term ‘Tardomania’ by Laurent Mucchielli (Borch, 2014, 
p.2). It is not difficult to see the appeal of his work given the challenge it presents to 
longstanding sociological theory and methodology: he is cast as an – albeit now rather 
elderly – enfant terrible or, to borrow Alliez’s phrase, ‘philosophical spoilsport’ (2004, 
p.49). He is also in tune with a key post-modern concern in the social sciences – the 
collapse of the distinction between structure and agency – in his observation that society is 
not a social being that stands over and above the individual but rather the social world is a 
network of individuals and their individual relations with one another: in other words, 
society is immanent not transcendent. As one prominent sociologist noted: 
His renewed presence can enliven almost every aspect of current work on political 
communication, on diffusion of innovation, on social network theory, on public 
opinion, on collective behaviour, and on the deliberative democracy of the “public 
sphere”. 
(Katz, 2006, p.263) 
However, it is not quite correct to state that Tarde had been completely forgotten. It is no 
exaggeration to say that Tarde lurks quietly over the shoulder of Giles Deleuze, particularly 
Difference and Repetition, a work whose name is derived from a Tardean formulation: that 
‘repetition is therefore the process by which difference . . . ‘is different' and ‘is its own 
goal’ (Deleuze quoted in Alliez, 2004, p.50). But Deleuze never directly discusses his debt 
                                         
36 A prominence within certain circles, of course. Tarde’s renaissance has yet to arrive at my own university: 
the only book on Tarde held in Glasgow University Library is M. Davis’ 1906 Essay in Sociological 
Theory, a work that is highly critical of Tarde.  
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to Tarde, despite the long shadow cast by Tarde over his work – unlike Latour who is only 
too happy to proclaim: 
But I have decided to share with the readers the good news that ANT actually has a 
forefather, namely Gabriel Tarde, and that, far from being marginalised orphans in 
social theory, our pet theory benefits from a respectable pedigree. 
(Latour, 2002, p.1) 
And: 
I had to delve into social theory and to propose, with Michel Callon, under the 
horrible name of actor network theory, an alternative possibility - which, I later 
discovered, had actually been entertained by Gabriel Tarde at the beginning of 
sociology. 
(2010, p.603) 
As we will see, the similarities between Tarde’s and Latour’s thinking are clear: the 
collapse of the micro-macro distinction, the idea that power arises from the forging of 
networks between actors, and, as Czarniawska observes, ‘the idea that the social and not 
society is the clue to sociality’ (2009, p.9). Indeed, the two concepts to bear in mind during 
our discussion of Tarde’s work are, in Latour’s own words: ‘a) the nature and society 
divide is irrelevant for understanding the world of human interactions; b) the micro/macro 
distinction stifle any attempt at understanding how society is being generated’ (2002, p.2). 
The purpose of this chapter is to build on our discussion of Leibniz’s monads and to 
discover how Tarde sets about transforming the monad into an open, dynamic, possessive 
entity. To accomplish this we will read through Tarde’s Monadology and Sociology, a work 
dedicated to elucidating his sometimes tentative but always audacious theory of ‘dynamic 
possession’ (Debaise, 2008). Throughout, we will refer back to Leibniz and forward to 
Whitehead and Latour, with a view to interrogating Latour’s adoption of Tarde as his 
intellectual grandfather.37 38 Much of Tarde’s rehabilitation to date has occurred in the 
                                         
37 Latour has gone as far as playing Tarde in a reconstruction of a debate between Tarde and Durkheim 
(2007); an event which, according to Borch, played a central role in Latour’s discovery of Tarde. Borch 
places ‘discovery’ in inverted commas, revealing a degree of scepticism about Latour’s use of Tarde to 
strengthen ANT’s pedigree. (2014, p.2) In my opinion, this scepticism says more about the reluctance of 
sociologists – particularly of the business school variety – to entertain Tarde’s – and by extension, 
Latour’s – more radical ideas, particularly those found in Monadology and Sociology. 
38 Not for the first time, I refer to Risan’s words, which are, of course, particularly pertinent to this thesis:  
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social sciences and he has received significantly less attention from philosophers. As such, 
much of the work published on Tarde in recent years has concerned his theory of imitation. 
Significant as this is – and it will not be entirely neglected here – it is his neo-monadology 
that is of interest to us as it is directly derived from Leibniz’s monadology and related to 
Latour’s actor-network or actant-rhizome. The fact that Christian Borch – an economic 
sociologist – criticizes Latour for ignoring Tarde’s imitative programme (2014, p.10) 
seems justification enough to follow Latour’s lead, given that this thesis is concerned with 
the history of the monad and the ‘philosophers of monadologies’ (Risan, 2006, p.130). 
* * * 
Hypothesis fingo 
(Tarde, 2012, p.5) 
Unlike Newton, Gabriel Tarde makes hypotheses. He makes hypotheses in the Leibnizian 
tradition: prodigiously and with abandon. His first and primary hypothesis, from which all 
others flow, is that child of Leibniz: the monad. Bolstered by the findings of late 19th 
century chemists and physicists, it becomes, in Tarde’s hands, the great hypothesis, 
implying: 
[T]he reduction of two entities, matter and mind, to a single one, such that they are 
merged in the latter, and at the same time a prodigious multiplication of purely 
mental agents in the world. In other words, it implies both the discontinuity of the 
elements and the homogeneity of their being. 
(Tarde, p.5) 
Pointing to, among others, Newton, cellular theory, and the work of Pasteur – where 
‘parasites, too, have their parasites’39 (Tarde, p.7) – Tarde enrols all branches of the natural 
sciences in support of the monad and the infinitesimal. Monads are the logical conclusion 
of 19th century positivism; inasmuch as, if all matter is aggregated atoms and there is no 
‘vital principal’, then these atoms themselves become the explanans. Recast as Tardian 
                                         
The STS embrace of Whitehead is part of a move to rediscover some “grandfathers” in the Western 
history of ideas. Included are the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde (Latour uses the metaphor of 
“grandfather” regarding Tarde), the British philosopher Whitehead, and, as the (usually) first mover 
in this story, G. W. Leibniz. These are philosophers of “monadologies.” (2006, p.130)  
39 Or, as per the Siphonaptera: ‘Big fleas have little fleas, upon their backs to bite 'em, and little fleas have 
lesser fleas, and so, ad infinitum.’ Thanks to Susan Stuart for making the connection. 
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monads, they are innumerable, independent, infinitesimal agencies whose engagement with 
one another creates the beings and entities that we are able to perceive. Moreover, the 
scientific method itself is monadic. Because all scientific facts are contingent we are 
required to compose, as Toews writes, ‘multiple temporary orders of reality’ (2003, p.393). 
Here we can begin to sense a shift from the monadology to the sociology. The body of 
atoms is a social body. It finds its analogue in the nation. That human aggregate is, in the 
monadological view, just that: an aggregate. It is not a being in itself; it is a collection of 
beings whose individual actions create a contingent whole rather than a fixed entity. 
Clearly, Tarde’s project is one of complication rather than simplification. Despite little 
being known about the atom’s composition when Tarde wrote his Monadology and 
Sociology (hereafter, M&S), he assumes that it too is an aggregate of simpler substances. 
And, as we know from our discussion of Leibniz, divisibility is inherent in extension. So 
we arrive, only four pages in to M&S, at the geometrical point and nothingness; and to 
Tarde’s great invention. This geometrical point is not nothing, it is a centre. Material reality 
is infused with these centres, points which provide a central focus for infinitesimal agency. 
Unlike Leibniz’s monads, which enfold and envelope, these monads ‘radiate indefinitely’ 
(Tarde, p.9) and ‘compose their own realities’ (Toews, 2003, p.398).  
What defines these centres and distinguishes them from one another is difference. Not the 
clear and distinct difference between, for example, an apple and an orange, but the 
infinitely small, imperceptible difference between, for example, one cell and another when 
viewed by the naked eye. The sum of these infinitesimal differences creates the finite 
distinctions we perceive when we look at, say, two people side by side or one person 
moving from one place to another. As we can see, this monadic formulation is not merely 
geometric but temporal too; change occurs in both time and space.40 But change must 
occur at the level of the infinitesimal, not the finite. Otherwise, how are we to account for a 
                                         
40 Unlike Kant’s understanding of space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic – where space and time are 
given a priori – Tarde appears to follow Leibniz’s relational account; that is to say, space as the relations – 
both possible and realised – between objects, and time as an order of successions. It is worth mentioning 
Kant here as Tarde himself refers to Kant as the ‘most profound analyst’ of space and time (p.17). However, 
while Tarde considers it possible that space and time are ‘primitive concepts or continuous and original 
quasi-sensations’, Kant has space and time as ‘simply forms of our sensory experience’ (p.17). This does not 
quite do justice do Kant’s views on the subject of space and time, as we can see here:  ‘Inner sense, by means 
of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but 
there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, 
and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time. Time 
cannot be outwardly 
intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us.’ (B27/A23) And: ‘Space is nothing but the 
form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer 
intuition is possible for us.’ (A26/B42) Finally: ‘Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of 
the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state.’ (A33) 
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body that we perceive to have moved from point A to point B? As Tarde suggests (p.9-10), 
we should be just as amazed at the instant teleportation of a body over a distance of the 
smallest fraction of a millimetre as we would be at the instant transportation of a body over 
a distance of several miles. Change – and, a fortiori, difference – must occur in the 
infinitesimal rather than the finite.  
The difference between the infinitesimal and the finite is not simply one of size. It must be 
a qualitative difference otherwise it succumbs to the same problem we encounter when 
trying to explain movement in finite terms. Therefore, to quote Tarde, ‘movement has a 
cause distinct from itself; being is not exhausted by what appears in phenomena’ (p.11). In 
other words, if we want to look beyond the world of appearance, we have to look for the 
monads; the monads are the substantial elements. The relationship between the monad and 
difference is a relationship between spatial and temporal modalities; it is the relationship 
between agency and activity. The agent is located in the monadic centre and activity is 
what radiates outwards from this point. Thus: 
[T]hese tiny beings which we call infinitesimal will be the real agents, and these 
tiny variations which we call infinitesimal will be the real actions. 
(Tarde, p.11)  
The agents and their activity occur simultaneously: we cannot have an inactive agent or an 
agentless activity. These tiny beings and their tiny variations obstruct, obscure, displace 
and impede one another. The extent of their discord regulates the rate of change we 
observe in the finite world. Everything, from the basest impulse to the most sophisticated 
notion, originates in a single, solitary, autonomous infinitesimal agent. Its realization, 
through infinitesimal action, is slowed, shaped, and mediated by innumerable other 
infinitesimal actions radiating from other infinitesimal agents. For example, my decision to 
walk across a road does not result in my instantly appearing on the other side of the road. I 
have to navigate a stream of traffic, other pedestrians, street furniture; I may have to walk 
into the wind or up a slight incline; I may even be prevented from doing so altogether and 
referred to a nearby pelican crossing by an overzealous passing policeman. This navigation 
is both pre-reflective and reflective. Take, for example, a passage from Sartre’s Marxism 
and Subjectivity: 
[I]f, as you go downstairs, you become conscious of what you are doing and if 
consciousness emerges to determine what you do, to intervene in this action, you 
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immediately stumble because the action no longer has the character it should. 
(Sartre, p.3) 
 But, more to the point, whether deliberately or not, consciously or unconsciously, my own 
activity collides with the activity of others and its ultimate success or realization is the 
result of a process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. It is in this way that these 
infinitesimal agents and their activities aggregate to form the finite expressions which we 
can observe and perceive. We must infuse matter with agency and activity. As Tarde writes: 
To what may we ascribe the need for society which Perrier sees as the soul of the 
organic world, if not to tiny persons? And what could this transformation be, this 
direct, regular, and rapid process imagined by other thinkers, if not the 
accomplishment of hidden workers who collaborate in realizing some specific plan 
for reorganization previously conceived and willed by one among their number? 
(p.14-15) 
Or, to put it another way, ‘Everything comes from the infinitesimal and everything returns 
to it’ (Tarde, p.11). 
Belief and Desire 
Having thus pulverized the universe into untold infinitesimal indeterminate beings, Tarde 
must explain the constitution of these ‘tiny persons’. This follower of Leibniz has no time 
for Cartesian dualism, nor for vulgar physicalism or any variant of neutral monism’s 
transformation of a duality into a trinity through the suggestion of a third element, neither 
mental nor physical. Instead, Tarde posits what he terms a universal psychomorphism; a 
theory now better known to us as pan-psychism but perhaps, following Alliez, better 
described as a vitalist materialism41 that claims for itself the:  
                                         
41 Muldoon also situates Tarde’s work in the vitalist tradition and notes, ‘It is doubtful whether Bergson or 
Tarde’s metaphysics will ever be completely disproven by contemporary science. The persistence of 
vitalism is its continual ability to return to current debates in a modified form’ (2014, p.69). And Latour 
concurs with the description of Tarde’s monadology as materialist: ‘No spiritualism nor idealism to 
expect from this affirmation though, since monads are also completely materialist: they are guided by no 
superior goal, no grand design, no telos. Each of them, much like Richard Dawkins’s genes or Susan 
Blackmore memes, fights for its own privately envisioned goal’ (2002, p.4). 
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…machinic principles of a political ontology of difference: this is the indissociably 
expressionist (the vital expression of forces) and constructivist (the machinic 
connection of fluxes) lesson of Gabriel Tarde. 
(2004, p.52) 
Universal psychomorphism is the reduction of matter to mind. However, unlike idealism, 
which holds that the entire universe is a property of one’s own mind, universal 
psychomorphism suggests that the entire universe is composed of mental entities; all of 
which have a certain, fundamental commonality or similarity – not unlike the partial 
similarity required between Leibniz’s dominant and subordinate entelechies. This 
similarity permits us knowledge of other things. If there is nothing common to all beings 
then we must concede to the idealist that we cannot know anything of, to borrow Tarde’s 
example, ‘the being in itself of a stone’ (p.15). But, following Tarde’s reasoning, if we 
cannot know anything of the being in itself of a stone, then we cannot claim to know that it 
is42; as, for the idealist, the stone must exist purely as a mental state in our own minds. 
However, when we admit a fundamental similarity between all beings, we can affirm the 
existence of the stone, or anything else for that matter, as it becomes knowable. It may be 
knowable in an obscure, distant or primitive way, but it is nonetheless knowable as it 
shares a common composition, namely, the aggregation of mental entities. As we will see 
in the next chapter, Whitehead proposes something similar in Process and Reality: 
They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial 
puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of 
importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality 
exemplifies all are on the same level. 
(1929, p.18 quoted in Debaise, 2008, p.4) 
Moreover, there is a fundamental similarity in the composition of these mental entities 
themselves. Each consists of two forces, belief and desire, from which derive affirmation 
and will.43 These twin forces of belief and desire are present in every being. By 
recognizing and translating these other beings’ ‘degrees and modes of belief and desire’ 
(p.17), we are able to have knowledge of them. Tarde proposes belief and desire – in a 
                                         
42 Like Dickens’ observation in A Tale of Two Cities, ‘that every human creature is constituted to be that 
profound secret and mystery to every other.’ (p.11) 
43 Note the similarity to Leibniz’s system of derivative force.  
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distinctly Humean formulation44 – as the origin of all judgements and concepts. In this 
way, belief becomes the partner of space and desire the companion of time – belief is a 
belief about things, it is an intentional belief and locates us in a universe of things we hold 
beliefs – consciously, unconsciously, and infinitesimally – about; desire drives movement, 
the succession of orderings of those things we stand in relation to. 
According to Tarde, in anticipation of William James’ depsychologized experience, what 
prevents psychomorphism from becoming an anthromorphism is the fact that neither belief 
nor desire requires a conscious state. We hold unconscious desires; we make unconscious 
judgements. These things precede sensation: we cannot sense without feeling, a state that 
requires consciousness, though we can have sensations that we do not discern, for example, 
Leibniz’s petit perceptions. As such, belief and desire are present in all beings, human and 
non-human. As Toews notes, the human / non-human divide is sometimes viewed as the 
widest form of difference but, he writes: 
[W]e know from our relationship with animals that it can also very often involve 
very subtle, even imperceptible degrees of difference. In fact, it is not too hard to 
see that the continuity of any identity is actually just a practical matter of accepting 
a certain range of small differences as negligible for some particular purpose. 
Humans, then, can be seen as connected to non-humans by a chain of such 
identities. 
(2003, p.396) 
With the static force, belief, and the dynamic force, desire, Tarde has two ‘irreducible 
concepts’ (p.20). Belief and desire are not products of the mind but forces which, ‘with 
their reciprocal combinations, passions and intentions, … are the perpetual winds of 
history’s tempests, and the waterfalls which turn the mills of politics’ (p.21). They are to be 
found everywhere and, as a universal commonality, proclaim the commensurability of all 
things. Take the humble protoplasm, which Tarde cites as proof of his discovery: it is 
capable of capturing and digesting animalcules, which implies a desire to capture and an 
ability to perceive the object of its desire. That this soup of molecules within a single cell 
seems capable of greater mental exertions than the dull bodies they form a part of – for 
example, a houseplant or loaf of bread; both of which are composed of such cells and we 
                                         
44 Humean in the sense that one finds a similar schema in the beginning of the Treatise: where everything 
proceeds from the distinction between impressions and ideas rather than, but strikingly akin to, Tarde’s belief 
and desire.  
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would ordinarily regard as unconscious and immobile – is further proof of Tarde’s radical 
programme of complication. 
Therefore, we can envisage, with Tarde, the great cities, populated by tiny minds, which 
form even a single cell within an organism. It is our prejudice, Tarde suggests, in believing 
that we are superior to all other beings that prevents us from accepting this monadological 
hypothesis.45 Tarde’s, it is worth repeating, is a project of complication. It is a project to 
explode agency, to show that concealed within any given action of any given actor there 
are an infinite number of infinitesimal agents46 working to produce that action. In brief, 
simplicity is explained by ever-increasing complexity. A lengthier example in Tarde’s own 
words is worth quoting in full: 
Since the accomplishment of the simplest and most banal social function, which 
has persisted unchanged over centuries (for example, the reasonably regular 
coordinated movement of a procession or a regiment) demands, as we know, so 
much preparatory training, so many words; so much effort, and so much mental 
force spent almost all in vain – then what torrents of mental or quasi-mental energy 
must be necessary to produce these complex manoeuvres of simultaneously 
accomplished vital functions, by not thousands but billions of different actors, all of 
them, we have reason to think, essentially egotistical, and all as different from each 
other as the citizens of a vast empire! 
(p.23) 
All of this is not to suggest that activity or agency at the level on which we perceive it – for 
example, the actions of an individual person – is illusory. Instead, it is to suggest that such 
activity is an abstraction. It is the signifier not the referent. The referent is infinitesimal, 
multitudinous, and far more intelligent than we suppose.47 Perhaps it is the term 
‘individual’ that obscures Tarde’s meaning for, as Latour reminds us, ‘the individual 
                                         
45 ‘Our mind as it were blows out all the lights of the world for the sole benefit of its own little spark.’ 
(Tarde, 2012, p.22) 
46 It is worth adding a reminder here that the infinitesimal is qualitative not quantitative; it is not simply 
‘tiny’, as Tarde says, as even tiny things are divisible. It is, in mathematical terms, a value between zero 
and a finite number.  
47 This is, of course, both a reference to and bastardisation of Saussure’s semiotics. The purpose of the 
reference is to make clear that we are not talking simply of the difference between appearance and reality. 
We are talking about different levels of reality. Just as the word ‘horse’ is the signifier of the four-legged 
equine (the signified), with the referent being the thing that kicks you; when we discuss agency, the 
individual human agent is what is signified, while the referent – the force driving the whole thing forward – 
is to be found in the infinitesimal. And in the same way that signs are real, so are the agents we perceive in 
the world even if their causa sine qua non is to be found in the infinitesimal.     
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element is a monad, that is, a representation, a reflection, or an interiorization of a whole 
set of other elements borrowed from the world around it’ (2010, p.156).48     
Socialising the Monad 
However, with so many, to borrow Tarde’s wonderful phrase, ‘invisible and innumerable 
little gods’ (p.26), how are we to account for the appearance of order rather than utter 
chaos in our universe? As Tarde notes, Leibniz’s monads enjoy a pre-established harmony. 
But this is a leap too far for Tarde: his monads are not to be dependent on God.49 50 There 
can be no omniscient being who, knowing the concepts contained within each monad, 
knows precisely how each monad will unfold. For Tarde, knowing everything there is to 
know about the present and the past does not mean one can know the future as we simply 
cannot account for ‘unknown and unpredictable inventions’ (Geiger, 1972, p.115 quoted in 
Czarniawska, 2009, p.6). Nor can we rely on the universal laws of the materialists for these 
laws only serve to veil elemental agency behind any ‘mystical commandment’ which: 
… all beings would obey and which was not produced by any being, a kind of 
ineffable and unintelligible word which, having never been pronounced by anyone, 
nonetheless would be heard everywhere and forever. 
(p.26) 
Tarde’s solution is to explode the monad, to knock down its walls, open its windows and 
turn the closed Leibnizian monad into an open monad fit for the ‘modern’51 scientific 
                                         
48 Alongside this reminder, Latour makes the claim, with which I agree, that: ‘This is where the word 
“network” – and even actor network – captures what Tarde had to say much better than the word 
“individual.” Contrary to what is often said, there is not even a hint of “methodological individualism” in 
this argument. There is no psychologism, nor of course any temptation toward “rational choice.”’ (2010, 
p.156) 
49 Kalyniuk notes in the essay Jurisprudence of the Damned that: 
Without God, the natural state of the world is not one of compossibility, but incompossibility: the 
monads are left free to desire beyond the artificial limits of what was formerly thought to be pre-
established, and the world multiplies into as many variations of itself as there are desires willing 
them into existence. (2013, p.218) 
The consequence of this notion is that rather than an unfolding of a priori concepts within an individual, 
these concepts are rationalised a posteriori.  
50 Latour quips: ‘Tarde is probably the most systematic atheist there has ever been since he rejects even the 
transcendence of a “collective self” emerging ex abrupto from its associates’ (2010, p.157). 
51 I use the term in its Latourian sense, conscious of the connotations of an implied human/nature or, more 
accurately, human/non-human dualism. But, as we will see, Tarde uses the discoveries and methods of 
modern science to look beyond itself, thus pointing towards a resolution of this dichotomy; a move which 
obviously endears him to Latour. Indeed, in his essay Coming Out as a Philosopher, Latour writes:  
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age.52 And here we find another of Tarde’s key innovations: the monad is not a point but a 
sphere of action. The implications of this innovation are significant. We have discussed 
Leibniz’s conception of time and space as opposed to Newton’s; Tarde’s sphere-of-action 
monads necessitate the rejection of both. Whereas both Leibniz and Newton posit a single 
space – one relational, the other absolute – Tarde’s sphere-of-action monads each 
constitute their own spatiality in the enaction of their agency. These trajectories overlap 
and interpenetrate, but they are the distinguishable domain of each element. That element 
is the centre of the sphere; or, to be more exact, the properties that define that element. But 
the essence of the element is diffused, by virtue of its activity, throughout the sphere of 
action: in other words, each element ‘exists in its entirety in the place where it acts’ (p.27). 
The element or ‘centre’ of the sphere is a point, but it is only a point in virtue of being the 
‘centre’ of the sphere of action.53 In this way, each monad is constituted of the properties of 
belief – its point or its anchor – and desire – its activity or trajectory in the world. Given 
the interrelated nature of all things, the monad becomes the milieu universel, the universal 
medium; or is forever in the process of becoming by virtue of its activity. And so, while 
Leibniz’s monad contains a reflection of the universe as a whole, Tarde’s is the universe as 
a whole, the interrelation of all beings and trajectories ‘vanquished and absorbed by a 
single being’. Latour alerts us to the remarkable fact that this anticipates Whitehead’s work 
some three decades later on the notion of bifurcation: 
Tarde tries to find a solution to the ‘bifurcation of nature’. Instead of having two 
vocabularies, one for the agent and one for the causes that make the agents act, one 
can do with only one, on the condition of allowing the agent to concentrate the 
whole under some sort of point of view or folding 
(2002, p.14) 
                                         
What was clear to me, at least, was that the two master narratives of 'nature' and 'society' with which 
modernism had built what I called its Constitution, have always been only the most superficial part 
of what had happened to them. Something else had happened that required a double-edged critique 
of Nature and Society. For criticizing the latter, I had to delve into social theory and to propose, with 
Michel Callon, under the horrible name of actor network theory, an alternative possibility - which, I 
later discovered, had actually been entertained by Gabriel Tarde at the beginning of sociology. 
(Latour, 2010b, p.603)   
52 Both Leibniz and Tarde, however, are, as John Law points out, very much philosophers of the baroque 
inasmuch as – in contrast to the romantic – they favour the heterogeneous, the complexity within, 
specificity and the lack of any totality (2003, p.9-10). 
53 For clarity, there are of course innumerable spheres of action, which have innumerable centres, which 
spread out and infuse reality rhizomatically. 
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The same applies to time as to space: each desire produces its own time. The order that we 
perceive in the universe is produced by the domination and subjection – later to become in 
the hands of Latour, ‘enrolment’ – of one monad or set of monads by another. When we 
discern a similarity between or repetition54 of certain phenomena it is because there are 
monads which have imposed themselves on others, reproducing their forms and fulfilling 
their desires. The universe is therefore made up of countless interwoven realities engaged 
in incessant activity to reproduce themselves and their beliefs and desires.   
So, from the cloistered Leibnizian monad, we have moved to a voracious, capacious 
monad, which gobbles up its fellow monads – and their space and time – whole and creates 
dominions pursuant to its will. The monad does this by enveloping its fellow monads in its 
sphere of action, engendering imitative activity in its subjects. As Tarde puts it, ‘What do 
we place within the ultimate discontinuity if not continuity? We place therein … the 
totality of other beings. At the basis of each thing are all real or possible things’ (p.27). 
Clearly, we are continuing our movement from monadology to sociology. Tarde’s monads 
ooze sociality – they are thoroughly social beings that engage in social activity. And as 
these monads are the milieu universel, we must follow Tarde and affirm that, ‘everything is 
a society, that every phenomenon is a social fact’, and that, ‘All sciences seem destined to 
become branches of sociology’ (p.28).55  ‘Everything’ includes both the living and the 
inorganic; the two bridged by their inextricably intertwined existence and the fact that 
characteristics of both are to be found in the evolution of society, that is the shift from 
organic (living) subsistence to technological (inorganic) dominion. Almost a century on, 
Latour and his fellow actor-network theorists have begun formulating similar arguments on 
the human / non-human divide. However, whereas the prime concern of actor-network 
theorists – such as Michal Callon and his scallops of St. Brieuc Bay (1984) – was 
accounting for the consolidation and propagation of certain scientific truths through an 
account of the interactions and negotiations between the various actants and points of 
obligatory passage, etc., Tarde is engaged in a more speculative, ontological investigation 
                                         
54 This repetition is imitative rather than replicative, it results in similarity not identity. 
55 Conversely, for Tarde, sociology is the science par excellence, as the process of quantification – key to the 
scientific method – begins with the individual, as Latour explains:  
the very heart of social phenomena is quantifiable because individual monads are constantly evaluating 
one another in simultaneous attempts to expand and to stabilize their worlds. The notion of 
expansion is coded for him in the word “desire,” and stabilization in the word “belief” (more on this 
below).3 Each monad strives to possess one another. Most social scientists remain limited to the 
study of qualities when they handle only one entity, and quantification begins, so to speak, once 
they have collected large numbers of those entities. (2010c, p.150) 
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directed at beings themselves rather than the realities they produce.56 Take, for example, 
Tarde’s defence of the assimilation of organisms and inorganic bodies within societies. His 
argument is, ultimately, one of organisation. Where a being is well organised, it appears 
well-defined and symmetrical. Where it is decentralized and disorganised, it appears 
amorphous and asymmetrical. For example, a large, sprawling empire like China in the late 
19th century exhibits little symmetry and regularity.57 The same is true of certain slime 
moulds or, to borrow Tarde’s example, the ill-defined and asymmetrical contours of lichen 
when it ‘takes the form of a thin layer of widely spread cells’ (p.31).58 However, consider 
the symmetry of an orchid or coral and the high degree of definition and symmetry found 
in a centralized city-state or a strictly run barracks.59 The more tightly organised the 
organism or social group, the higher degree of symmetry. But all of this is mere prologue. 
Tarde’s argument is that this tendency towards symmetry in both organisms and social 
groups results, ‘not from a competition of intermingled plans which clash together, but 
from an individual’s design executed without hindrance’ (p.32).60  Where we find 
symmetry and regularity in human endeavours, we usually credit a single, strong mind, 
which has been able to execute its plans in full. ‘Every despot has a love of symmetry’61 
(p.32). But Tarde argues that the ability of every individual to execute their plans in full is 
a sign of social progress. And if this is indeed the case, then we must admit that organisms 
                                         
56 Tarde is, of course, interested in these realities too, inasmuch as there exists a recursive process whereby 
the realities produced by any given body define that body, i.e. the sphere of activity.  
57 Tarde – writing at the end of the 19th century, it must be remembered – points out, in what we could 
charitably call a colourful example, that China is many thousands of kilometres in length and breadth, but 
only one or two metres tall, ‘since the Chinese are rather short and their buildings low’ (p.30). The point, 
however, could equally be made of most nations: there exists, in terms of dimensions, a disproportionality 
that is not often found in nature. The point is not that an organism is like a nation; but that where a nation – 
or any social group, for that matter – begins to approach the proportionate dimensions found in nature, it also 
begins to exhibit the same degree of symmetry as found in nature.  
58 It is worth noting that this is not quite the case: as Philip Ball points out in Branches: Nature’s Patterns, the 
seemingly random nature of certain organisms and particular aggregates can be analysed mathematically by 
employing fractal geometry (Ball, 2007, section titled ‘Urban Sprawl’). This is not, I believe, critical to 
Tarde’s argument as he clearly conceives of symmetry and regularity as having the appearance of simplicity 
– a simplicity which conceals a great deal of complexity. Or, to paraphrase Leibniz, the simplest laws with 
the maximum possible variety.  
59 And if we are to treat every phenomenon as a social fact, we can look well beyond cities, which we are 
already reasonably well versed in understanding as abstractions. As Lewis Mumford writes, ‘Habitually, 
people treat the realities of personality and association and city as abstractions, while they treat confused 
pragmatic abstractions such as money, credit, political sovereignty, as if they were concrete realities that had 
an existence independent of human conventions.’ (Mumford, 1942, p. 7)  
60 Crucially, this is a tendency which will never be realized given the competition between individual’s 
designs and the explosion of diversity from symmetry. 
61 A view confirmed in the 1930s in Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. As pointed out by the external 
examiner of this thesis, Martin Savransky, it is ironic to say the least that Tarde should make this 
observation in quite this way, given the centrality of the principle of generalised symmetry to ANT.  
86 
 
exhibit a far greater degree of social progress than any human society in their ‘high degree 
of perfection … and the enlightened despotism to which they are subject’ (p.32).62 
Nevertheless, social progress requires society63. To be social requires the interaction of 
more than one individual. The idea of the unfettered plans of the single great mind, 
executed to perfection, obscures the contributions of all those who lay the foundations for 
these plans or create the conditions in which they can be realised or, indeed, those who 
seek to inhibit and impede. The monadological sociology which Tarde is proposing is 
based on this one truth: that the monad is, by necessity, a social entity. Let us quote a key 
passage from part IV of Monadology and Sociology: 
The obscure labourers who, by the accumulation of tiny facts, prepare the 
appearance of a great scientific theory formulated by a Newton, a Cuvier, or a 
Darwin, compose in some sense the organism of which this genius is the soul; and 
their labours are the cerebral vibrations of which this theory is the consciousness. 
Consciousness means in some sense the cerebral glory of the brain’s most 
influential and powerful element. Thus, left to its own devices, a monad can 
achieve nothing. This is the crucial fact, and it immediately explains another, the 
tendency of monads to assemble. … Let us also observe that the obscure labourers I 
mentioned above may sometime have as much merit, erudition, and force of 
thought, as the celebrated beneficiary of their labours, or indeed even more. I make 
this remark in passing, to address the prejudice which leads us to judge all external 
monads inferior to ourselves. If the ego is only a director monad64 among the 
myriads of commensal monads in the same skull, why, fundamentally, should we 
believe the latter to be inferior? Is a monarch necessarily more intelligent than his 
                                         
62 We are not to be too downhearted: whereas a city may be only a few hundred years old and have only a 
few million citizens; a single organism can be many times older and composed of an inconceivably large 
number of constituent elements. 
63 As a caveat to the use of the term ‘society’ I will quote Toews who writes: 
It is, in the end, of course impossible to will away the need to speak of social concepts that transcend 
our individual desires. Even a desire for unconditional world peace has to be qualified by hard 
thinking at times. But it may very well be possible, and indeed crucial, to avoid attributing a 
universal representational quality to those socially useful concepts that filter through to us in this 
process. (2013, p.396) 
This is an important point: we can problematize and complicate society, refuse to conceptualise it as an entity 
independent of its parts but we must retain the concept of the social, even if we continue to refer to it 
from time to time as society. 
64 The director monad occupies its position by virtue of being the one monad within the body which is held in 
some direct chain of relation to all other monads within the body, rather like the head of a family tree. 
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ministers or his subjects?  
(pp.34-35) 
This final ‘passing remark’ is what gives Tarde’s work much of its appeal. It allows us to 
break apart genius, hierarchies, power, nations, aggregates in all their forms and instead of 
finding simple entities or vulgar explanations and laws, we find even more complexity. But 
more than that, it allows us to question the very ontological foundations of those 
aggregates. Is it really true to say, Tarde wonders, that the aggregation of a number of 
separate beings results in the creation of a new being? If true, we are admitting that one 
plus one equals three, not two. For example, the nation. Sweden is a nation of 9,875,378 
beings.65 To that, are we to add another 1 – the new entity called the Swedish nation?66 Or, 
on a smaller scale, the individual human being is made up of innumerable elements. By 
virtue of their organization and relation is a new element created, namely, me? This mode 
of thought, where relation leads automatically to creation, actually generates hierarchy by 
claiming that through aggregating smaller elements we get a larger, superior being. Of 
course, this is antithetical to Tarde’s project which, at its heart, is an attempt to complicate 
the parts rather than the whole. As Tarde notes in Les Lois Sociales:  
In general, there is more logic in a sentence than in a talk, in a talk than in a 
sequence or group of talks; there is more logic in a special ritual than in a whole 
credo; in an article of law than in a whole code of laws67, in a specific scientific 
theory than in the whole body of a science; there is more logic in each piece of 
work executed by an artisan than in the totality of his behaviour.’ 
(Tarde, Les Lois Sociales, p.115 quoted in Latour, 2002, p.8) 
                                         
65 According to the official March 2016 estimate. 
66 Another example is the Scientist notion of the sciences. As Latour and Lépinay write, ‘the sciences do 
more than just know: they add themselves to the world, they involve it, they fold it, they complicate it on 
numerous points all while simplifying it on others’ (2009). 
67 Tarde’s training as a lawyer and occupation as a judge meant he had a deep understanding of the nature of 
the French legal system, particularly its peculiar role of juge d’instruction. Latour astutely suggests that 
this understanding has a significant influence on Tarde’s work:  
For a judge, the Code (or the case law) is never seen as more than a reference, a summary, a memory, a 
“composite photograph,” a guide; it is not a structure from which one could deduce any individual 
motif or to which individual behaviour should obey. The law sits side by side with a multiplicity of 
cases and precedents. Son of a judge and a judge himself for most of his active life, Tarde could feel 
the gap between rules and individual behaviour every day. … When Tarde heard the words “laws of 
society” in Spencer or even Durkheim, or “laws of nature” when reading natural scientists, he knew, 
first hand, that this was, at best a loose legal metaphor, and that it could never truly be the way that 
elements and aggregates would conspire together (2010c, pp.154-155). 
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What Tarde proposes as an alternative is a model that makes absolutely clear that – to fall 
back on the Leibnizian vocabulary – while the director-monad may direct, it is still a 
monad like any other; it is still a member of the aggregate like any other. As Sartre writes 
in Words, ‘A whole man, made of men, worth all of them, and any one of them worth him’ 
(1977, p.158). 
By shifting the focus to relation itself rather than the results of relation, Tarde necessitates 
a sociological monadology: a mode of enquiry that is fundamentally concerned with the 
relations between agents rather than the actions of an agent, actions that are really a 
manifestation or simplification of the complexity of the relations an agent finds itself 
enmeshed in.  An example from, as Tarde notes, the only social world we can know ‘from 
the inside’, is human language. Historically, as individual human beings within certain 
social groups have accumulated more and more knowledge, the language used to 
communicate this knowledge has become more regular, standardised, and universal. In the 
law, too, we tend to see an increase in regularity and standardisation as the constituents of 
the society that is being governed become increasingly differentiated on a variety of social 
levels, for example, as a result of increasing specialisation in the division of labour. In 
other words, the standardisation – in effect, the simplification – of collective social 
functions is correlated with the complication and differentiation of the individuals who 
inhabit that collective; homogeneity arises from heterogeneity. The social world that we 
know from the inside shows us that there is a tendency for complexity to be a property of 
the individual, the agent, while simplicity tends to be a property of the collective, the 
action. Before we move on, let us consider for a moment the implication of such an idea. 
Positing the individual as the agent and the collective as the action is not a metaphorical 
device. It is a key consequence of Tarde’s ontology. All action is and must be social. An 
individual cannot act alone. Therefore, when an individual acts on or with another, in doing 
so they form a collective. All action is collective but, more importantly, all collectives 
depend on action for their existence.68 Adding up the population of Sweden or all the 
things that are Swedish does not result in a new entity – Sweden – springing to life. But the 
activity of the Swedish populace at an individual level – as messy, contradictory, apathetic, 
or enthusiastic as that activity may be – creates and sustains the aggregate. The aggregate 
is the action. Should the activity cease, so does the aggregate. As Latour memorably wrote, 
‘If a dancer stops dancing, the dance is finished’ (Latour, 2005, p.37). We should also note 
                                         
68 There is something of the Hegelian dialectic about all of this, where the individual is the universal, and the 
universal exists through the individual.   
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the significance of the idea of ‘knowing from the inside’. Our position within the human 
social world affords us a privileged vantage point as students of human society that cannot 
be attained by, for example, students of geology or molecular biology. We do not have to 
rely on abstractions such as laws or structure, we can trace the associations of individual 
agents and their movements and interactions as we are ‘in’ not ‘part of’ the human social 
world, as the urban flaneur is ‘in’ not a ‘part of’ the city69 (Dörk et al, 2014, p.1543). When 
we do propose structures, it is because we have to separate the entity from its context due 
to a lack of knowledge of the attributes of which that entity is composed (Latour et al, 
2012, p.595). By the same token, causality is not located in abstract structural forces but in 
the ‘specific contexts of human interdependence and interaction’ (Santana-Acuña, 2015, 
p.214). To quote Latour again:    
Given the immense privilege of having proximity to their objects of study, 
sociologists should not be (mis)led into imagining that there could be a strict 
distinction between structural features and individual or sub-individual 
components. If they are, they have been engaged in the rather silly task of 
becoming voluntarily estranged from the societies they are studying. It implies that 
they are attempting to grasp them in the same way that astronomers deal with stars 
or biologists with cells. And yet, if the latter must handle their subject matter from 
far away, it is not because it is especially “scientific” to do so. It is because they 
have no other way to reach their objects of investigation. 
(2010, p.148) 
Difference 
Now we must move on to Tarde’s next innovation. So far, we know of the difference 
between agents and actions, the aggregate and the infinitesimal, the foundational forces of 
belief and desire, but to this we must add another concept: difference. If belief and desire 
are the foundational forces, then difference is the foundational substance. Leibniz begins 
with identity – ‘A is A’, subject ‘A’ has the properties of ‘A’ – but Tarde starts with 
                                         
69 There is a similarity to Wittgenstein’s differentiation between theoretical and non-theoretical 
understanding. As Ray Monk puts it, ‘Scientific understanding is given through the construction and 
testing of hypotheses and theories; philosophical understanding, on the other hand, is resolutely non-
theoretical. What we are after in philosophy is “the understanding that consists in seeing connections.”’ 
(1999) 
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difference, a concept that is a great deal harder to express in the form ‘A is n’, as we will 
see. Again it is worth quoting Tarde at length, for both explanatory and literary reasons: 
To exist is to differ; difference is, in a sense, the truly substantial side of things; it is 
at once their ownmost possession and that which they hold most in common. This 
must be our starting point, and we must refrain from further explaining this 
principle, since all things come back to it – including identity, which is more 
usually, but mistakenly, taken as the point of departure. For identity is only the 
minimal degree of difference and hence a kind of difference, and an infinitely rare 
kind, as rest is only a special case of movement, and the circle only a particular 
variety of ellipse. To begin from the primordial identity is to posit at the origin of 
things a prodigiously improbable singularity, an impossible coincidence of multiple 
beings, at once distinct from and similar to one another; or else the inexplicable 
mystery of a single simple being, which would subsequently, for no 
comprehensible reason, suffer division. It is to commit a similar error to that of the 
ancient astronomers who, in their chimerical explanations of the solar system, 
began with the circle and not with the ellipse, on the basis that former is more 
perfect. Difference is the alpha and omega of the universe; everything begins with 
difference, with the elements whose innate diversity (which various reasons make 
probable) can in my view be the only justification of their multiplicity; everything 
ends with difference, where, in the higher phenomena of thought and history, it 
finally breaks free of the narrow circles in which it had bound itself, namely the 
atomic vortex and the vital vortex, and transforming the very obstacle it faced into 
a fulcrum, surpasses and transfigures itself. It seems to me that all similarities and 
all phenomenal repetitions are only intermediaries, which will inevitably be found 
to be interposed between some elementary diversities which are more or less 
obliterated, and the transcendent diversities produced by their partial immolation. 
(2012, pp.40-41) 
This is a quite extraordinary passage and requires considerable unpacking. We will begin at 
the beginning. ‘To exist is to differ’. This formulation moves beyond Leibniz’s ‘identity of 
indiscernibles’70 or Hegel’s ‘identity of identity and non-identity’71, although it certainly 
                                         
70 ‘[I]t is not true that two substances may be exactly alike and differ only numerically, solo mimero’. From 
Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics, §9. 
71 ‘The analysis of the beginning would thus yield the notion of the unity of being and nothing — or, in a 
more reflected form, the unity of differentiatedness and non-differentiatedness, or the identity of identity and 
non-identity.’ From Hegel’s Science of Logic, §112. The former form – the unity of differentiatedness and 
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owes a debt to both. It substitutes difference for identity with the result that we must 
reconceptualise our whole notion of ontology as being concerned with being qua being; 
and indeed, as we will soon see, Tarde does just that with his theory of dynamic 
possession. But however we formulate identity, with Leibniz as A is A or with Hegel and 
his dynamic of contradiction and negation72, then we start, at least, with A. How are we to 
formulate difference? We cannot simply state that A is not-B, because that would require an 
identity, B, for there to be a not-B. It is also not necessary but rather contingent that A is 
not-B; not-B could also be not-C or not- D. Can we say then that A is not-everything other 
than A, the negation of everything that is not-A; or, to put it in its classic Hegelian form, A 
is not-not-A? Perhaps not, as when we start with identity, we start with the notion that there 
exists something, A, which has all the properties of A. These properties may include the 
negation of their negation, A is not-not-A, and may be defined by their difference to other 
beings, A is not B or C or D. But this is the negation of difference to establish identity. On 
the other hand, if we begin with difference surely it should be identity that is negated. 
Therefore, a truly radical ontology of difference would take the form of A is not-A. When 
we begin with difference we replace substance with relation. We start with the relation and 
discover the substances that are related instead of starting with the substance to discover to 
what it is related. If we begin with relation it means that ‘association is not what happens 
after individuals have been defined with few properties, but what characterize entities in 
the first place’ (Latour et al, 2012, p.598). As Roth writes in his essay Realizing Marx’s 
Ontology of Difference, ‘each instance of A is a singularity and, as such, inherently is 
different from other singularities … each singularity is itself heterogeneous, because it is 
what it is only through the plurality of singularities’ (2008, p.88). This is what Tarde means 
when he writes, ‘identity is only the minimal degree of difference and hence a kind of 
difference, and an infinitely rare kind’. This minimal degree of difference is found in the 
infinitesimal – identity occupies the smallest margin between difference and yet more 
                                         
non-differentiatedness – is perhaps more appropriate when discussing Tarde but would ruin the symmetry 
between Hegel’s postulate and Leibniz’s! 
72 For Tarde, the key problem with Hegel – and the reason that Deleuze is so staunchly anti-Hegelian – is that 
in Hegel’s formulation difference is always negated. One begins with identity; identity is negated (by 
difference); and, finally, the negation is negated to restore identity. In the process, difference is obliterated. 
This use of negation and the negation of the negation to define identity moves beyond classical logic’s empty 
statement of A = A but does so at the expense of difference which must, as Deleuze says, always be 
‘crucified’ (2004, p.174). So, while Hegel defines identity by difference, it is difference which he goes on to 
sacrifice. Tarde would much rather sacrifice identity. All of this deserves a much more detailed discussion 
but sadly there is not the space, nor the time, here for a lengthy detour through the ‘architectural and 
magisterial grandeur’ of Hegel’s ‘ruined work’ (Tarde, 2012, p.20).  
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difference, it is but a point in a process of incessant, unravelling difference. This is related 
to Leibniz’s view of motion and rest, expressed clearly in Specimen Dynamicum:  
Nothing more foreign to nature can be conceived, moreover, than to seek firmness 
in rest, for, there is never any true rest in bodies, and nothing but rest can arise from 
rest. 
(in Bussotti, p.38) 
For Leibniz, motion itself is absolute while, in actuality, the motion of any given body is 
relative. The inertial tendency of matter is overcome by the dynamic tendency of the 
entelechy (the expression of absolute motion): the two are engaged in a tug of war that 
neither can win outright, a body will never come to a complete halt nor will it break free of 
inertia. If we continue Tarde’s substitution of identity with difference, we find it is 
difference that expresses absolute motion and identity (the analogue of the entelechy) that 
expresses inertia.  
Accordingly, rather than difference constituting the space between discrete identities 
(beings), difference is the relational plain upon which identity is to be found. Difference, 
for Tarde, is akin to Leibniz’s ‘primary matter’, and whereas Phemister’s Leibniz infuses 
primary matter with entelechies, Tarde infuses difference with identity. Identity is an 
instantiation of difference: it is the particular to difference’s universal, the circle to the 
ellipse.73 Identity is also an event, the fulcrum or momentary point of obligatory passage 
between the differential alpha and omega – to use a suitably Latourian phrase – which 
transfigures and surpasses itself, and a way of punctuating, periodizing, or dividing up the 
‘differential continuum’.74 Identity is a manifestation of stability, a freeze frame or cross-
section of difference which is always in motion.75 To put it another way: 
                                         
73 Reminiscent of Kant in the Second Preface: ‘Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must 
conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in 
regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must 
therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose 
that objects must conform to our knowledge.’ (Bxvi) 
74 Not unlike the way Mondrian divides up space, for example: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piet_Mondrian#/media/File:Piet_Mondriaan,_1930_-
_Mondrian_Composition_II_in_Red,_Blue,_and_Yellow.jpg  
75 Deleuze makes a similar claim in Difference and Repetition: We know that each one of these completed 
notions (monads) expresses the totality of the world: but it expresses it precisely under a certain 
differential relation and around certain distinctive points which correspond to this relation. It is in this 
sense that the differential relations and distinctive points already indicate centres of envelopment within 
the continuum, centres of possible implication or involution which are brought about by individual 
essences. It suffices to show that the continuum of affections and properties in a sense precedes the 
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The essence of things is not in their being and certainly not in their collective 
manifestations, but in their individuality and interaction through communication. 
There is no such thing as personal identity apart from the external influences on 
thought, behaviour and desire that the individual assimilates from the outside 
world. ‘The identity of the person is only an avidity which is satisfied by an 
incessant appropriation from without. The ‘‘I’’ is only a word, or is only ‘‘mine’’ 
constantly enlarged’.’ 
(Niezen, 2014, p.49; quotation from Tarde, La Philosophie Pénale, 2006, p.120) 
Where Hegel seeks to obliterate difference in the service of identity, Tarde obliterates 
identity – ‘more or less’ (Tarde, p.41) – in the service of difference. Or, to be more precise, 
in the service of producing higher forms of difference or, as Tarde himself puts it, 
‘transcendent diversities’ (p.41). Tarde’s project stands apart from the two dominant modes 
of contemporary identity theory: the Foucault school who see alterity as something which 
is excluded in order to produce identity; and, as already touched upon, the post-Hegelian’s 
who see difference as the negation in the dialectic. Tarde, on the contrary, affirms 
difference; an idea taken up by few theorists, with the exception of Deleuze and, of course, 
Latour who would speak of differentiation and identification instead of identity and alterity 
(Czarniawska, 2009, pp.11-13). The interplay between the two can be thought of in terms 
of the relation of a wave to the sea: 
The wave—an individual brain—is a fold caused by the movement of the sea, this 
space of associated brains. The wave folds in and returns to the sea, but the 
movement continues. Thus, it does not make sense to speak of the sea as 
‘influencing’ or ‘determining’ the waves, but it does make sense to speak of waves 
as forming the sea, and of the sea as forming the waves. 
(p.13) 
When we consider the production of higher diversities, a similar process is evident in the 
evolution of language. Languages tend to move from diversity to uniformity through the 
formulation of rules of grammar and the smoothing out of differences in accent and 
dialect.76 However, that uniformity allows greater clarity in the exchange of ideas, which 
                                         
constitution of these individual essences (which amounts to saying that the distinctive points are 
themselves pre-individual singularities; this in no way contradicts the idea that individuation precedes the 
actual determination of species, even though it is preceded by the whole differential continuum). (p.47) 
76 For example, the increasing ubiquity of T-glottalization and th-fronting in British English. The following 
article is overly simplistic in its explanation (T-glottalization most likely travelled south from Scotland 
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results in a greater diversity of ideas. Tarde uses Victor Hugo’s ‘prosody with its subtle 
rules’ (p.41) as an example of regularization through the formation of laws and rules as a 
means to greater complexity; although, of course, not all laws and rules are 
institutionalized. We can only speculate as to what Tarde would have made of the turn to 
free verse and the abandonment of meter and rhyme in 20th century poetry. But it is 
certainly the case that the best of free verse poetry has its very own subtle rules – as T.S. 
Eliot said, ‘No verse is libre for the man who wants to do a good job’77 – and the worst 
clearly shows the effect of too many rules; inasmuch as the abandonment of meter and 
rhyming forms does not mean the abandonment of rules, but the substitution of a clear, 
simple set of rules with a messy, confused multiplicity of competing rules derived from 
common language and social convention. The result is a journey from the complex to the 
simplistic, rather than the desired move from the simple to the complex. This is strikingly 
similar to Leibniz’s maxim, quoted in the previous chapter, that perfection is, ‘that which is 
simultaneously simplest in theories and the richest in phenomena.’ Tarde puts Leibniz’s 
maxim in to motion by setting it upon the wheels of a refashioned Hegelian dialectic. To 
borrow a Marxian formulation, Tarde’s ontology can be described as D-I-D’,78 where 
difference is transformed into identity only to be transformed into a greater form of 
difference. Where the traditional dialect aims for a reduction to a single opposition, Tarde, 
to use Muldoon’s term, ‘depolarizes’ the dialectic and affirms a ‘multiplicity of forces’ 
(2014, p.63). And, in this formulation, we find the dynamism of Tarde’s, in Didier 
Debaise’s words, theory of ‘dynamic possession’ (2008). We will come to the ‘possession’ 
shortly, but in the meantime let us focus on the dynamism of Tarde’s theory. Identity sits 
between difference and a greater difference and, on the level of the aggregate, order and 
                                         
rather than north from London), but it illustrates the general trend away from a plurality of distinct 
regional accents: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/05/26/revealed-how-london-accents-have-
killed-off-local-dialects-acros/  
77 From Eliot’s lecture The Music of Poetry, delivered as the 1942 W.P. Kerr Lecture at the University of 
Glasgow. 
78 As opposed to Marx’s general formula for Capital, M-C-M’, where money (M) is transformed into 
commodities (C) which are then transformed back into money plus the surplus value extracted from the 
process (M’). Of course, Marx posits an alternative formula: where M-C-M’ produces exchange values; 
the form C-M-C produces only use values, that is to say the cycle ends with the production of a use value 
which is consumed. Thus we have the dual nature of commodities, containing both use values and 
exchange values. This is interesting, in my opinion, because of the similarity to Tarde’s formulation. For 
Marx, money is the universal equivalent whereas a commodity is a particular product of labour. The 
formulation M-C-M is then comparable to Tarde’s D-I-D’ – both move from a universal – in Marx’s case 
money, in Tarde’s difference – to a particular – the commodity or identity – in order to accumulate more 
money / greater difference and diversity. The contradiction inherent in commodities (between use and 
exchange value) takes in Tarde the form of an inherent contradiction in the nature of identity: identity 
both negates and is negated by difference. That both Tarde and Marx are using Hegel in a similar way – 
completely independently of one another, as far as I am aware – is quite striking and deserves further 
examination; but, again due to time and space, not here.  
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simplicity interpose between diversity and greater diversity: ‘order and simplicity are 
simply mediating terms, alembics in which elementary diversity is potently transfigured 
and, as it were, sublimated.’ (p.43) Order, simplicity, identity; these are but points of 
obligatory passage for difference, complexity, diversity.  
This point of obligatory passage could be interpreted as a period of time in which identity 
is fixed as a state. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, the only state is the state 
of difference: identity is, like rest is to movement, merely a special kind of difference. 
Identity is an abstraction, a punctuation or periodization of difference, a point without 
extension. One finds a similar strand of thinking in Bergson’s Creative Evolution:  
[T]here is no essential difference between passing from one state to another and 
persisting in the same state. If the state which “remains the same” is more varied 
than we think, on the other hand the passing from one state to another resembles, 
more than we imagine, a single state being prolonged; the transition is continuous. 
But, just because we close our eyes to the unceasing variation of every psychical 
state, we are obliged, when the change has become so considerable as to force itself 
on our attention, to speak as if a new state were placed alongside the previous 
one. … Discontinuous though they appear, however, in point of fact they stand out 
against the continuity of a background on which they are designed, and to which 
indeed they owe the intervals that separate them; they are the beats of the drum 
which break forth here and there in the symphony. 
(1998, p.3)  
Difference, not identity, is the alpha and omega of the universe. Difference is constitutive 
of identity, it is not simply the relation between two identities. In other words, it is the 
difference between things that makes them individuals. As opposed to Hegel, Tarde does 
not accept that ‘difference is grounded in an underlying identity’ (Stern, p.23). On the 
contrary, the underlying identity is wholly grounded in difference. Difference is primary, 
difference comes first. Only in this way can we account for variety, for if we begin with 
identity we will always smooth over differences in an attempt to integrate individuals into 
general categories. Unlike identity, difference is irreducible. As Tarde writes, ‘If everything 
comes from identity and returns to identity, what is the source of this dazzling torrent of 
variety?’ (2012, p.46) The laws and forces which govern our universe do not apply to an 
inert, passive, apathetic substance, fixed in its identity and state; the laws and forces are 
only the brakes and dykes:  
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…erected in vain against the overflowing of revolutionary and civil dissensions, in 
which the laws and forms of tomorrow secretly take shape, and which, in spite of 
the yokes upon yokes they bear, in spite of chemical and vital discipline, in spite of 
reason79, in spite of celestial mechanics, will one distant day, like the people of a 
nation, sweep away all barriers and from their very wreckage construct the 
instrument of a still higher diversity. 
(pp.46-47) 
This call to arms places difference at the heart of things rather than identity. Laws and 
forces do not motivate, they constrain; and, in so doing, produce higher and higher forms 
of difference. Difference is the élan vital. In society, this takes the form of imitation: the 
association and assimilation of social beings to produce new diversities. Of course, this 
social imitation is not mechanical; it is not mere replication but something more akin to 
influence (Katz, 2006, p.264). In fact, as Latour claims in a passage which would not have 
endeared him to the sociologists among Tarde’s followers: 
[I]t is important to understand that imitation is not an obsession of [Tarde’s]. Nor is 
his point a psychological argument about how humans imitate one another, as if 
Tarde had generalized from some observations to the rest of his social psychology. 
The situation was rather the opposite. He was searching for a route by which to 
bypass the ill-conceived notion of structure when he stumbled upon a plausible 
vocabulary, borrowed in part from medicine, and later from psychology. Imitation, 
that is, literally, the “epidemiology of ideas.” With this notion, he could render the 
social sciences scientific enough by following individual traits, yet without them 
getting confused when they aggregated to form seemingly “impersonal” models 
and transcendent structures. The term “imitation” may be replaced by many others 
(for instance, monad, actor-network or entelechy), provided these have the 
equivalent role: of tracing the ways in which individual monads conspire with one 
another without ever producing a structure. 
(2010, p.152) 
Latour correctly identifies Tarde’s monadology as the dominant mode of Tarde’s thought, 
with imitation placed in its proper place – as part of the vocabulary of Tarde’s monadology. 
                                         
79 It is worth pausing at ‘reason’ to quote Katz, who writes: ‘for Tarde, reason is better thought of as a 
product of conversation, in the sense that participants in Tardean conversation emerge with more 
considered opinions than the ones with which they entered’ (2006, p.268)  
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It is therefore impossible to understand Tarde’s social laws and laws of imitation without 
first understanding his monadology – it cannot be set aside as many writers on Tarde have 
attempted to do, explicitly or otherwise (Borch, 2014; Katz, 2006; Niezen, 2014; Scott, 
2007). To return to the production of higher diversities, in the organic world, it takes the 
form of generation: molecular, cellular, sub-cellular and so on. Both begin with difference 
and result in greater difference.80 For Tarde, the monad becomes a functional concept – its 
function is to produce: 
…a variation or a difference inside a continuous movement. It is an agency of 
variation that goes ‘differing,’ that is to say, that has step by step repercussions on 
the whole universe, although according to variable degrees of intensity. 
(Debaise, 2008, p.3)  
Possession 
Now we must turn to possession. Possession is the next of Tarde’s innovations. Whilst 
difference animates, motivates, and constitutes the elements, possession is the glue that 
holds together the aggregate. Relations of possession constitute society, for example, my 
father, my son, my mother, my city, my country, my party, and so on. These relations have 
different characters; some are unilateral – a master and a slave, for example – while others 
are reciprocal – two lovers who possess one another. Others still are mediated through a 
complicated series of cultural, legal, and political institutions. But we must not get ahead 
of ourselves, Tarde’s point is more fundamental than this: 
All philosophy hitherto has been based on the verb Be, the definition of which was 
the philosopher’s stone, which all sought to discover. We may affirm that, if it had 
been based on the verb Have, many sterile debates and fruitless intellectual 
exertions would have been avoided. From this principle, I am, all the subtlety in the 
world has not made it possible to deduce any existence other than my own: hence 
the negation of external reality. If, however, the postulate I have is posited as the 
fundamental fact, both that which has and that which is had are given inseparably 
                                         
80 Even atoms composed of the same substance are sufficiently differentiated to join to create a new 
substance, hydrogen hydride, for example (2012, p.50).      
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at once. 
(2012, p.52) 
Furthermore, ‘being’, as a concept, is dependent on possession as ‘being’ itself is a 
property. Something is or it is not. Something which ‘is’ has (possesses) the property of 
being. What is more, a shift from ‘being’ to ‘possession’ allows the emergence of a new 
continuum heretofore excluded by the binary nature of ‘being’. There is nothing between 
being and non-being, one cannot ‘be’ more than something else; there is however 
something between having and not having as one can have more or less of something. One 
can gain and lose possession in a way that one cannot with being, even accounting for the 
concept of becoming which, after all, has no satisfactory opposite.81 Another distinction 
between ‘being’ and ‘having’ is that one is, in effect, a stationary and fixed concept while 
the other is, by its very nature, active and dynamic. One ‘is’ until one ‘is not’. Whereas one 
‘has’ and can ‘have’ more and more again; or less, or any combination or series of gains 
and losses directed towards multiple elements and aggregates.82   
The philosophical shift entailed in this innovation is significant.83 Tarde writes, ‘Instead of 
the famous cogito ergo sum, I would prefer to say: I desire, I believe, therefore I have.’ 
(p.52) While by no means the first or last to reject Descartes cogito, as we saw, for 
instance, in the previous chapter84; Tarde is attempting a clean break with the whole 
concept of ontology. In its place, he posits an echontology85, a logic of having.  
                                         
81 Something may be unbecoming but it makes no sense to speak of something un-becoming.  One may 
object that such a complaint results from an inability to think beyond contradiction – affirmation and 
negation etc. – but ‘becoming’ connotes a linear, accumulative process where one moves forward into the 
world; as opposed to possession which is necessarily a social relation with no fixed direction and is 
capable of including accumulation and dissipation, accretion and erosion, folding and unfolding without 
contradiction.     
82 In addition to the similarities in language (All philosophy hitherto…), there is another echo of Marx in 
Tarde’s writing; specifically, the 11th theses on Feuerbach: ‘Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted 
the world in various ways; the point is to change it.’ Both Tarde and Marx are attempting to formulate a 
philosophy grounded in activity and dynamism. 
83 There is potentially a significant political shift too, as Latour observes: ‘Nothing is more sterile than 
identity philosophy —not to mention identity politics— but possession philosophy —and maybe 
possession politics? — create solidarity and attachments that cannot be matched (2002, p.15). Latour, in 
my opinion, is correct on the question of identity politics which, in Deleuzian terms, absorbs the notion of 
difference while completely ignoring that of repetition – or in Tardian terms, difference is affirmed while 
possession is overlooked. 
 
85 From the Greek ἔχοντος (echontos), the genitive present participle of ἔχω, ‘I have’ or ‘I possess’. Despite 
constructing this term after a significant time spent with Woodhouse’s English-Greek Dictionary , I was 
slightly disappointed to find that Theo Lorenc had arrived at it first in a footnote to his Afterword on 
Tarde’s M&S. However, he feels that its similarity to ‘ec(h)ology’ would be distracting. I do not share 
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Historically speaking, this logic of having emerges from the logic of being; it is implied by 
‘being’ inasmuch as ‘being’ is a property of something. The key ontological opposition can 
therefore be mapped onto an echontological opposition which reveals it to be, in fact, non-
contradictory: ‘being’ becomes ‘having’, ‘not-being’ becomes ‘what is had’. One cannot 
both ‘be’ and ‘not-be’ but one can simultaneously have and be had, possess and be 
possessed. For example, I have a brother and my brother has me as his brother. One also 
‘has’ in the plural, one ‘has’ in a multiplicity of directions and intensities. Similarly, one is 
‘had’ or possessed from a multiplicity of directions and in varying degrees of intensity. 
These multiplicities result in multiple worlds, centred on multiple actor-monads so that 
when Tarde ‘reassembles the social’ he finds a multiplicity within a multiplicity of worlds 
(Marrero-Guillamón, 2013, p.419). As observed earlier in this chapter in relation to 
identity, the substitution of being with possession explodes activity. Action is not simply 
something performed by an agent on other agents or objects. Action consists of the having 
and being had, the reciprocal possessions which, combined with a concept of agency based 
on difference rather than identity, constitutes a truly social relationality, a sociological 
monadology.  
The consequence of this social relationality is to reveal that, in the natural world, the 
property of any given proprietor is itself a proprietor or set of proprietors of one another. 
For example, extension is not a property but a description of the relation between one 
proprietor and all others: something is extended by virtue of its relation to other things; 
something is in motion by virtue of its changing relation – its spatiotemporal relation – to 
other things. Possession is reciprocal in this case. However, we find another type of 
possession, a unilateral possession. As mentioned above, this form of possession is like the 
relation of a master to a slave. Tarde describes this latter form of possession as extra-social, 
and the former, the reciprocal, as intra-social. This may appear counterintuitive but is 
perfectly in keeping with his radically social relational echontology. It is a question of 
abstraction. At the level of the elemental, the infinitesimal, it is true to say that every thing 
possesses and is possessed by every other. However, if we speak, as Tarde does, of the 
mind, we can say with confidence that whilst the mind possesses thoughts, these thoughts 
do not possess the mind. With less confidence, Tarde sketches a distinction between the 
real domain of an element and the conditionally necessary domain: 
                                         
this view. In fact, I believe the similarity is serendipitous and the term useful inasmuch as it makes clear 
Tarde’s break with ontology.  
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They mean, I think, that beyond the real domain of every element, there is its 
conditionally necessary domain, that is certain although unreal, and that the ancient 
distinction between the real and the possible, in a new sense, is not a chimera. 
(2012, p.54) 
It is problematic to describe the unilateral relation as unreal – after all, the relation between 
master and slave is all too real for the slave. What Tarde is getting at here is the question of 
proximity. For the individual element or monad, its nearest neighbours (its real domain) are 
its fellow elements within a certain being. For example, if a monad belongs to a cactus, it 
will be immediately surrounded by other cactus monads. Its relations with these other 
monads is therefore intra-social as it is a relation between elements of a single social form. 
When these elements are aggregated – when their intra-social relations create a social form 
– then that being is able to enter into a relation with other aggregated beings. For the 
monadic element, that relation constitutes an extra-social relation which takes place in its 
conditionally necessary domain. As discussed earlier in this chapter, these extra-social 
relations – where elements reach beyond their own social form – is, as Leonard Cohen 
would have said, the crack through which the light gets in. It is the extra-social relations 
that drive difference into social forms; whether the form is a plant, a human being, or a 
human society. As we know, Leibniz did not allow for extra-social relations in his 
monadology; their inclusion in Tarde’s is a significant innovation which creates a radical 
sociality both within and without the monadic element. 
However, we must also take into account the complexities of Tarde’s manifold and 
overlapping societies. It is true to say that the relation of a cactus to me is extra-social. I, in 
ordinary circumstances, perceive the cactus as a whole. Within it is, no doubt, a thriving 
monadic community but it is one to which I have no access. On the other hand, when I 
speak to a friend I do so as one member of a social group to a fellow member of that group. 
We, as Tarde writes, ‘reciprocally grasp each other.’ (2012, p.55) My ego-monad stands in 
an intra-social relation with the other monads belonging to me; but it is also part of a larger 
social form – a particular human society – and therefore also stands in an intra-social 
relation with the ego-monad of my friend. The distinction is clear: the relation I have with 
my friend is one of reciprocal possession; my relation to the cactus is unilateral. This is 
why systemized slavery or bigotry requires the ‘othering’ of a particular social group. Yet, 
even this is subject to complication and is inherently unstable. In their restless and 
indefatigable sociality, monads will find one another. There is something even in my 
relation to a cactus that is reciprocal, affirmed by our mutual organic life and all that 
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entails. ‘The element, already, intuits the element; the girl who tends a flower loves it with 
a devotion which no diamond could inspire in her.’86 (2012, p.56) The reciprocal relation 
also produces an emergent harmony – as opposed to Leibniz’s pre-established harmony – 
by concretising relations of belief and desire and allowing further relations to be built on 
those foundations. For example, in terms of technological development, the steam train is a 
harmonic relation between the steam engine, pistons and iron; all of which are inventions 
which occurred independently of one another. The steam train in turn enters into relations 
with the railway system, the movement of goods and passengers and all the social, political 
and economic developments that entails. Thus, we find the ‘unceasing tendency of internal 
small harmonies to exteriorize and to progressively amplify’ (Tarde, 1999, p.107 quoted in 
Debaise, 2008, pp.11-12).  
Reciprocal possession is the superior relation, it is the relation par excellence: 
… [relations are] the paradigm of possession of which all others are only sketches 
or reflections. By persuasion, by love and hate, by personal prestige, by common 
beliefs and desires, or by the mutual chain of contract, in a kind of tightly knit 
network which extends indefinitely, social elements hold each other or pull each 
other in a thousand ways, and from their competition the marvels of civilization are 
born. 
(2012, p.56) 
It is also the creative relation, the fertile exchange of one element with another. Its 
opposite, unilateral possession, is destructive. The two form a dialectic. The extra-social 
relation introduces the difference necessary to sufficiently transform any given social form 
to the point where it can absorb another – or elements of another – social form, thus 
creating a new set of intra-social relations. Difference leads to greater unity, which allows 
for still greater diversity. For example, imagine a walled society with its own particular 
social form. A foreign element coming upon this walled society will only be able to 
perceive it and interact with it as a whole.87 However, if that foreign element is able to 
effect some change on the society, breach its walls, intuit a fellow element within it; then, 
the introduction of a new diversity can transform that walled society into, if not an open 
society, a society at least capable of understanding this foreign element sufficiently to 
                                         
86 Of course, if she were a geologist she might see that the diamond too is, in its own way, teeming with life.  
87 For an example of that kind of closed society think of the Japan’s Sakoku policy during the Edo period. 
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grasp it reciprocally. In introducing diversity the possibility of reciprocity is introduced, 
which in turns allows ultimately for the absorption of that diversity and the foreign element 
into a larger social form, filled with reciprocal relations and all the social and creative 
possibilities that occasions. This is a form of creative destruction which should not be 
thought of as an annihilation or opposition but:  
a) one of combining elements that, in their varying repetition, are scattered by 
destruction and re-integrated in the new, b) an initiator of the translational 
processes precipitated by the new, and c) an opportunity for associations of actors 
to take shape. 
(Rothe, 2012, p.180)  
Tarde writes, ‘We must see every spontaneous modification of a living species, even the 
most fleeting, as aiming towards another species, which it would attain if exaggerated 
sufficiently.’ (p.59) The attainment or possession of the other is the telos embedded in each 
element, it is a kind of restive acquisitiveness; or, as Tarde terms it, an avidity. In 
sociological terms, this avidity is realised through imitation. Innovations are imitated and 
thus elements are absorbed into the social programme of the innovator.88 For the innovator 
to innovate, to create something truly new, they must stand outside these relations of 
imitation. But, as we know, no one can truly stand apart from the relations in which they 
find themselves enmeshed – any such claim amounts to an egotistical denial of the 
‘obscure labourers’ cited by Tarde. And so, instead of conceptualising a hierarchy where 
the innovations of the innovators are imitated by the imitators, we must understand that the 
social reality is more akin to a web traversed by countless monads who, by virtue of their 
movements and relations to one another, act as both innovators and imitators.89  
                                         
88 Muldoon, writing about the work of Lazzarato, describes the similarity of this notion to Deleuze’s 
difference and repetition:  
On the basis of this analysis of infinitesimal psychic forces, Tarde defines the most basic social fact as 
the action at a distance of one brain on another (Lazzarato, 2002: 31). The two elemental ways in 
which an action may occur are either through innovation or imitation. Lazzarato reveals how 
Tarde’s two basic social tools of analysis mirror that of Deleuze’s difference and repetition: 
innovation (difference) describes the power of social forces to invent, differentiate and compose the 
social world, whereas imitation (repetition) refers to the capacity to reproduce and diffuse that 
which is innovated, not according to a repetition of the same but through a production of something 
altogether new in the process (Lazzarato, 2002: 42). When one brain interacts with another it 
imprints or receives certain desires and beliefs through the encounter. On a social level, organisms 
are continually engaged in such encounters through various connections and within a general flux of 
psychic forces. (2014, p.64) 
89 This, in my opinion, is why Tarde’s monadology is not an afterthought to his theory of imitation but key to 
fully understanding its complexity. Unfortunately, without his monadology Tarde is fodder for business 
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Again, we must be conscious of the various levels at which Tarde’s metaphysics operate. 
While there is a telos at work within the element, there is no teleology present in the 
aggregate or the world as a whole.90 This is not because avidity is restricted to the element 
only, but rather because avidity is necessarily expressed through each individual element 
and, consequently, comes into competition and conflict – or accord and alliance – with 
other elements when aggregated. An element’s appetite can never be sated, its ‘telos’ can 
never be realised. In other words, while a lone element is driven by the need to possess, the 
element within an aggregate or social form is forced to compete with all the other elements 
within that aggregate, thus ruling out any one essential telos inherent to the aggregate. The 
nature of this universal avidity is that, ‘every possibility tends towards its realization, every 
reality tends towards its universalization.’ (p.60) What prevents the universalization of any 
given social form is the presence of external rival social forms and internal elemental 
dissidents. Therefore, due to the presence of these competing elements with their 
conflicting aims, there can be no teleology of history or indeed, for example and contra 
Aristotle, an oak tree. External reality becomes, in this model, something we push against, 
push into, and absorb and so on. It frustrates and resists; it is for this reason that the 
characteristic of, for example, solidity is necessarily a relation between an object and a 
subject, not a relation that makes any sense for the object in relation to itself. (p.61) 
Solidity is a form of resistance to our avidity, rather than an intrinsic property. The irony of 
this is that when universalization of a particular reality occurs, it increases the complexity 
and diversity of the elements within that social form whilst also increasing the number of 
elements whose avidity will ultimately be stifled. For example, in early human societies, 
we can reasonably suppose that it was not overly difficult for an individual to impose their 
will on their tribe or social group; for no other reason than in a smaller social group, there 
are fewer competing individual plans that need to be overcome. In modern society, the 
degree of universalization in society makes it extremely unlikely that one individual will 
be able to impose their will on the whole of society. Having said that, there is still one ‘tiny 
mind’ whose idea or plan has triumphed by the process described earlier in this chapter, 
whereby any state of affairs has its genesis in a lone ‘tiny mind’ or element that is, through 
a combination of possession and mimesis, ultimately successful in imposing its ‘plan’ on 
the rest of the social aggregate it inhabits. In one sense, it is a question of ratios: a large 
                                         
school innovators and entrepreneurs who wish to separate in a Randian fashion the innovators from the 
mass of imitators.   
90 On teleology, Latour et al comment, ‘When we say, for instance, that interacting ants unwittingly produce 
a perfectly designed ant nest ‘without’ being themselves aware of the ‘overall plan’, we might have 
unwittingly confused two different observing points of view: that of the ant and that of the ethologist’ 
(2012, p.602).  
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number of small societies will see, say, a ratio of one fulfilled individual plan to 100 stifled 
plans, but the larger society the greater the ratio. That means, if we persevere with the 
example of human society, that a single universal human society would be moving towards 
the realization of a ‘unique individual plan’ (p.61) which has its origin in one mind at the 
expense of billions of unrealized plans. A world of smaller, fragmented social groups could 
see the realization of thousands of unique individual plans within each group at the 
expense of fewer unrealized plans. Here we can see how universalization does not result in 
uniformity but, rather, a greater degree of diversity.91  
This may give the impression that Tarde’s monadological society is a nightmarish 
Hobbesian state of nature. This is not the case at all. It is clearly impossible to identify 
from which element any idea or action originates and, regardless, its realization is 
ultimately dependent on the collaboration of its rivals. Tarde writes:  
[I]n reality there exist an infinite number of centres and foci, from different points 
of view and to varying degrees. To consider only the most important of these 
centres, there still exists, we maintain, at the heart of the sun, the conquering atom 
which by its individual action extended by degrees to the whole primordial nebula, 
disrupted the contented state of equilibrium which, we are told, the latter enjoyed. 
Little by little, its attractive influence created a mass, while around it other atoms, 
its crowned vassals, followed its example in separately gathering together several 
fragments of its vast empire, and shaped the planets. And, since this first beginning 
of time, have these triumphant atoms, imitated by their slaves who exert their own 
attractive power, ever ceased for an instant their attraction and vibration? In 
spreading like a contagion through infinite space, has their condensatory power 
                                         
91 To indulge Tarde on this theme outside the main body of the text, he writes at length but rather beautifully 
in An Outline of Sociology: 
Disharmonies are to harmonies what dissymmetries are to symmetries and variations to repetitions. It is 
from the midst of exact repetitions, absolute contrasts, and perfect harmonies, that the best examples 
of general diversity, picturesqueness, and disorder appear, namely, the individual characteristics of 
things. The expression of a man or woman’s face, refined by the influences of the social life and the 
intense, complex, and ceaseless life of imitation, is a small and fleeting phenomenon. Yet there is 
nothing so important as just this fugitive shade of expression. And no painter has succeeded in 
catching it; no poet or novelist has recalled it to life, no matter how hard he has striven in the 
attempt. The thinker has no right to smile at sight of their long-continued endeavours to grasp this 
almost tangible thing, which never has been, and never can be, recalled. There is no science of the 
individual, but art is wholly of the individual. And the scientist, remembering that the life of the 
universe depends entirely on the fruition of personal individuality, would be compelled to reflect on 
the artist’s labour with a humility mingled with some envy, did he not himself, by stamping his 
personal seal on his own general notion of phenomena, always impart to that notion an aesthetic 
value, the real raison d’être of his thought. (1899, p.91) 
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diminished? No, for its imitators are not only its rivals, but its collaborators. 
(p.62) 
Setting aside the heliocentrism of that passage, we can still appreciate the model that is on 
offer, one which applies not just to the universe but human, cellular, atomic, and so on, 
societies too. Within this model, we find our twin universal forces of belief and desire.92 
The force of belief93 in an element generates an idea, the force of desire transforms that 
idea into an intention. These intentions are communicated between elements, by whatever 
means, and when the intention of one element is adopted by another, the adopting element 
is transformed. In The Laws of Imitation, Tarde renders these as ‘invention and imitation’ 
which take possession of belief and desire in order to organise and use the ‘real social 
quantities’ of belief and desire (1903, pp.144-146). In the language of religion or politics, 
these processes would be described as propaganda and conversion (p.63). The metaphor is 
a useful one for it elucidates the difference between unilateral possessions and reciprocal 
possessions. For example, the invading army tends to land at one point, a beachhead or 
suchlike, and conquer from that point outwards. A proselytizing religion, on the other hand, 
tends to spread its followers far and wide, conquering by persuasion rather than force. 
Soldiers are conscripted to fill a certain number of positions and ranks, disciplined and sent 
to forcibly impose the will of some imperial ruler on foreign populations. Evangelists are 
motivated by conviction, convert through propaganda and have no limit to the number of 
converts they seek. Armies confront one another as wholes and triumph by the destruction 
of the other; religions also confront one another as wholes, their rituals indecipherable to 
the other, but they endure and expand by absorbing elements of the other.  Of course, these 
are just metaphors for the processes of unilateral and reciprocal possession – we know 
from history the difficulty of separating the religious from the military and the complicity 
of almost any religion you can think of in violence and conquest – but they serve to 
illustrate in their ideal, abstract forms the difference between the two modes and, crucially, 
their differing resilience: most military outfits enter and exit history’s stage in the blink of 
an eye compared to the longevity of the major religions. (pp.64-65) The superior relation, 
the relation par excellence, is the reciprocal relation; the one found most readily in the 
highly developed, unified yet diverse, ancient cellular and organic societies.94 Therefore, 
                                         
92 Discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
93 To reiterate for clarity, belief is not necessarily conscious rational belief but includes pre-noetic belief.  
94 As pointed out in a previous footnote, our human society, young in comparison to these millennia old 
communities, still struggles. 
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we must not view nature with Darwin, as a battlefield where the survival of one is 
conditional on the demise of the other. Instead, we can view nature as an arena in which 
different forms of life absorb and assimilate one another, where aggregates are discarded 
and renewed but elements and, crucially, difference endure. This is a not a destructive 
process but a creative one; a creative evolution, to borrow Bergson’s phrase.  
Recall the quotation from Pauline Phemister in the previous chapter: 
Apparent death is the separation of the person (or corporeal substance) from the 
larger part of their physical body. A visible and divisible corpse is left behind. The 
corporeal substance itself, however, comprising the core body and indestructible 
soul, remains a living, indivisible (although now to all practical purposes invisible) 
being. 
(Phemister, 2005, p.99) 
Tarde follows Leibniz, writing:  
Non-life is not necessarily non-being, any more than is non-ego … Perhaps life is 
nothing but a time of trials, a drudgery of schoolboy exercises undergone by the 
monads who, on graduating from this hard and mystical school, find themselves 
purged of their former need for universal domination. 
(pp.65-66) 
Taking the whimsical latter half of the quotation at face value, the obvious question is, can 
we attain such a heaven here on earth? But one must suspect Tarde has fallen victim to his 
literary flair here, for he neglects one half of his thesis.95 It may be true that each monad 
desires universal domination, but each monad also requires the domination and imperious 
ambitions of other monads. When we begin with difference, when we place relation, in the 
form of possession, at the heart of metaphysics, we find a system centred on process, not 
substance. The schoolboy exercises are not only undergone by the monads, but the monads 
too are undergone by the schoolboy exercises. The exercises, the process of possession, 
dispossession and repossession, of being possessed, released and possessed once more; 
                                         
95 True, I think, in this case but worth noting Niezen’s assertion in relation to Tarde’s literary style that 
‘Indeterminacy was a principle in his work precisely because the foundations of social life as he 
conceived them were indeterminate’ (2014, p.46). 
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these relations define the monads, without them they are nothing, they have no properties, 
they are subjects without predicates. 
* * * 
The boldness and radicalism of Tarde’s echontology is striking. For a politically 
conservative criminologist and judge, Tarde is an unlikely iconoclast. But a radical streak 
does run through his work. Czarniawska points to Tarde’s 1896 science fiction novel, 
Fragment d'histoire future (published in English as Underground Man), wherein he 
describes, ‘a completely egalitarian society, people are free of needs and develop an 
intense ‘interspiritual’ life, consisting of the circulation of ideas—all barriers to 
conversation gone’ (2009, p.5).96 And Latour points out that what emerges in Tarde’s work 
is an: 
Extraordinary picture of a social order constantly threatened by immediate 
decomposition because no component is fully part of it. Every monad overspills the 
artificial being of any ‘superior’ order, having lend for allowing its existence only a 
tiny part, a facade of itself! You can enrol some sides of the monads, but you can 
never dominate them. Revolt, resistance, break down, conspiracy, alternative is 
everywhere. Doesn’t have one the impression of reading Deleuze and Guattari 
Mille Plateaux? The social is not the whole, but a part, and a fragile one at that! 
(2002, p.9) 
Marrero-Guillamón also notes that, ‘it is useful to make an explicit link between Tardian 
monads and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage as a “constellation of 
singularities”’ (2013, p.413). For him, Tarde can usefully be enrolled into contemporary 
political activism, as the Tardian monad allows us to ‘rethink the left as a “symbiotic” or 
“sympathetic” articulation of difference and disagreement’, and because the monad ‘allows 
us to conceptualize the “disjunctures between the actual and the possible” i.e. the power of 
invention and disruption that collectives have’ (p.413). The Italian autonomist Maurizio 
Lazzarato also cites Tarde as offering us a ‘unique perspective from which to view the 
operation of capitalism within this framework of societies of control’ (Muldoon, 2014, 
p.67). What is becoming apparent is the ease with which Tarde’s thought is enrolled into a 
diverse crowd of philosophical and political traditions. As we have seen, Tarde is claimed 
                                         
96 Although, I must admit, Underground Man, is a very strange novel and does contain some thoroughly 
bizarre ideas concerning sex and sexuality and is downright reactionary in terms of notions of gender. 
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as a pan-psychist, a vitalist materialist, even a speculative empiricist (Debaise, 2008, p.12). 
His work is taken as anticipating the digital age – Niezen writes:  
He seems to have anticipated – before the advent of radio broadcasting – some of 
the complex relationships between communication and social belonging … the 
connections between print capitalism and the rise of nationalism … his concept of 
publics seems more appropriate for the age of the Internet than for the time of mass 
production of newspapers. 
(2014, p.55) 
Tarde also finds himself employed by computer scientists and network analysts, for 
example Dörk et al who are, ‘inspired by the concept of the monad, which offers a 
relational perspective on the world by shifting emphasis from aggregation of the whole to 
movement among particular points of view’ (2014, p.1535).  
In other words, Tarde is everyone’s favourite, in Latour’s words, ‘not totally respectable 
grandfather’ (2002, p.2); which leads Latour to clarify that his claim on Tarde is ‘not for 
the sake of genealogy building, but because, on a few technical points of horrendous 
difficulty, Tarde possessed solution we have been looking in vain for so long’ (2002, p.3). 
This solution is arrived at through asking the following question, which is absolutely 
fundamental to Tarde’s thought:  
how does Leibniz’s Monadology allow us to rethink the nature of individuals in a 
way that makes them useful again to themselves, not as privileged, humanized 
subjects, but as actors seeking order? Can we eschew the modern myth of sacrifice, 
humiliation, and the lowest common denominator, and realize a more vigorous 
scientific conception of active social life? 
(Toews, 2003, p.401) 
The answer is found in his echontology, his theory of dynamic possession and vitalist 
materialism, and his rejection of identity in favour of difference. This final point, the issue 
of identity, is the foremost technical point of horrendous difficulty to which Latour refers. 
As we have discussed, the notion of the individual in Tarde’s work contains no trace of 
psychologism or psychological individualism. The individual, as Latour proudly points 
out, is a network, even an actor-network (2010, p.156). And, as such, Tarde provides the 
justification for the inclusion of non-human actors within Latour’s own programme. The 
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‘missing masses’ can be included by shifting from the notion of being to the notion of 
possession, ‘ending a hypocrisy that claims to say what non-humans are —their identity— 
and abstaining meticulously from saying what they want —their avidity, possession or 
properties’ (Latour, 2002, p.15). Putting this idea to the test in a digital setting, Latour 
argues that in tracing relations of possession:   
The point of this navigation is that it does not start with substitutable individuals … 
but individualizes an entity by deploying its attributes. The farther the list of items 
extends, the more precise becomes the viewpoint of this individual monad. It 
begins as a dot, a spot, and it ends (provisionally) as a monad with an interior 
encapsulated into an envelope. Were the inquiry to continue, the ‘whole world’, as 
Leibniz said, would be ‘grasped’ or ‘reflected’ through this idiosyncratic point of 
view. 
(Latour et al, 2012, p.599)97    
In this chapter, we have continued to build our library of concepts: adding possession, 
imitation, innovation, difference and our twin forces of belief and desire to appetition and 
apperception, compossibility and continuity, and, of course, the embodied monad. Indeed, 
it is that last of these concepts which represents the golden thread running through the 
work of Leibniz, Tarde, Whitehead and Latour; a thread we will continue to unpick in the 
next chapter on Whitehead before we turn our gaze to Latour’s actant-rhizome ontology, 
equipped with our library of concepts from our troika of ‘philosophers of monadologies’.
                                         
97 For context, the following is one of Latour and his colleagues’ examples of a digital test:  
We all have had the experience of preparing a meeting by searching on the web the name of the person 
we are soon to meet. If for instance we look on the web for the curriculum vitae of a scholar we 
have never heard of before, we will stumble on a list of items that are at first vague. Let’s say that 
we have been just told that ‘Hervé C.’ is now ‘professor of economics at Paris School of 
Management’. At the start of the search it is nothing more than a proper name. Then, we learn that 
he has a ‘PhD from Penn University’, ‘has written on voting patterns among corporate stake 
holders’, ‘has demonstrated a theorem on the irrationality of aggregation’, etc. If we go on through 
the list of attributes, the definition will expand until paradoxically it will narrow down to a more and 
more particular instance. Very quickly, just as in the kid game of Q and A, we will zero in on one 
name and one name only, for the unique solution: ‘Hervé C.’. Who is this actor? Answer: this 
network. What was at first a meaningless string of words with no content, a mere dot, now possesses 
a content, an interior, that is, a network summarized by one now fully specified proper name. The 
set of attributes – the network – may now be grasped as an envelope – the actor – that encapsulates 
its content in one shorthand notation. (2012, p.592-594)  
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Chapter 3: Whitehead 
It could be one of those little games journalists play on television talk shows about 
books: “Who was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century whose name 
begins with W?” Most learned people in America would answer “Wittgenstein.” 
Sorry. The right answer is “Whitehead”. 
(Latour, 2005b, p.223)98 
There is always a temptation to dwell on philosophical categories and labels. The two 
preceding chapters indulge such accusatory taxonomizing: Leibniz charged with ‘pan-
psychism’; Tarde with ‘vitalism’. Yet both charges will require reappraisal in light of 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. And what of Whitehead? A monist, for sure, but so 
were Leibniz and Tarde. Perhaps it is best to introduce Whitehead as a philosopher of 
relations or, even better, a monadologist.99 The term is more than adequate for our trio – 
perhaps Latour will make it a quartet – but the term monadologist gives little away beyond 
a preoccupation with internal relations and the identification of the subject with its object 
and vice versa. As for the reappraisal of Leibniz and Tarde, it may well be possible to avoid 
such pejoratives as ‘vitalist’ and ‘pan-psychist’ by appealing to Whitehead’s use of the 
Jamesian depsychologized category of experience (Stengers, 2011, p.202): the actual 
occasion. Looking forward, depsychologized experience affords us a valuable perspective 
from which to understand the societies of actants Latour is attempting to anthropologize 
and is a term Latour quotes favourably in his introduction to Stengers’ Thinking with 
Whitehead.100  
But first, a few biographical remarks. Most philosophers have an early, middle, and late 
period but there are few for whom those periods are so markedly distinct as Alfred North 
                                         
98 Latour adds later in the same article, ‘As to the other ‘‘W’’ [Wittgenstein] and those who have totally 
abandoned cosmology and metaphysics in order to retreat into language, they should remain where they 
are and where they belong: silent in the shelter of the various university campuses where they reside.’ 
(p.229) 
99 Didier Debaise argues that Whitehead is in fact a ‘speculative empiricist’ as ‘his ultimate aim is not to say 
what reality really is like, as it is from nowhere, but, rather, to provide more adequate and coherent 
interpretations of experience through a method of speculative and descriptive generalization.’ (Weber, 
p.521) 
100 As an aside, tt is Isabelle Stengers who first introduces Latour to Whitehead’s work, based on her 
discernment of a similarity in the concerns of the two writers. (Schmidgen, 2015, p.82)  
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Whitehead.101 Whitehead was born in 1861 in Kent. He entered Trinity College, 
Cambridge, in 1879 on a mathematics scholarship and was elected Fellow in 1884 on 
completion of his undergraduate degree. Beginning his working life as a Cambridge 
mathematician, Whitehead taught and then collaborated with Bertrand Russell; a union 
which ultimately produced Principia Mathematica, published between 1910 and 1913. He 
left Cambridge in 1910, the result of a controversy regarding a friend and that friend’s 
extra-marital activities, and moved his family to London, eventually securing a position as 
a lecturer at University College London in 1911. In 1914 he was appointed Professor of 
Applied Mathematics at Imperial College and, despite the Principia attaining canonical 
status and becoming one of the most influential works in the study of logic, Whitehead 
began to move away from his earlier mathematical logicism. During this period he mostly 
dedicated himself to teaching and administrative duties, while developing an interest in 
pedagogy, the philosophy of education, and the philosophy of science. It is during this 
stage of his career that the seeds for his later metaphysical works are sown, but it is not 
until he is appointed Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University in 1924 that he begins 
to realise a body of thought which reaches its zenith in Process and Reality: An Essay in 
Cosmology. The move to Harvard was precipitated by strict rules regarding mandatory 
retirement which would, by the early 1920s, have shortly put an end to Whitehead’s 
academic career in England. The significance of the move and the break it represented with 
his career to date was not lost on Whitehead when he himself remarked that the first 
philosophy lecture he ever attended was the first he delivered at Harvard (Halewood, 
p.2).102 Whitehead taught at Harvard until his retirement in 1937 and died in 1947, all his 
notes and manuscripts burnt, as per his instructions, by his wife, Evelyn. As for his essay in 
cosmology, published in 1929, Process and Reality (referred to henceforth as PR) began 
life as Whitehead’s Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1927 and 
1928. The work is, to use Whitehead’s own term, an exposition of ‘organic realism’ (PR, 
p.309): we will unpack and interrogate this term throughout the chapter to come, 
                                         
101 Though some argue that there is a continuity to Whitehead’s thought. John Lango argues that, ‘A 
peculiarity that sets it apart from most writings on Process and Reality is the use of logic – in particular, 
the logic of relations – to define the types of entity. This indicates that, even though Whitehead’s career is 
often divided into periods, there is no hiatus between his later metaphysical speculation and his earlier 
writings in mathematics, logic, physics, and the philosophy of science. In short, this indicates that the 
Whitehead of Principia Mathematica, is at work in Process and Reality.’ (Lango, 1972, preface) 
102 This is not to suggest that Whitehead did not have a solid grasp of the philosophical canon; as Pomeroy 
notes, ‘the philosophy of organism takes its subjectivism from Descartes, the communication between 
existents from Locke, the notion of repetition from Hume, and from Kant, the relational conditioning of 
experience by the subject.’ (2004, p.28) 
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particularly given our introduction of Tarde (see previous chapter) as a thoroughgoing 
nominalist.  
PR ‘is concerned with the becoming, the being, and the relatedness of ‘actual entities’’ (PR, 
p.xiii).  The doctrine at the heart of Whitehead’s essay is this: ‘the creative advance of the 
world is the becoming, the perishing, and the objective immortalities of those things which 
jointly constitute stubborn fact’ (PR, p.xiii). In other words, ‘The many become one, and 
are increased by one’ (PR, p.21). The meaning of this phrase will become clear through the 
following chapter: it serves as something of a Whiteheadian mantra, yet in it one can read a 
Tardean dialectic, difference as the alpha and omega with unity as an intermediary stage, 
and it captures something of the locomotive force of Whitehead’s process metaphysics. As 
for Whitehead’s relationship to Leibniz and Tarde; Whitehead is not a Leibnizian and he 
would likely never have encountered Tarde’s work.  
Whitehead’s relationship with Leibniz is peculiar inasmuch as Whitehead is both indebted 
to, and, in a way he is towards no other philosopher, vehemently critical of his fellow 
mathematician. Two quotes demonstrate something of this complex relationship: pre-
established harmony is denounced as a ‘magician’s trick’ (quoted in Stengers, 2011, p.279) 
while he proposes, in Modes of Thought, ‘there is a book that should be written, and its title 
should be The Mind of Leibniz’ (p.3). The latter is often read as a tribute but can reasonably 
also be understood as having a double-edge. However, there is a similarity in approach 
identified by Stengers who argues that: 
Perhaps only Leibniz, another mathematician, has adopted a perspective on 
experience similar to Whitehead’s. In his Philosopher’s Confession, Leibniz 
proposes, as the only general piece of advice he has to give, to always ask the 
question “Dic cur hic” (say why here). The point is to “say,” not to “know.” Leibniz 
demands that when we have to define a “purpose,” we not obey general reasons, a 
conformity indifferent to circumstances, a blind norm, but that we submit such 
generalities to the test of the “hic.” 
(2011, p.207) 
The ‘hic’ is the concrete, the ‘dic’ is the abstract – Stengers is absolutely correct to 
highlight this similarity between Leibniz and Whitehead as, as we will see, the dialectic 
between the concrete and the abstract is central to process philosophy. 
The relationship between the work of Tarde and the work of Whitehead is also complex. 
Whitehead the mathematician would have been wary of Tarde’s grandiloquence and his 
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fast and loose approach to the natural sciences but they are both theorists who take the 
primacy of difference and the interpenetration of subject and object as their starting point. 
They also share an understanding of abstraction – take this quote from Stengers’ Thinking 
with Whitehead and consider the striking similarity to Tarde’s views on the relation 
between the whole and its parts: ‘For Whitehead, the parts do not constitute the whole 
without the whole infecting the parts. In other words, the identity, or the enduring pattern, 
of the whole and the parts are strictly contemporary’ (2011, p.174). There is also a shared 
interest in the notion of repetition and imitation, and the genetic analysis of ideas. For 
Whitehead, crucial to social science is the understanding of the transmission of, as 
Stengers puts it, ‘the abstractions without which we cannot think.’ (2011, p.333) 
The following chapter will consist, largely, of a close reading of Whitehead’s PR. We will 
also draw periodically on Whitehead’s Modes of Thought, Science and the Modern World 
and The Concept of Nature, all but the last of which were written during his Harvard 
period. In fact, it is worth noting that all these works are based on lecture series for this 
provides an insight into both Whitehead’s temperament – the first editions of PR were 
notoriously error-strewn as Whitehead was not one for revisiting a work once he had 
finished it103 – and his pedagogical approach104 – where ideas are presented and then, 
through a process of iteration, developed, elaborated, clarified, placed in different contexts, 
until one becomes conceptually conversant, almost like the repetitive process of learning a 
new language.105 There is a certain tension here between novelty and repetition – both 
concepts at the heart of Whitehead’s metaphysics, as we will see, and the latter, repetition, 
something we are familiar with from our discussion of Tarde– which gives a clue as to the 
dipolar, dialectic nature of Whitehead’s thought.106 There is a dearth of relevant secondary 
                                         
103 As Peter Simons notes, ‘A comparison between the concurrent British and American editions reveals a 
slew of major and minor discrepancies, and it is clear that Whitehead’s evident disinterest in the 
mechanics of proofreading will leave a nasty legacy of misprints and inconsistencies. These will only be 
remedied by the heroic but as yet unpublished Corrected Edition of David Ray Grifﬁn and Donald W. 
Sherburne. No other edition should be used’. The Sherburne and Griffin edition is used throughout this 
chapter and all references are to it. 
104 Given the complexity and originality of Whitehead’s thought during this period, one must feel for the 
audience of these lectures who, in the majority, cannot but have been rather bemused. Indeed, Victor 
Lowe, in his biography of Whitehead, claims that the first of Whitehead’s Gifford Lectures was attended 
by 600; the subsequent lectures, by half a dozen. (1990, p.250) 
105 The entire contents of Whitehead’s system are more or less to be found in Part I, Chapter II of Process 
and Reality in the dozen or so pages he titles ‘The Categoreal Scheme.’ The remaining 350 pages serve to 
tease out this scheme that he presents at the beginning of the book; the scheme itself only really comes to 
life when one returns to it having studied the remainder of the work.  
106 There is insufficient space to fully explore the argument, but one could perhaps claim that Whitehead’s 
God is the dialectic, that God and the dialectic are one and the same. Take, for example, the following 
passage: ‘Thus the universe is to be conceived as attaining the active self-expression of its own variety of 
opposites – of its own freedom and its own necessity, of its own multiplicity and its own unity, of its own 
imperfection and its own perfection. All the ‘opposites’ are elements in the nature of things, and are 
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literature on Whitehead in relation to the significance of his work; that is secondary 
literature that is concerned with philosophy rather than theology. As Latour writes in his 
review of Stengers’ Thinking with Whitehead, ‘Among his many misfortunes, Alfred North 
Whitehead had the very bad one of provoking too much interest among theologians and too 
little among epistemologists’ (Latour, 2005b, p.223).107 However, beyond Whitehead’s 
own work, this chapter will make extensive use of Stenger’s masterly Thinking with 
Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts and Pomeroy’s heterodox reading of 
Whitehead’s process philosophy, Marx and Whitehead: Process, Dialectics, and the 
Critique of Capitalism. This chapter will work through the key concepts contained within 
PR with reference to Tarde and Leibniz, before presenting a view of Whitehead’s 
metaphysics as a monadological ontology which, not only provides a foundation for 
Latour’s actant rhizome ontology but also the tools for its critique.  
On a final biographical note, there is a popular notion that Whitehead’s break with Russell 
and his embrace of a relational philosophy – with its concepts of solidarity, God, feeling, 
enjoyment, and objective immortality – is the result of personal tragedy, the loss of his son 
in the First World War. In fact, these terms are not to be understood in their everyday sense. 
Whitehead is one of those philosophers, like Marx before and Deleuze after, for whom 
language as it exists is insufficient for the complexity and nuance of their ideas. One of the 
greatest challenges in thinking with Whitehead is learning his language; in a sense that 
constitutes the central task of this chapter. On the notion that Whitehead’s metaphysics is 
the result of grief and confusion, Stengers puts it best when she writes: 
To my knowledge, only Bertrand Russell, who always found ways to denigrate 
what he did not understand, ventured such an interpretation of the philosophical 
turn taken by his friend: it was, he suggested, the death of his son Eric, a fighter 
pilot, in 1918, that led Whitehead to reject a purely mechanistic universe and turn 
toward philosophy. No comment. 
(2011, p.4) 
* * * 
Process and Reality is a work of speculative philosophy. This is neither an admonition nor 
does it constitute words of warning, as it might have done in many twentieth century 
                                         
incorrigibly there. The concept of ‘God’ is the way in which we understand this incredible fact – that 
what cannot be, yet is.’ (PR, p.350) 
107 We might say ‘ontologists’ rather than ‘epistemologists’, since this distinction provides a clue as to the 
perspective of Latour’s reading of Whitehead. 
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Anglo-American academic circles; yet it is a term which requires some explanation. 
Whitehead dedicates a section of PR to a ‘Defence of Speculative Philosophy’, which is 
less a defence and more a redefinition – both in light of the physics of Einstein and against 
the positivism of the likes of Russell. Within this defence, Whitehead’s ‘Nine myths and 
fallacious procedures’ (PR, p.xiii) identifies, first and foremost, ‘the distrust of speculative 
philosophy’. It is this fallacy which frames, contextualises, even historicizes, the other 
eight. Here they are in full: 
(i) The distrust of speculative philosophy 
(ii) The trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions 
(iii) The mode of philosophical thought which implies, and is implied by, the 
faculty-psychological 
(iv) The subject-predicate form of expression 
(v) The sensationalist doctrine of perception 
(vi) The doctrine of vacuous actuality 
(vii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical construct from 
purely subjective experience 
(viii) Arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments 
(ix) Belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than some 
antecedent errors. 
We will not dwell on each individual proposition, but it is worth highlighting one or two 
and considering their effect as a whole. These nine procedures contain the seeds of 
Whitehead’s organic realism, his relational monadology. The dismissal of Wittgenstein’s 
language games, the denial of the Cartesian subject-predicate, the rejection of Kantian 
idealism, are all crucial to Whitehead’s project. Furthermore, his commitment to avoiding 
what he terms ‘vacuous actuality’ results in the most difficult, and for many philosophers 
most problematic, of Whiteheadian concepts: the eternal object and the primordial, 
consequent, and superjective natures of God. However, it is the last of these procedures 
which is of particular interest in the wider context of our history of monadologies. 
Whitehead, much later in PR, expands on this, writing: 
The conception of propositions as merely material for judgements is fatal to any 
understanding of their role in the universe. In that purely logical aspect, non-
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conformal propositions are merely wrong, and therefore worse than useless. But in 
their primary role, they pave the way along which the world advances into novelty. 
Error is the price which we pay for progress. 
(PR, p.187) 
It is this that appears to form at least part of the basis for Latour’s claim that ‘Whitehead 
has a gift of the most extraordinary rarity: he is not a creature of the culture of critique. 
‘‘He knows no critique,’’ as one could say of a saint “she knows no sin”’ (Latour, 2005b, 
p.236). However, in order to claim Whitehead as part of Latour’s anti-critique project one 
must only see one side of Whitehead’s philosophy. That is to say, one must read Whitehead 
solely as an anthropologist of actual entities and not also as a critical theorist of relations of 
power. Take, for example, this passage from Science and the Modern World: 
You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the utmost importance 
to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction. It is here that 
philosophy finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society. It is the 
critic of abstractions. A civilization which cannot burst through its current 
abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress. An active 
school of philosophy is quite as important for the locomotion of ideas, as is an 
active school of railway engineers for the locomotion of fuel. 
(p.36) 
These are not the words of a philosopher who ‘knows no critique’; on the contrary, these 
are the words of a philosopher for whom the critique of abstraction – which amounts to the 
critique of all thought, theorising, conceptualisation – is absolutely central to their 
philosophical project. When Whitehead denies the belief that logical inconsistencies can 
indicate anything other than some antecedent error, he is not denying the power of critique; 
rather he is denying the power of that particular mode of critique, one which effectively 
subordinates philosophy to mathematics and ignores the play between the abstract and the 
real, the subject and the object. When Latour insists we have never been modern we can 
agree with his rejection of both the positivism of the modernists and the subjectivism of the 
post-modernists – and the fact that both are based ultimately on the bifurcation of nature. 
However, by insisting on a flattening of (a)social relations, a tracing and charting of 
networks of actants in their localities and on a human (or whatever actant one is pursuing) 
scale, abstraction is dismissed as totalizing and disabling rather than something that one 
cannot think without. We find a similar understanding of abstraction in Tarde and Leibniz, 
both of whom assign abstraction a role which it is not afforded by Latour, but we will 
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discuss this in greater depth in the final chapter where we confront Latour’s monadology 
with those of Leibniz, Tarde and Whitehead.  
A few final remarks on this subject before we move on to the substance of Whitehead’s 
process philosophy. Whitehead writes, in the early pages of PR, ‘Philosophy is explanatory 
of abstraction, and not of concreteness’ (p.20). This is a statement Latour could agree with, 
at least in part. Concreteness is not there to be explained, it is present, immanent, traceable 
but, ultimately, irreducible. It can also be acted upon – crucial for Latour as a theorist of 
agency. We can intervene in the concrete; one can act in one’s own locality, on objects 
within one’s grasp; but one cannot intervene in the abstract; to attempt such an intervention 
is tantamount to chasing phantoms. For Latour, the spectral quality of abstraction is 
grounds for its rejection in favour of an anthropological metaphysics – taking the world as 
one finds it. For Whitehead, on the contrary, abstraction has, to borrow a phrase from 
Marx, a spectral objectivity. Whitehead is very clear – everything must be somewhere (PR, 
p.46). This is as true of the abstract as it is of the concrete. On the question of abstraction, 
Stengers also cites Marx, writing: 
[Whitehead] might also be considered a Marxist without knowing it, for the 
domination of abstraction is what is presupposed and realized by the process of 
commodification, when all concrete production is reduced to its exchange value in 
a regime of generalized equivalence, and when the living labour of human beings is 
evaluated as “labour force.”  
(2011, p.136)108 
In reading the following passage from Science and the Modern World we may be inclined 
to agree: 
                                         
108 There are a number of writers who draw parallels between Marx and Whitehead’s work. This is not a new 
phenomenon, as Marsh and Hamrick (1984, p.191) note Ernst Bloch’s social theory was grounded in 
process philosophy. However, it is an area ripe for further study as all too often the understanding of 
Marx’s philosophy is inadequate. Halewood, for example, provides a Whiteheadian account of capitalism 
which is entirely consistent with Marx, despite what he may think: ‘…it will be possible to move beyond 
the base-superstructure model to an account of capitalism as comprised of a certain quality of processes 
which infect contemporary society. It will be argued that, in a technical, Whiteheadian sense, capitalism 
does not exist; it does not subtend or determine the elaboration of social relations; instead it is constituted 
in and through the manner of these relations. Hence process, facticity, potentiality, limitation, productions 
are all interlinked as operations of the ongoing, ever-renewing dynamics which occur in a specific 
manner: the manner of capitalism. To claim that capitalism has no substantial existence is not to deny or 
lessen its pernicious effects. Rather it is to point to the insidious way in which it inhabits, inheres in, 
proscribes and prescribes contemporary existence.’ (Halewood, 2013, p.149) Of course, Latour makes the 
same point, albeit in a different way, when he writes in Irreductions, ‘Like God, capitalism does not 
exist.’  
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In regard to the aesthetic needs of civilized society the reactions of science have so 
far been unfortunate. Its materialist basis has directed attention to things as opposed 
to values. The antithesis is a false one, if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at 
the abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced emphasis coalesced with the 
abstractions of political economy, which are in fact the abstractions in terms of 
which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus all thought concerned with social 
organisation expressed itself in terms of material things and of capital. Ultimate 
values were excluded. 
(SMW, pp.202-203)109 
Values and valuation – and therefore abstraction – are central to process philosophy and the 
processive reality it seeks to explain. In PR, in two passages on the Category of 
Transmutation, Whitehead writes ‘[I]ntellectuality consists in the gain of a power of 
abstraction. The irrelevant multiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on the 
elements of systematic order on the actual world’ (p.254) and ‘Apart from transmutation 
our feeble intellectual operations would fail to penetrate into the dominant characteristics 
of things. We can only understand by discarding’ (p.251).110 The question of what is 
excluded ties in with Latour’s notion of exteriority – the main difference being that while 
what is excluded for Whitehead remains in the realm of potentiality, for Latour what is 
excluded exists in exteriority and can return, as Fraser puts it, ‘at any moment knock at the 
door of the good common world and, in demanding to be taken into account, not only 
modify the ‘inside’ but also, necessarily, invoke a new definition of the outside.’ (Fraser, 
                                         
109 The phrase ‘ultimate values’ opens a space for a consideration of alternative values and systems of 
valuation, unlike systems which alienate and obfuscate like capitalism. Benjamin Noys, in his critique of 
Latour, writes: 
Marx’s analysis reveals the complexity of what we take for granted as, precisely ‘objects’, deflated into 
our ‘concrete’ experience. In fact, ‘objects’ take on value only in relation to other objects, and we 
treat this ‘value’ as a natural or, dare we say, psychological fact. The result is that ‘things take on a 
life of their own’ (Heinrich, 2012, p. 73) but not in the sense Latour supposes. This is because this is 
a ‘real’ situation, one not generated by us or by the objects but by the form of value that inheres in 
them. Therefore, our interactions with the world are not illusory but formed in social processes 
which constitute a social reality and necessity which dominates us. Therefore, contra Latour, it is 
social relations that produce the reification of capital, which is nonetheless real for all that. We can’t 
wish away or dismantle these relations by the fiat of network analysis but rather have to grasp 
capitalism’s constitution of itself as ‘automatic subject [automatisches Subjekt]’ (Marx, 1976, p. 
255). (Noys, pp.205-206) 
What Noys describes here captures the play between the concrete and the abstract, aversion and adversion, 
the spectral and the real, all that is at the heart of Whitehead’s metaphysics. Latour only appears to be 
interested in one half of this metaphysics: the concrete, adversion, the real.  
110 Whitehead also writes that ‘the notion of complete abstraction is self-contradictory. For you cannot 
abstract the universe from any entity ... so as to consider that entity in isolation’ (PR, 28). Here we again 
see the nuance of Whitehead’s metaphysics and his determination to account for the subtle interplay of 
subject and object within each entity through a dialectical logic rather than Latour’s one-sided ‘taking the 
world as it is’ empiricism. 
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2006, p.63) In terms of metaphysics, Whitehead’s understanding of abstraction, value and 
potentiality is clearly more nuanced and consistent with a monadological tradition which 
maintains that, ‘all the elements in the same world are in contact with or connected to each 
other; there are no gaps, and there is no outside.’ (Fraser, 2006b, p.130) 111 We can also 
compare Whitehead’s approach here with that of Leibniz who views perception as a sliding 
scale between the clear and the confused. Whitehead, on the other hand, in allowing for the 
fact that that which is excluded is also at the same time included – through the concept of 
negative prehension – allows the actualisation of any given potentiality not merely a 
viewpoint or perspective on the world, but ‘involved in a world, thus and not otherwise.’ 
(Stengers, 2011, p.213) 
 
In this section, as we are interrogating Latour’s own metaphysics and his claims of 
association with Whitehead, we have framed Whitehead’s work in our own terms and not 
in Latour’s. Before we move on to consider the actual entity let us return to the question of 
speculative philosophy and draw this section to a close with one final quotation from 
Whitehead which renders crystal clear the purpose of his philosophy: ‘Speculative 
Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas 
in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.’ (PR, p.3) 
Actual entities 
All modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms 
of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. The result 
always does violence to that immediate experience which we express in our 
actions, our hopes, our sympathies, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spite of 
                                         
111 On the question of abstraction – framed in terms of ethics – Fraser draws out the difference between 
Latour and Whitehead as follows:  
Like Whitehead, Latour would certainly agree that what is excluded is part and parcel of enduring 
entities (in Whitehead’s terms, enduring shapes of value). But herein lies a crucial difference 
between them, because what is excluded for Whitehead is not an exterior composed of things or 
even of propositions, but rather the potential for division or differentiation (for becoming); the 
potential, that is, to become differently. The price of becoming, as the discussion of abstractions and 
specialized knowledges earlier implied, is ‘the exclusion of the boundless wealth of alternative 
potentiality’ (Whitehead, 1938: 207–8). ‘[B]y the nature of the case’, Whitehead writes, ‘you have 
abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are important in your 
experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them’ (Whitehead, 1985: 73). This is 
the rub: excluded potentiality is important, but it cannot be grasped in thought. This suggests that it 
is not abstractions in themselves, whether they are internalized or externalized, which are relevant to 
ethics, but rather the relation of those abstractions to the unrealized potentialities, ‘the remainder of 
things’, that they necessarily exclude but whose significance cannot be refused. 
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our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis. We find ourselves in a buzzing world, 
amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some disguise or other, 
orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances, each enjoying an 
illusory experience: “O Bottom, thou art changed! what do I see on thee?” 
(PR, pp.49-50) 
The actual entity is Whitehead’s monad. It is the ‘stubborn matter of fact’ (PR, p.239), the 
foundational element, the building block of reality. The centrality of actual entities and 
experience is clear:  
‘Actual entities’ – also termed ‘actual occasions’ – are the final real things of which 
the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more 
real … these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.’ 
(PR, p.18)  
And, ‘Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare 
nothingness’ (PR, p.167). The actual entity resolves the contradictions of subject and 
predicate, particular and universal, becoming and being. Moreover, it is a concept which 
delineates the individual experience whilst preserving the fluidity of experience: the many 
become one, and are increased by one. In other words, we find, in the actual entity, a 
dialectic of experience; a becoming and a perishing, an immortal object and transient 
subject, a unity of difference which produces still greater diversity.  The Jamesian ‘buzzing 
world’ which Whitehead describes in the quote above perfectly captures this idea, the 
‘vibratory experience’, of the vibration between the one and the many, the universal and 
the particular (Pomeroy 2004, pp.37-38). Let us now look at the actual entity in more 
detail, and in doing so, introduce some of Whitehead’s other vital concepts. 
To be clear, like Tarde, Whitehead may have taken the Leibnizian monad as a model but it 
undergoes a significant transformation under him. With Tarde, the monad is no longer 
windowless, and this is also true of Whitehead’s monad – indeed we might go so far as to 
say that for Whitehead the monad is ‘all window’ (Simons, p.301); yet, Whitehead goes 
still further. The crucial difference between Whitehead’s monad and Leibniz’s – and 
Tarde’s for that matter – is that Leibniz’s monads change. Whitehead’s do not.112 Rather, 
they ‘merely become’ (Whitehead’s emphasis): 
                                         
112 This may appear surprising but all will become clear as the chapter unfolds. 
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Each monadic creature is a mode of the process of ‘feeling’ the world, of housing 
the world in one unit of complex feeling, in every way determinate. Such a unit is 
an ‘actual occasion’; it is the ultimate creature derivative from the creative process. 
(PR, p.80) 
Once the actual entity becomes, it perishes. Leibniz’s monads are able to change through 
time, but only as a result of pre-established harmony. The result is, as Bell notes, that:  
Leibniz forecloses any possibility for novelty, which leads Deleuze, despite his 
admiration for Leibniz in many other respects, to this harsh conclusion: ‘he 
[Leibniz] assigns to philosophy the creation of new concepts provided that they do 
not overthrow “established sentiments”’ 
(Bell, 2010, p.20) 
Put another way, in Whitehead’s system, ‘monads no longer function as intermediaries 
between states of the world but are rather the very becoming of the world itself.’ (Bell, 
2012, p.135) As a result, Whitehead rejects the principle of sufficient reason. The universe, 
for Whitehead, is not a problem or equation that can be worked out. There is no divine 
being, ensuring everything is in its right place. For that matter, Whitehead writes in 
Religion in the Making: 
The Leibnizian theory of the “best of possible worlds” is an audacious fudge 
produced in order to save the face of a Creator constructed by contemporary, and 
antecedent, theologians. Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate 
experience is most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision 
of the immediate subject-superject … is the foundation of our experience of 
responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-
reproach, of freedom, of emphasis. 
(p.46-47) 
But still the question remains: what is an actual entity? Hooper, in his impeccably lucid 
1941 article on Whitehead for the journal Philosophy writes: 
You may wish me to point out an actual entity to you, so that you may see it with 
your eyes. I am afraid I cannot do that because they are too microscopic for the 
eyes to see, and in addition are as a rule, swiftly transitory. The table at which I am 
writing, and the lamp which enables me to see, are not actual entities in the sense of 
the Organic Philosophy. Neither is the dog at my feet, or the walnut tree in my 
garden, whose leaves are now dropping. They certainly are composed of actual 
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entities in great number, but it is better to regard them as "societies" of actual 
entities with varying degrees of complex order, than actual occasions. Indeed, an 
actual entity or "occasion" in the physical world is much more like a vibration than 
a table or lamp, dog or tree. In the realm of conscious life an actual occasion is the 
passing experience of a pleasure or pain, the experience of an emotion, such as 
anger or fear, or an aesthetic thrill of delight evoked by the contemplation of a 
beautiful object. All these examples are "occasions" or units of experience. 
(p.286) 
We have come as far as we can in describing the general character of Whitehead’s organic 
philosophy and must now release a torrent of concepts, many of which, in the Leibnizian 
fashion, originate in Whitehead’s work as the result of his grasping for an adequate 
vocabulary with which to describe and interrogate the world but, contra the Leibnizian 
fashion, do overthrow ‘established sentiments’. 
The first of these, beyond the actual entity, is prehension. The actual entity itself is 
composed of prehensions. These prehensions can be characterised by three features. First, a 
prehension is prehended by a subject – the actual entity; it is thus relational. Second, the 
object of prehension is the datum which is prehended; it is thus intentional. Finally, the 
prehension has a subjective form; in other words, the subject prehends in a particular way. 
The datum is that particular aspect of a preceding actual entity which is objectified in the 
prehending actual entity. To put it another way, datum are derived from the universe of past 
actual entities (the many) and united in the process of the becoming of the prehending 
actual entity (the one). This process is known as concrescence. It is a multi-phased process 
which we will discuss in more detail but first let us return to the prehension and its place in 
the process.  
There are both positive and negative prehensions. Negative prehensions function as an 
eliminative process: a means of focussing on particular aspects of the many. The positive 
prehension is a feeling which effects a concrescence (PR, pp.220-221). In this sense, the 
negative prehension is subordinate to the positive prehension or feeling. The term ‘feeling’ 
is, of course, used in a technical sense but is deliberately chosen to give some sense of the 
interplay between subject and object, the grasping of things in experience. Whitehead 
describes it in the following terms: 
Each actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It is a 
process of ‘feeling’ the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one 
individual ‘satisfaction.’ Here ‘feeling’ is the term used for the basic generic 
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operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual 
entity in question. 
(PR, p.40) 
Again, this concept of feeling can be characterised by several features. There is the feeling 
subject which is the actual entity; the initial data which present themselves to the 
prehending entity, that is, the data prior to any eliminative process; the negative 
prehensions which focus the feeling through elimination; the objective datum, which is 
felt; and finally the aforementioned subjective form, which is the response of the actual 
entity to the felt datum, that is how the datum is valued, compared, the role of 
consciousness, and so on. This subjective form is defined by its novelty. In other words, it 
is particular to the prehending subject and the objective datum that is being prehended. 
Each instance of prehension, each concrescence produces something new – it is a creative 
advance into the world, the many become one, and are increased by one. Novelty is of 
immense importance to Whitehead’s system. Without novelty there can be no movement, 
no creativity, no progress. Novelty is achieved through repetition; through the inheritance 
of objective datum viewed from a particular and unique perspective. This particular 
perspective necessarily creates something new, something novel, which, in turn, becomes 
the initial data for further novelty: ‘the world around us is a familiar home and a continual 
surprise’ (Pomeroy, p.38). Whitehead writes, 
Order is not sufficient. What is required, is something much more complex. It is 
order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness of order does not degenerate 
into mere repetition; and so that the novelty is always reflected upon a background 
of system. 
(PR, p.339) 
As Tarde begins with difference, so Whitehead begins with novelty: it is Whitehead’s 
‘alpha and omega’, with order entering the space between. 
This process of prehension, of feeling and elimination, continues until there is a concrete 
unity of feeling, which is to say that ‘all indetermination as to the realization of 
possibilities has been eliminated’ (PR, p.211). This is termed the ‘satisfaction’; the 
‘culmination of the concrescence into a completely determinate matter of fact’ (PR, p.212). 
The actual entity therefore has a dual character. It is both the subject of its own becoming 
and the object, in its being, of the becoming of other actual entities. Whitehead describes 
this as the subject/superject character of the actual entity. The actual entity becomes, it is 
the prehending subject; it achieves satisfaction through concrescence; and finally perishes 
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to live on in objective immortality as the initial data presented to further actual entities and 
the seam from which objective datum is mined. 
The consequence of this is that the actual entity is simultaneously intensive and extensive, 
nontemporal and temporalized. Furthermore the actual entity is both passive and active: 
active in its own becoming and passive as data for the becoming of other actual entities. 
These two states are not consecutive but contemporaneous. In a similar fashion to 
Leibniz’s primary matter, Whitehead employs the extensive continuum. This continuum 
constitutes the raw stuff in which the actual entity is located. Whitehead writes: 
Actual entities atomize the extensive continuum. This continuum is in itself merely 
the potentiality for division; actual entity effects this division […] with the 
becoming of any actual entity what was previously potential in the space-time 
continuum is now the primary real phase in something actual. 
(PR, p.67) 
Again, we see here the interplay between the abstract and the concrete, the atomic and the 
continuum. The actual entity is, in effect, what Deleuze would call a fold; or Latour a 
periodisation.  
The essential duality of the abstract entity results in the possibility of two form analysis. 
The first is a genetic analysis; that is to say, an intensive analysis of the actual entity as 
subject, its ‘adventure of becoming that subject’ (Pomeroy, p.31). The second is coordinate 
analysis; that is, the extensive analysis of the actual entity as superject, its analysis as a 
concrete fact. Crucial to our understanding of both these modes of analysis is the fact that 
both are abstractive of the actual entity which is always at the same time both intensive and 
extensive, subject and superject. We ought not to see these two modes of analysis as a form 
of dualism, but rather as a duality, a unity of difference; in other words, a dialectic, which 
is to say an internal relation of difference, of opposing dualities. If we take the dialectical 
nature of the actual entity as our starting point it becomes far less likely that we will 
impose a one-sided or dualistic concreteness on to the actual entity as a result of one or 
other mode of analysis. We will, in other words, not privilege one or the other – which is to 
say, either the genetic or coordinate analysis, or the subjective or superjective nature of the 
entity – or effect such a partition through our analysis as to render it impossible to reunite 
the dual natures back into the one entity. To do so would be to indulge in a form of 
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misplaced concreteness, an error which, as Pomeroy writes, ‘Whitehead himself warned 
against ... often enough’ (p.31).113 
The radically relational nature of Whitehead’s process philosophy is beginning to emerge. 
Tarde grasps for a truly relational monadology, one that does not require reflections and the 
hand of God, like Leibniz’s. He finds a social and relational monadology but one which is 
psychologized. Whitehead adopts the Jamesian depsychologized category of experience 
and, in doing so, moves beyond the concepts of belief and desire which lead to the 
characterization of Tarde’s work as pan-psychist and vitalist. When discussing Leibniz’s 
concepts of perception and apperception Whitehead cautions that these terms are ‘too 
closely allied to the notion of consciousness which in my doctrine is not a necessary 
accompaniment.’ (Adventures of Ideas, p.234) Indeed, we have to be careful not to read 
terms like feeling and satisfaction as being conscious mental states. It is a mistake 
frequently made and has led writers like Peter Simons114 to disparage Whitehead’s work as 
pan-psychist when it patently is not. On the contrary, as Ford correctly observes, 
‘Whitehead is not a pan-psychist. All of Whitehead’s occasions are physical as well as 
mental, which he came to see were subjective in their present immediacy but objective in 
their pastness.’ (Ford, p.145)  
It is worth quoting Pomeroy at length here as she provides a clear and concise account of 
the relational nature of the actual entity:  
Process philosophy is based on the conception of the constitution of each actual 
entity by its unique perspective on and integration of the data provided for it by its 
settled actual world. Thus, each occasion inherits a settled past that provides the 
datum for the physical and conceptual feelings that are its nontemporal self-
actualization. Each actual entity is its self-creative activity of physical inheritance 
from a unique spaciotemporal perspective on the datum and conceptual valuation of 
that inherited datum; it constitutes itself by the way in which it is related to and 
relates itself to its world: each actual entity is its internal relations to all other 
                                         
113 Pomeroy astutely observes that ‘misplaced concreteness lies at the heart of capitalism’s form of social 
relations’ (p.10) and ‘Thus capitalism itself appears as a form of misplaced concreteness in which human 
beings are literally ruled by abstractions, particularly the abstraction of value. As we labour within 
capitalism, we allow our very being/becoming to be dominated by the reiterative dative inheritance, we 
allow ourselves to be constituted by past value and thereby misplace our concrete processive activity in 
abstract commodity value.’ (p.171) 
114 Who takes the position that Stengers describes as ‘so you think electrons “think like we do”?’ (2011, 
p.202) 
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entities. 
(p.43) 
For now, we will let Whitehead have the last word on the actual entity, although, as we will 
see, the interdependency of these concepts is such that more is added to the familiar 
concepts with the introduction of each new concept – another example of a philosophical 
system reflecting the world it describes rather than taking the world as one finds it. 
It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of organism, that 
the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely 
abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of 
its experiences. It is subject-superject, and neither half of this description can for a 
moment be lost sight of. 
(PR, p.29) 
Eternal objects 
The eternal object is among the most difficult of Whitehead’s concepts. Reminiscent of the 
Platonic Forms, but in fact substantially different, the eternal object is pure potential.115 
Unlike Plato’s Forms, Whitehead’s eternal objects are not determinant themselves but 
rather provide the conditions for determination. As Stengers explains, ‘they explain 
nothing, justify nothing, guarantee nothing, privilege nothing, especially not intellectual 
operations in search of abstraction.’ (2011, p.302) 
Eternal objects are necessary to account for novelty, for creativity; in other words, for 
change. However, as we will see, they lead inexorably to another of the most difficult 
Whiteheadian concepts: God. ‘Everything must be somewhere; and here ‘somewhere’ 
means ‘some actual entity.’’ (PR, p.46) Eternal objects are not exempt from this, even 
general potentiality must be actualized; and so, we require God, in its116 primordial nature, 
as the non-temporal actual entity. But, for the moment, let us put God to one side and 
return to the eternal object.  
                                         
115 In fact, Whitehead writes that, ‘if the term ‘eternal objects’ is disliked, the term ‘potentials’ would be 
suitable.’ (PR, 149) As Latour observes, the term ‘eternal objects’ causes its fair share of discomfort and 
anxiety but ‘potentials’ does not quite communicate the significance and novelty of the concept, 
affording, perhaps, an escape from the difficulty and complexity of the notion itself. 
116 We will use the neutral pronoun to refer to God to make clear it is God as concept rather than God as 
Judaeo-Christian being. 
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As tricky a concept as eternal objects may be, they are indispensable. On this, Latour is 
right when he writes: ‘Try to take eternal objects out, as so many embarrassed readers 
would like to, and, immediately, Whitehead’s argument becomes another theory of 
emergence, another form of naturalization, or even worse, some type of pan-psychism.’ 
(p.235)  
There is more to the philosophy of organism than the isolated, atomized subject. The actual 
entity must realize its potential(s) in order to differentiate itself from its fellow actual 
entities. These potentials must exist independently, to be realized or unrealized, in order to 
allow the possibility that something might have been otherwise, that ‘whatever component 
is red, might have been green; and whatever component is loved, might have been coldly 
esteemed.’ (PR, p.149) Without the possibility of unrealized potentialities, the notion of 
potentiality itself becomes meaningless; with the undesirable result being a ‘static monistic 
universe.’ (PR, p.46)  
The eternal object is present in the actual entity through ingression. It is akin to the relation 
between the universal and the particular; although one must remember that following 
Whitehead’s principle of relativity – that is, that being is a potential for every becoming – 
that actual entities also function as universals in their objective immortality. Thus, we can 
understand the eternal object as a particular universal and the actual entity as a universal 
particular.117  
Therefore, in light of the above, we must understand the ingression of an eternal object into 
an actual entity not as the transformation of the eternal object from a state of non-being to 
being, but as the difference between indetermination and determination. (PR, p.149) We 
also ought to heed Stengers when she points out that it is not that, as Whitehead’s quoted 
example above, that colour itself is an eternal object, but rather that the experience of 
colour testifies to the ingression of an eternal object. (2011, p.209) For Stengers, the 
eternal object simply ‘is what it is.’ (2011, p.211) It cannot be discussed in reference to 
itself but only in reference to something else, that is, something it is not. This is a highly 
pragmatic reading of Whitehead, and indispensable if we are to avoid becoming lost in his 
labyrinthine system. 
Eternal objects are felt by actual entities through conceptual prehension. This form of 
prehension differs from the simple causal feeling of an actual entity for some other 
                                         
117 ‘The contrary opinion led to the collapse of Descartes’ many substance into Spinoza’s one substance; to 
Leibniz’s windowless monads with their pre-established harmony; to the sceptical reduction of Hume’s 
philosophy.’ (PR, p.48)  
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antecedent actual entity. The difference is that while an actual entity in its objective 
immortality can be prehended positively and negatively, it can never be completely 
dismissed; even a negative prehension entails a relation. Conversely, eternal objects can be 
dismissed; they do not have to enter into the concrescence of the actual entity. It is this 
distinction that leads Whitehead to remark that ‘the one is stubborn matter of fact; and the 
other never loses its ‘accent’ of potentiality.’ (PR, p.239) Conceptual prehension is the 
feeling of an actual entity of its capacity to be settled matter of fact; to be, in other words, 
an object. In this way we find the actual entity is grasping in two directions. It grasps the 
eternal object as immanent realized determinant; and it reaches out beyond itself to future 
actual entities as transcendent capacity for determination. 
The other crucial point to note is that by insisting that one cannot help but prehend every 
antecedent actual entity, one is insisting – contra Aristotle and the notion that a substance 
is not present in a subject – on the principle of universal relativity. That is, that every 
preceding actual entity is present in the emergent actual entity. It is remarkable that Tarde, 
more or less, arrives at the same conclusion with his assertion that the entire universe is 
present in each individual monad. Of course, Tarde is working on the principles of late 
19th century science whereas Whitehead, only a few decades later, is standing on a 
foundation of what is recognisable as modern physics. This principle of universal relativity 
is what Whitehead means when he writes of the solidarity of the universe. Eternal objects 
are essential to this solidarity as through their dual function as both a determinant of the 
datum – in other words, the cause – and a determinant of the subject form – the effect – 
they provide the relational link: within the eternal object one finds the union of the 
objective and subjective, the cause and effect. (PR, p.164) 
If, as Latour notes, the concept of eternal objects has the capacity to embarrass readers of 
Whitehead – as one of the more egregious examples of his having indulged in metaphysics, 
‘something one is no longer supposed to do after the edicts of the first “W,” [Wittgenstein]’ 
(2005b, p.224) – Stengers is unabashed. She writes, ‘If the eternal objects do not bother me 
in Process and Reality – quite the contrary – it is, here once again, thanks to the distinction 
Deleuze proposes between virtual and potential.’ (2011, p.215) 
Latour also picks up on this point (2005b, p.235), and to illustrate the similarities between 
Deleuze’s notion of virtuality and Whitehead’s eternal objects it is worth examining the 
relevant passage from Difference and Repetition. 
We have ceaselessly invoked the virtual. In so doing, have we not fallen into the 
vagueness of a notion closer to the undetermined than to the determinations of 
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difference? It is precisely this, however, that we wished to avoid in speaking of the 
virtual. We opposed the virtual and the real: although it could not have been more 
precise before now, this terminology must be corrected. The virtual is opposed not 
to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. Exactly 
what Proust said of states of resonance must be said of the virtual: 'Real without 
being actual, ideal without being abstract';118 and symbolic without being fictional. 
Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object - as though 
the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into 
an objective dimension. 
(2004, pp.208-209) 
So, for Deleuze the virtual is real in the same way that for Whitehead the eternal object is 
real: both are, ‘Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.’ The eternal object 
is actualized in the actual entity but, as noted above, this is not a case of it going from a 
state of not-being to being; rather, the eternal object was always real, just not actual: in 
Deleuze’s parlance: virtual.  
With this in mind, we can further distance ourselves from the idea that Whitehead’s eternal 
objects bear any meaningful similarity to Plato’s forms. Stengers writes convincingly that:  
When I say “it is blue,” but also “it is a circle,” I am not naming a blue object, or a 
circular one, but I testify to the ingression into my experience of an “eternal 
object.” Whitehead is not mad enough to calmly announce that “red” as we 
perceive it existed before the biological invention of the visual organs. This is why 
he speaks of “eternality,” a neologism that enables him to avoid “eternity.” 
“Eternality” designates a dimension of the concrete, complete fact that must belong 
to the job specifications. 
(2011, p.154) 
Again, like Deleuze’s insistence that ‘the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the 
real object,’ Whitehead insists that the eternal object must be fastened to stubborn fact.  
                                         
118 The full quote from Chapter III of Time Regained reads: ‘But let a sound, a scent already heard and 
breathed in the past be heard and breathed anew, simultaneously in the present and in the past, real 
without being actual, ideal without being abstract, then instantly the permanent and characteristic essence 
hidden in things is freed and our true being which has for long seemed dead but was not so in other ways 
awakes and revives, thanks to this celestial nourishment. An instant liberated from the order of time has 
recreated in us man liberated from the same order, so that he should be conscious of it.’ 
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In fact, this provides a further sense of the necessity of the eternal object. Stubborn fact 
alone is not sufficient. Not everything emerges from the general flux; the ingression of an 
eternal object is required in order to determine what Stengers refers to as ‘the mode of 
taking into account,’ which is to say, ‘the mode of “how” an event takes another event into 
account, that which allows prehension to be said to be the prehension of something else.’ 
(2011, pp.188-189) 
Whitehead writes in Science and the Modern World: 
Wherever such objects have ingression into the general flux, they interpret events, 
each to the other. They are here in the perceiver; but, perceived by him, they 
convey for him something of the total flux which is beyond himself. 
(p.151) 
In this quotation we can identify Stengers’ notion of ‘taking-into-account’ in the 
interpretation of events; but we also get a further sense of the eternal object’s two-fold 
character. It is, to reiterate, both a determinant of the datum and a determinant of the 
subject form. It is both ‘here in the perceiver’ and there in the perceived, but that relation is 
always being turned around upon itself so that the perceiver becomes the perceived and the 
perceived the perceiver. There is, as Whitehead notes, a ‘reciprocity of aspects.’ (SMW, 
p.103) Facilitating that reciprocity is the panoply of eternal objects. An actual entity cannot 
determine for itself how it is to be prehended, but it must be prehended in a determinate 
mode nonetheless. Thus, prehension and ingression are mutually dependent. Stengers 
expands on this notion: 
Prehension and ingression thus cannot be defined separately. Prehension without 
ingression would be reduced to some determinate relation of cause to effect. As far 
as the ingression of an eternal object is concerned, if it were conceivable 
independently of prehension – always that prehension – whose “how” is to be 
determined, it would confer upon eternal objects a power of explanation that would 
relegate the concrete fact, the event that determines itself to be this event and no 
other, to the realm of appearances. We would then fall into what Whitehead defines 
as the paradigmatic philosophical error: trying to explain a particular fact on the 
basis of universals. 
(2011, p.189) 
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God 
However, there is something missing from this account: after setting it aside a mere 
handful of pages ago, we must bring God back in. It is that aspect of Whitehead’s work 
which is the most challenging as, like with a lot of Whitehead’s terminology, it is a word 
which has a tangled web of association. The embarrassment Latour speaks of is often to be 
found when Whitehead’s God is discussed, when it is discussed at all by anyone other than 
the theologians.119   
Latour writes that, ‘No more than you can choose in nature to eliminate either primary or 
secondary qualities120 can you choose, in Whitehead, between his epistemology and his 
theology.’ (Latour, 2005b, p.236) Latour is correct that Whitehead’s God cannot be 
ignored. However, the distinction between epistemology and theology is a false one. The 
philosophy of organism is not an epistemological system – indeed, Whitehead writes that 
the very use of the term actual entity instead of ‘sensible object’ is to avoid the need for 
becoming bogged down in an ‘epistemological theory as to sense-perception’ (PR, p.73) – 
and neither is there a theology inherent in the philosophy of organism. When Latour refers 
to the notion of a ‘crossed-out God’ that is inherent is all modernist philosophy, he could 
just as well be referring to a ‘crossed-out dialectic’ or a ‘crossed-out organism’ for that 
matter. The point is that God in Whitehead is important because Whitehead’s God has a 
series of functions as the embodiment – if the metaphor can be excused – of process, of the 
many becoming one and being increased by one; and not as a theological construct or deus 
ex machina that can be deployed to explain everything away.121 God, in Process and 
Reality, has effectively been secularized. God is not ‘the being to whom one may say 
“Thou,” for he has no other value than the difference he will make in the occasional 
experience that will derive from its initial aim.’ (Stengers, 2011, p.477) 
                                         
119 Which is not to say that there is no merit whatsoever in the work of theologians. Catherine Keller writes 
compellingly of Whitehead’s God as being akin to laughter, referencing Deleuze’s words in Difference et 
Repetition, ‘Two believers cannot observe one another without laughing.’ Keller writes: And sometimes 
that becoming-subject, caught off guard, in the sudden surprise of the unknown, breaks open as laughter.  
Hence Bataille develops what we could call an apophatics of laughter. In his contemplative proposition 
from 1953, coining the term “atheology”: “God is an effect of un-knowing. He can nevertheless be known 
as an effect of un-knowing- like laughter, like the sacred.’ (Keller, p.15) 
120 To be clear, Latour is not arguing here that we ought to split the world into primary and secondary 
qualities. He agrees with Whitehead wholeheartedly on the question of the bifurcation of nature. Rather 
he is referring to any tendency which seeks to elevate one at the expense of the other. 
121 Of course, Whitehead is claiming that the modernists allow God to lurk in the shadows of their systems of 
thought in order to explain away – however, in doing so he implies that Whitehead’s God plays the same 
role – explaining away – except it does so out in the open. 
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Remember, everything must be somewhere. God’s role here is to prevent eternal objects 
from being reduced to ‘mere undifferentiated nonentities.’ (PR, p.257) In the same passage, 
Whitehead continues: 
[T]he differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative 
process requires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God. He 
does not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the same degree that 
they require him. … The general relationships of eternal objects to each other, 
relationships of diversity and of pattern, are their relationships in God’s conceptual 
realization. Apart from this realization, there is mere isolation indistinguishable 
from nonentity. 
(PR, p.257) 
It is tempting to pause for breath here but let us go on. We have eternal objects and we 
have God. They arise contemporaneously. Let us envisage an explosion – a ‘big bang’ if 
you like – of eternal objects. At the same time, the becoming of God. Because eternal 
objects must exist somewhere, they cannot become without the simultaneous becoming of 
God. The reverse also holds true as there can be no God without eternal objects. God, 
therefore, functions as the ‘primordial superject of creativity,’ achieving: 
…in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal 
objects. This is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects 
on which creative order depends. It is the conceptual adjustment of all appetites in 
the form of aversions and adversions. It constitutes the meaning of relevance. Its 
status as an actual efficient fact is recognized by terming it the ‘primordial nature of 
God.’’ 
(PR, p.32) 
This ‘complete conceptual valuation’ provides each actual entity with its conceptual feeling 
of subjective aim in the earliest stages of concrescence: in other words, ‘God and the actual 
world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel 
concrescence.’ To avoid any hint of the teleological, Whitehead continues: ‘The subject, 
thus constituted, is the autonomous master of its own concrescence into subject-superject.’ 
(PR, p.245) 
So, let’s unpack this. Remember that ‘there is nothing which floats into the world from 
nowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity.’ (PR, p.244) 
God, in its primordial nature, is the actual entity that provides that initial aim to each actual 
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entity, thereby sparking its process of self-determination. This operates in an actual entity 
as follows. Every actual entity has a threefold character. First, there is a past that is given 
for each actual entity. Second, there is the subjective character of the actual entity; this 
arises through the process of concrescence and the conceptual valuation of the given past. 
The process of conceptual valuation is the positive and negative prehension of eternal 
objects, the result being the ingression of a particular eternal object into actual entity; in 
other words, the actualisation of a particular potentiality, the determination of the 
subjective form. The third character is in the satisfaction, the actual entity as superject. God 
is also an actual entity. However, given its primordial nature, God has no past. Instead, 
God has eternal objects. The eternal objects function as datum for God. At the same time, 
God functions as the actual entity in which all eternal objects are actualized. God is 
therefore the ‘outcome of creativity, … the foundation of order, and … the goad towards 
novelty.’ (PR, p.88) God, then, has a second nature; the consequent nature of God. In other 
words, God also prehends the temporal world of actual occasions. In doing so, God 
effectively guarantees the objective immortality of the actual entity which has completed 
the process of becoming. Finally, there is a third nature to God: the superjective nature, 
whereby objective immortality passes back into the world as the raw datum for emerging 
actual entities. As with Leibniz,122 God does not stand above or apart from the world; God 
is, therefore, simultaneously prior to, contemporary with, and consequent to the temporal 
world of actual entities.  
Furthermore, as Whitehead writes:  
In the first place, God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical 
principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification. Viewed 
as primordial, he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of 
potentiality. In this aspect, he is not before all creation, but with all creation. 
(PR, p.343) 
With this in mind, we can, as already tentatively proposed, understand God as the dialectic 
at work: the thesis, antithesis and synthesis all at once. There is a passage on the final page 
of Process and Reality which not only captures Whitehead’s notion of God – and indeed 
the character of his entire philosophy of organism – but also gets to the heart of that sense 
of longing that permeates Whitehead’s work and renders it so compelling; a rare and truly 
human mode of understanding the world: 
                                         
122 See p.38 for a discussion of Leibniz’s conception of God. 
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There are thus four creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its actuality. 
There is first the phase of conceptual origination, deficient in actuality, but infinite 
in its adjustment of valuation [the primordial nature of God]. Secondly, there is the 
temporal phase of physical origination, with its multiplicity of actualities [the 
temporal world of actual occasions]. In this phase full actuality is attained; but there 
is deficiency in the solidarity of individuals with each other. This phase derives its 
determinate conditions from the first phase. Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected 
actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without the qualification of any 
loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity [the consequent nature 
of God]. In everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality. 
This phase derives the conditions of its being from the two antecedent phases. In 
the fourth phase, the creative action completes itself. For the perfected actuality 
passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal 
actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the kingdom 
of heaven is with us today [the superjective nature of God]. The action of the fourth 
phase is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular 
occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the 
reality in heaven passes back into the world. God is the great companion – the 
fellow sufferer who understands. (PR, pp.350-351)123 
Concrescence 
We will now return to concrescence and, as promised, look at the process in more detail. 
Whitehead’s tenth Category of Explanations states: 
(x) That the first analysis of an actual entity, into its most concrete elements, 
discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which have originated in its 
process of becoming. All further analysis is an analysis of prehensions. Analysis 
in terms of prehensions is termed ‘division’. 
(PR, p.23) 
Therefore, when we discuss the process of concrescence, we are in fact discussing the 
process of becoming of an actual entity; in other words, the actual entity, as a processive 
event, and the concrescence are one and the same. The process of concrescence consists of 
                                         
123 It may seem premature to quote this passage here but it is indispensable in understanding Whitehead’s 
God. 
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a succession of phases whereby prehensions arise under different conditions before being 
drawn together in to a unity of feeling. This drawing together is known as the satisfaction 
and constitutes the completion of the actual entity; its passage into objective immortality. 
To put it all another way, recall the expression ‘The many become one, and are increased 
by one’ – this, in a nutshell, is the process of concrescence. Prehensions arise in a number 
of different ways – the many – before being drawn in to a unity of feeling in the 
satisfaction – the one – at which point the actual entity, having completed the process of 
becoming, perishes and is added to the universe of actual entities – the many – to become 
the datum for some new cycle of concrescence. 
There are three phases to the process of concrescence: the conformal phase, the conceptual 
phase, and the comparative phases. Whitehead characterises the latter two as the 
‘supplemental’ phase; the first phase is concerned with emergence of prehensions in 
‘disjunctive diversity’ (PR, p.21) while the second and third are concerned with the 
passage of that disjunctive diversity of entities into ‘conjunctive unity’ (PR, p21).    
Before discussing each phase it is worthwhile taking a brief step back to reiterate just what 
Whitehead is hoping to achieve by this system. Rather than laboriously expositing on 
Whitehead’s intentions, let us instead consider the following account Whitehead himself 
provides in Section II of ‘The Categoral Scheme’: 
‘Creativity,’ ‘many,’ ‘one’ are the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of the 
synonymous terms ‘thing,’ ‘being,’ ‘entity.’ … [The term ‘one’] stands for the 
singularity of an entity. The term ‘many’ presupposes the term ‘one,’ and the term 
‘one’ presupposes the term ‘many.’ The term ‘many’ conveys the notion of 
‘disjunctive diversity’; this notion is an essential element in the concept of ‘being.’ 
There are many ‘beings’ in disjunctive diversity.  
‘Creativity’ is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is 
that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, 
become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the 
nature of things that the many enter into complex unity.  
‘Creativity’ is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse 
from any entity in the 'many' which it unifies. Thus ‘creativity’ introduces novelty 
into the content of the many, which are the universe disjunctively. The ‘creative 
advance’ is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel 
situation which it originates.  
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‘Together’ is a generic term covering the various special ways in which various 
sorts of entities are ‘together’ in any one actual occasion. Thus ‘together’ 
presupposes the notions ‘creativity,’ ‘many,’ ‘one,’ ‘identity’ and ‘diversity.’ The 
ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, 
creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction. The novel entity 
is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it finds, and also it is one among the 
disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the 
many entities which it synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by 
one.  
In their natures, entities are disjunctively ‘many’ in process of passage into 
conjunctive unity. This Category of the Ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of 
‘primary substance.’  
Thus the ‘production of novel togetherness’ is the ultimate notion embodied in the 
term ‘concrescence.’ 
(PR, p.21) 
The inclusion of this lengthy quotation is essential, it provides the fullest context for the 
notion of concrescence, and it is concrescence which reveals the actual entity as a buzzing 
booming world, one which explodes into multiplicity before imploding into a single unity, 
only to be cast into yet another creative explosion as the next actual entity processes into 
its’ becoming. 
The explosion into multiplicity itself, however, requires further explanation. In other 
words, where do new actual entities come from? In the quote above we have creativity as 
the ‘universal of universals’, creativity as the ‘principle of novelty’, and the notion of the 
‘creative advance’. The actual entity does not just emerge from the world of settled fact; it 
emerges because creativity, as Cloots argues, ‘[permeates] the whole of reality, 
transcending what is and yet carried by it, leading to ever new becoming’ (2001, p.42). 
Cloots argues that to truly appreciate the centrality of creativity to Whitehead’s system124 – 
and to avoid either having to resort to God as the supplier of creativity in the world or to 
the unsatisfactory explanation that activity somehow emerges from a passive, settled state 
                                         
124 Michael Halewood claims that Whitehead coins the term ‘creativity’ and is responsible for the terms use 
in the modern sense. It is difficult to prove this. Certainly the OED uses two examples of Whitehead’s use 
of the word, both from Religion in the Making, but also cites an earlier example from 1875 where the 
critic A.N. Ward refers to Shakespeare’s ‘poetic creativity’, suggesting the term was understood in that 
sense, and not just in the sense of divine creation, already. 
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of affairs – one must look to the following passage in Adventure of Ideas, published four 
years after PR. Writing about the deficiency of the terms ‘object’ and ‘data’ inasmuch as 
they suggest that ‘an occasion of experiencing arises out of a passive situation which is a 
mere welter of many data’, Whitehead continues to say: 
The exact contrary is the case. The initial situation includes a factor of activity, 
which is the reason for the origin of that occasion of experience. This factor of 
activity is what I have called "Creativity" The initial situation with its creativity can 
be termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well be termed the 
"actual world" relative to that occasion. It has a certain unity of its own, expressive 
of its capacity of providing the objects requisite for a new occasion, and also 
expressive of its conjoint activity whereby it is essentially the primary phase of a 
new occasion. It can thus be termed a "real potentiality" The "potentiality" refers to 
the passive capacity, the term "real" refers to the creative activity, where the 
Platonic definition of "real" in the Sophist is referred to. This basic situation, this 
actual world, this primary phase, this real potentiality -- however you characterize it 
-- as a whole is active with its inherent creativity, but in its details it provides the 
passive objects which derive their activity from the creativity of the whole. The 
creativity is the actualization of potentiality, and the process of actualization is an 
occasion of experiencing. Thus viewed in abstraction objects are passive, but 
viewed in conjunction they carry the creativity which drives the world. The process 
of creation is the form of unity of the Universe. 
(Whitehead, 1933, p.179) 
The Conformal Phase 
The first phase of concrescence is that of conformal feelings. In essence, a conformal 
feeling is the transformation of objective content into subjective feelings. This 
transformation involves two actual entities: the perceiving subject actual entity that is in 
the process of becoming and the antecedent object actual entity that has passed into 
objective immortality. The becoming actual entity cannot prehend the past actual entity in 
its entirety but rather prehends a particular aspect of it. If we understand actual entities to 
be bundles of prehensions, we can say that the relation, in terms of conformal feeling, 
between the becoming entity and the past entity is the grasping of one prehension by 
another. In other words, the becoming entity positively prehends a particular prehension in 
139 
 
the past entity while discarding or negatively prehending the rest. Thus that particular 
prehension comes to represent the past entity as a whole. The antecedent entity – as a 
whole – constitutes the initial datum of which the prehending entity seeks to objectify an 
aspect of. In other the words, the whole cannot be grasped in its entirety but only in part. 
The aspect or part which is prehended constitutes the objective datum.  
What we are talking about here is perspective. Perspective is the means by which the 
object is felt, by which the objective content is transformed into subjective feelings. The 
antecedent actual entity does not determine how it is perceived, but it does provide a 
determinate range of prehensions for the becoming actual entity to positively or negatively 
prehend. In this space resides the agency of the subject. As Whitehead writes, ‘the ‘power’ 
of one actual entity on the other is simply how the former is objectified in the constitution 
of the other.’ (PR, p.58)  
This process of simple physical feeling is a complex causal act. The antecedent entity is the 
cause; the prehension the effect. But the prehending actual entity is also the effect as it is 
conditioned by its prehension. The simple physical feeling provides the link between the 
antecedent entity and the becoming entity. It is termed a ‘conformal’ feeling because it is 
the conformation of the immediate present to the past. (PR, p.238) It is the appeal to the 
facts that sits at the heart of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism.125 (PR, p.117) 
It is also strikingly similar to Leibniz’s perspectivism, discussed in Chapter 1. Recall that 
Deleuze writes of Leibniz: ‘He has to go all the way to a theory of point of view such that 
the subject is constituted by the point of view and not the point of view constituted by the 
subject.’ (1980) However, with Whitehead we can see that in the complex causal relation 
between antecedent actual entity and becoming actual entity, the subject is constituted by 
the point of view and the point of view is constituted by the subject. 
                                         
125 The process is further complicated by the fact that antecedent actual entities can present themselves in 
different ways. Whitehead explains: ‘Any actual entity, which we will name A, feels other actual entities 
which we will name B, C and D. Thus B, C and D all lie in the actual world of A. But C and D may lie in 
the actual world of B, and are then felt by it; also D may lie in the actual world of C and be felt by it. … 
Now B, as an initial datum for A’s feeling, also presents C and D for A to feel through its mediation. Also 
C, as an initial datum for A’s feeling, also presents D for A to feel through its mediation. Thus, in this 
artificially simplified example, A has D presented for feeling through three distinct sources: (i) directly as 
crude datum, (ii) by the mediation of B, and (iii) by the mediation of C. This threefold presentation is D, 
in its function of an initial datum for A’s feeling of it, so far as concerns the mediation of B and C.’ The 
manner in which this threefold presentation is integrated is governed by three categoreal conditions: (i) 
the category of subjective unity, (ii) the category of objective identity, and (iii) the category of objective 
diversity. Space does not permit a sustained discussion of these and it is not strictly necessary in order to 
grasp the essence of Whitehead’s system, yet, we can see again in these three categoreal conditions the 
process of the many (the objective diversity) becoming one (the subjective unity) and being increased by 
one (the objective identity). 
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The Conceptual Phase 
The second phase of concrescence is that of conceptual feelings. Earlier in this chapter we 
described Whitehead’s philosophy as dipolar. This refers to the twofold character of each 
actual entity and, therefore, the twofold character of the world. Each actual entity has two 
aspects, its mental pole and its physical pole. In the previous section we provided a sketch 
of conformal feelings, the simple physical feelings that constitute the physical pole of the 
actual entity from present to past. We will now consider its opposite, the mental pole: 
conceptual feelings. Every actual entity has a physical and a mental pole, although the 
importance of each differs from entity to entity: one entity may place more weight on the 
physical pole, another on the mental. However, both must be present as the integration of 
the physical and mental poles into a single unity of experience as part of the process of 
concrescence. 
This is where the eternal object and the notion of ingression makes its return. According to 
Whitehead’s category of conceptual valuation, from every simple physical feeling is 
derived a conceptual feeling that takes as its datum the eternal object that is present in the 
actual entity through ingression. Moreover, according to the category of conceptual 
reversion, there is a further generation of conceptual feelings from the datum which are 
partially identical to and partially distinct form the eternal object referred to by the 
category of conceptual valuation. In other words, the process of conceptual feeling has two 
phases. The first is the straightforward reproduction of the physical feeling in the 
conceptual mode. The second is the emergence of conceptual feelings that take as their 
datum other relevant eternal objects that have not played a determining role in the actual 
entity. The purpose of this distinction between conceptual valuation and conceptual 
reversion is to allow novelty in to the system. Unlike Hume’s principle that conceptual 
experience is derived from physical experience, Whitehead insists that conceptual 
experience can be derived from the contrast of relevant conceptual experience. As a result, 
we are able to think beyond the simple physical feelings and engage creatively with the 
objective datum. 
Just as the character of the conformal feeling is one of causation, the character of the 
conceptual feeling is one of valuation. Valuation takes the form of adversion, a positive 
valuation, and aversion, a negative one. The valuation determines the importance of the 
datum for the next phase of concrescence. This valuation further augments the creativity 
and agency afforded to the subject during the process of concrescence.  
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It is important to understand that according to Whitehead’s category of subjective unity 
and category of subjective harmony, ‘no prehension can be considered in abstraction from 
its subject, although it originates in the process creative of its subject.’ (PR, p.27) That is to 
say, the superject, which is the outcome of the process of concrescence, is also the subject 
in its own process of determination. Whitehead points out that a key aspect of this process, 
particularly when we consider moral and political responsibility, is that the actual entity 
determines its own ultimate definiteness.  
The Comparative Phase 
Like the previous two phases, the comparative phase can itself be broken down into a 
number of phases. As Sherburne (1966, p.39) points out, the comparative phase could 
really be said to be two distinct phases: the process of comparison and the comparison of 
comparisons. Beginning with the process of comparison, this is simply the comparison 
between phase one and phase two of concrescence. It is the feeling that compares the 
simple physical conformal feeling with the conceptual feeling, where the conceptual 
feeling can derive either from valuation or reversion. This feeling is an integrative process 
which unites the mental and physical poles of the actual entity in a single feeling.  
There are two kinds of basic comparative feelings. The first is physical purpose. Physical 
purposes arise from ‘the integration of a conceptual feeling with the basic physical feeling 
from which it is derived, either directly [through conceptual valuation] … or indirectly 
[through conceptual reversion]’ (PR, p.266). Put another way, where an eternal object is 
both an element in the determination of the datum of the simple physical feeling, and the 
datum of the conceptual feeling, it loses its indetermination, its universality. The result is a 
physical purpose which, depending on whether the subjective form of the conceptual 
feeling is one of adversion or aversion, will become more or less important to future 
occasions. When this occurs the process of integration and concrescence is over. The 
resulting actual entities are primitive in nature – not unlike Leibniz’s bare monads – and 
belong to those objects which we generally designate as inanimate.  
The second are propositions. Propositions are what Whitehead terms as ‘lures’126 for 
feeling (PR, p.184). These are the comparative feelings which generate still more feelings. 
                                         
126 God is the ultimate ‘lure’: ‘He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to 
each creative act as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes him the initial 
‘object of desire’ establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim.’ (PR, p.344) 
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Unlike the physical purposes, where, to put it crudely, the eternal object present in the 
conceptual feeling and the eternal object present in conformal feeling are one and the 
same, thus terminating the possibility of any further novelty; propositional feelings arise 
when a conformal feeling is integrated with a conceptual feeling which has as its datum an 
eternal object which is referent to any actual entity, not simply the one from which the 
integrated simple physical feeling arises. (PR, p.257) Through the integration of the simple 
physical feeling with a conceptual feeling which takes for its datum this sort of free-
floating, universal eternal object, the eternal object is in fact restricted to acting as a 
determinant for the actual entity provided by the simple physical feeling. In other words, 
the simple physical feeling provides the logical subject of the proposition; the conceptual 
feeling provides the potentiality of the eternal object. This leads Whitehead to write that, 
‘in a proposition the logical subjects are reduced to the status of food for a possibility.’ 
(PR, p.258) Put another way:  
There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact. Every reality is 
there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt. Also there is nothing which 
belongs merely to the privacy of feeling of one individual actuality. All origination 
is private. But what has been thus originated, publicly pervades the world. 
(PR, p.310) 
The proposition is dependent on the actual world for its logical subjects and therefore 
maintains a relation with the actual world. The result is that a proposition can be true or 
false. Where a proposition conforms to the actual world, the result is, effectively, the 
conformation of feeling to fact, what Whitehead refers to as the abrupt emphasis of one 
form of definiteness illustrated in fact. (PR, p.187) On the other hand, when a proposition 
fails to conform to the actual world, the result is something novel. The actual world and the 
proposition are distinct; and when united within the conformal feeling something new has 
been created rather than simply a particular intensity of feeling towards something already 
existing. The significance of this conception of propositions becomes clear in the following 
passage: 
 
The conception of propositions as merely material for judgements is fatal to any 
understanding of their role in the universe. In that purely logical aspect, non-
conformal propositions are merely wrong, and therefore worse than useless. But in 
their primary role, they pave the way along which the world advances into novelty. 
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Error is the price which we pay for progress. 
(PR, p.187) 
The propositional prehension is the prehension of ‘theories’. These theories are not there to 
be judged true or false – though, of course, they are one or the other – but rather to 
motivate, provoke, elicit further feeling. The following passage clarifies the distinction 
between propositions as judgement and propositions as ‘lures’ for feeling: 
It is evident, however, that the primary function of theories is as a lure for feeling, 
thereby providing immediacy of enjoyment and purpose. Unfortunately theories, 
under their name of ‘propositions,’ have been handed over to logicians, who have 
countenanced the doctrine that their one function is to be judged as to their truth 
and falsehood. … The doctrine here laid down is that, in the realization of 
propositions, ‘judgement’ is a very rare component, and so is ‘consciousness.’ The 
existence of imaginative literature should have warned logicians that their narrow 
doctrine is absurd. It is difficult to believe that all logicians as they read Hamlet’s 
speech, “To be, or not to be: …” commence by judging whether the initial 
proposition be true or false, and keep up the task of judgement throughout the 
whole thirty-five lines. Surely, at some point in the reading, judgement is eclipsed 
by aesthetic delight. The speech, for the theatre audience, is purely theoretical, a 
mere lure for feeling. 
(PR, pp.184-185) 
The final kind of comparative feeling is the intellectual feeling. An intellectual feeling is 
the contrast between an actual entity and a proposition which has as its logical subject the 
same actual entity. As Whitehead writes: 
It is the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feelings, 
and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the 
propositional feeling. It is the contrast between ‘in fact’ and ‘might be,’ in respect 
to particular instances in this actual world. The subjective form of the feeling of 
this contrast is consciousness. 
(PR, p.267) 
In this conception of consciousness, Whitehead is very much thinking along similar lines 
as both Leibniz and Tarde, both of whom incorporate one form or other of the petit 
perceptions into their ontologies. To quote from Process and Reality once more, the above 
passage continues: 
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Thus in experience, consciousness arises by reason of intellectual feelings, and in 
proportion to the variety and intensity of such feelings. This account agrees with 
the plain facts of our conscious experience. Consciousness flickers; and even at its 
brightest, there is a small focal region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral 
region of experience which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The 
simplicity of clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete 
experience. Also this character of our experience suggests that consciousness is the 
crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base. 
(PR, p.267) 
In his earlier writing, Whitehead characterises human experience as having three facets: the 
enjoyment in experience, the achievement of that enjoyment as an aim, and the 
participation in a dynamic process through creativity. (Pittenger, pp.14-15) This is 
strikingly similar to Sartre’s account of Marx’s thinking on existence where, ‘he has in 
mind the total man, a being defined by a dialectic with three terms: need, work and 
enjoyment.’ (2014, Sartre) Marx’s ‘need, work and enjoyment’ can be mapped to 
Whitehead’s ‘aim, creativity and enjoyment.’ The comparison is more profound when we 
consider what Sartre writes next: ‘The three elements form a kind of explosion of the self 
into ‘outside being’ and, at the same time, a return to and reappropration of the self.’ (2014, 
Sartre) What is being described here is none other than the superject. Whitehead himself 
writes that, ‘For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, 
the subject emerges from the world— a 'superject' rather than a 'subject.'’ (PR, p.88) 
The term enjoyment is discussed by Steven Shaviro in a paper on Whitehead and Levinas 
which makes the useful observation that one cannot understand enjoyment without its 
correlate, concern. Enjoyment is necessarily self-enjoyment: it is therefore auto-affective. 
Concern – and Whitehead, as he reminds us in Modes of Thought, uses the term in the 
Quaker sense, that is being affected by the other, bearing a weight upon one’s spirit (p.167) 
– is hetero-affective. Concern is the result of Sartre’s ‘explosion of the self’ and is itself a 
kind of enjoyment. As Shaviro points out, ‘it is precisely when “engaged in its own 
immediate self-realization” that an occasion finds itself most vitally “concerned with the 
universe” that lies beyond it.’ (p.249) 
The process of concrescence finishes with the satisfaction of the actual entity and its 
passage in to givenness, or objective immortality. The satisfaction can be of greater or 
lesser intensity depending on whether the process of concrescence terminates with a 
physical purpose, conformal proposition, or intellectual feeling. The intellectual feeling 
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can be further valued in terms of its usefulness in the future. Let us allow Whitehead the 
last word on this: 
In the conception of the actual entity in its phase of satisfaction, the entity has 
attained its individual separation from other things; it has absorbed the datum, and 
it has not yet lost itself in the swing back to the ‘decision’ whereby its appetition 
becomes an element in the data of other entities superseding it. Time has stood still 
– if only it could. 
(PR, p.154) 
The Nexus  
So far, we have been discussing the process of concrescence at the level of the individual 
actual entity. Being familiar with Leibniz and Tarde, we know that there must be the 
possibility of aggregation in order for the ontological account to reflect the world as we 
perceive it. The nature of this aggregation is key. Leibniz has his bare, perceiving and ego 
monads; Tarde his tiny minds and insistence that the parts are greater than the whole. 
Whitehead has the nexus, or nexūs in the plural. The nexus is what confronts us in most 
cases: the human being, the tree, the stone and so on. These beings are aggregates of a 
multiplicity of actual entities but are prehended as a unity rather than as an aggregate. Once 
more, we have the many becoming one. This process, in regard to the nexus, is governed 
by Whitehead’s category of transmutation. It is much the same process that Leibniz 
explains with his theory of confusion, whereby the monad perceives the world as a whole 
but, for the most part, in a confused or indistinct manner. However, ‘confusion’ is too 
psychological a term for Whitehead and is not compatible with the Jamesian 
depsychologized category of experience. Whitehead, through the process of transmutation, 
proposes in its place abstraction. There is a forward thrust to Whiteheads monadology 
which is absent from Leibniz’s. The present is but the stuff of the future. When we 
consider the nexus, the emphasis is not on the internal relations of that particular nexus – 
although that does exist by virtue of the prehension of each actual entity of the other in 
what Whitehead terms a togetherness or mutual immanence – but rather on the perception 
of the nexus by the prehending subject.  
In perception, the nexus is the substitute for the actual entities from which it is composed. 
This process of substitution is the process of transmutation. It is, as Whitehead writes, ‘the 
gain of a power of abstraction.’ In effect, we have, the elimination of the ‘irrelevant 
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multiplicity of detail.’ (PR, p.254) As Whitehead notes, without this ability to abstract, ‘our 
feeble intellectual operation would fail to penetrate into the dominant characteristics of 
things. We can only understand by discarding.’ (PR, p.251) The way in which this works in 
practice is that, from the simple physical feelings of the entities which constitute the nexus 
originates an impartial conceptual feeling. In the prehending subject this conceptual feeling 
is held in contrast to the transmuted physical feelings, that is to say the physical feelings of 
a multiplicity of actualities felt as one physical feeling. The conceptual feeling is impartial 
because it stands in relation to all the actualities in the nexus by virtue of their common 
relation to the same eternal object. It is this common relation to the same eternal object that 
holds the actual entities together as a nexus. Furthermore, the conceptual feeling brings in 
the possibility of valuation, and the notions of aversion and adversion, introduced earlier, 
constitute a sort of decision making and ‘the first step towards intellectual mentality, 
though in themselves [adversion and aversion] do not amount to consciousness.’ (PR, 
p.254) 
As we have seen, a nexus is a group of entities held together by their mutual immanence. 
There is more than one kind of nexus; some nexūs are more tightly bound than others. A 
special type of nexus is a society, which is simply a nexus with a social order. These relate 
in the manner of familial relation, with some direct relations, others not so direct (the 
father-in-law, aunt by marriage, third cousin twice removed and so on). In this case we 
have a nexus but not necessarily a society. For a nexus to be a society it is necessary for 
there to be some defining characteristic which is held in common by all members of the 
nexus. Moreover, this common element of form must be self-sustaining or, put another 
way, autopoietic. As Whitehead writes, ‘The members of the society are alike because, by 
reason of their common character, they impose on other members of the society the 
conditions which lead to that likeness.’ (PR, p.89) There is something of Tarde’s theory of 
imitation in this, whereby societies are held together by likeness and the reproduction of 
the conditions for likeness. This is, essentially, Whitehead’s conception of the notion of 
power. He writes in reference to Locke’s Essay: 
The reason why the doctrine of power is peculiarly relevant to the enduring things, 
which the philosophy of Locke’s day conceived as individualized substances, is 
that any likeness between the successive occasions of a historic route procures a 
corresponding identity between their contributions to the datum of any subsequent 
actual entity; and it therefore secures a corresponding intensification in the 
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imposition of conformity. 
(PR, p.56) 
It must be said, at this point, that while the society is exclusive by necessity, it does not 
exist in isolation. There will always be a larger society to which the society belongs, one 
with a more general defining characteristic. To put it another way, ‘every society requires a 
social background of which it is itself a part.’ (PR, p.90) There is then different kinds of 
societies in the same way that there are different kinds of nexūs. We can differentiate 
between the structured and unstructured society, the structured society being one which 
includes subordinate societies which display a ‘definite pattern of structural inter-relations.’ 
(PR, p.99) An example, provided by Whitehead, would be the molecule within a living 
cell; a series of societies nested within a larger society with a very definite structure. 
Whitehead provides a strikingly Latourian method of analysis for these kinds of structured 
societies where he writes:  
The first stage of systematic investigation must always be the identification of 
analogies between occasions within the society and occasions without it. The 
second stage is constituted by the more subtle procedure of noting the differences 
between behaviour within and without the society, differences of behaviour 
exhibited by occasions which also have close analogies to each other. The history 
of science is marked by the vehement, dogmatic, denial of such differences, until 
they are found out. 
(PR, p.100) 
Of course, Whitehead has a particular understanding of science and the scientific method. 
He is not opposed to the scientific method, a charge, for example, levelled at Latour by 
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont in Intellectual Impostures and elsewhere, but rather he puts 
it in its place. The notion of ‘how’ and ‘why’ are bifurcated in the scientist mode of 
thought, where the ‘hows’ are fixed, real, objective and the ‘whys’ are what is yet to 
become a ‘how’. ‘[T]he “how” follows the advance of scientific territories and designates 
the “why” as what is left over, what is not scientifically demonstrable but is relative to the 
tastes and passions of an epoch; and it will pass, like an epoch.’ (PR, p.13) As Stengers 
writes,  
For Whitehead … science must be understood as an adventure, and an adventure 
never enables us to draw a general lesson. When the adventurer is perplexed, when 
the adventure turns out badly, the question to ask is rather “what has happened to 
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us?” 
(2011, p.13) 
We can also now account for the persistence of a being through time. This form of society 
is said to enjoy ‘personal order’ and to constitute an ‘enduring object.’ The endurance and 
personal order of a society result from ‘the genetic relatedness of its members … 
‘serially’.’ (PR, p.34) In other words, the defining characteristic which unites the nexus can 
be traced in a linear fashion, much like a line of inheritance, and similar to the conformal 
feeling from present to past. However, we are not yet at the level of personhood. The 
enduring object is not necessarily conscious; for personhood to arise requires a particular 
form of relations between members of the enduring object. Enduring objects are simply, as 
Whitehead puts it rather charmingly, those ‘permanent entities which enjoy adventures of 
change throughout time and space.’ (PR, p.35) 
There is, however, something of a paradox in the character of enduring objects. This relates 
to the degree to which the enduring object is specialized, which is to say the degree of 
flexibility the enduring object has in terms of its structure. An unspecialized society, 
flexible in its structural pattern, will not provide particularly fertile ground for the 
satisfaction of its component actual entities. On the other hand, a specialized society, 
highly structured and complex, will require a very particular environment for its survival. 
As Whitehead puts it,  
Thus the problem for Nature127 is the production of societies which are ‘structured’ 
with a high ‘complexity,’ and which are at the same time ‘unspecialized.’ In this 
way, intensity is mated with survival. 
(PR, p.101) 
Whitehead proposes two resolutions to this paradox. The first is, in effect, homogenisation. 
A society like a stone or a pebble is able to persist with its own individual ‘life-history’ 
because it has eliminated all detailed diversity of its members. The second is appetition, 
whose purpose is: 
                                         
127 ‘Nature’ for Whitehead is not opposed to society; as Halewood writes, one of Whitehead’s great 
achievements is ‘his insistence that science, philosophy, the humanities, and social theory all require a 
renewed conception of nature (in the broadest sense of the word), one that goes beyond strict scientiﬁc 
limitations, beyond any form of biological essentialism or reliance upon some notion of the ultimate laws 
of physics or nature. Through his philosophy of organism, Whitehead aims to develop a concept of nature 
that is able to incorporate all existence, thereby bringing together the empirical, the material, the social, 
the aesthetic, and thinking beings.’ (Halewood, 2005, pp.57-58) 
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[T]o receive the novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such 
subjective forms as conciliate them with the complex experiences proper to 
members of the structured society. Thus in each concrescent occasion its subjective 
aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment. 
In the case of the higher organisms, this conceptual initiative amounts to thinking 
about the diverse experiences; in the case of lower organisms, this conceptual 
initiative merely amounts to thoughtless adjustment of aesthetic emphasis in 
obedience to an ideal of harmony. (PR, p.102) 
The difference between the first and the second resolution is the difference between the 
inorganic being and the living being. A living society will necessarily contain both living 
and inorganic nexūs – after all, the human body is fundamentally composed of the same 
stuff as a stone, that is electrons, quarks, leptons, bosons; the fundamental particles. 
However, with the living nexus regnant, the living society, with its living and inorganic 
nexūs, is able to do something that the inorganic society alone cannot. That something is 
the production of novelty. This gets us to the heart of Whitehead’s system: 
Life is a bid for freedom: an enduring entity binds any one of its occasions to the 
line of its ancestry. The doctrine of the enduring soul with its permanent 
characteristics is exactly the irrelevant answer to the problem which life presents. 
That problem is, How can there be originality? And the answer explains how the 
soul need be no more original than a stone. 
(PR, p.104) 
We can therefore see that the real paradox is between endurance and novelty. How does an 
entity both persist and change? The answer lies in the interplay of the society with its 
environment and the introduction of novelty conceptually in the process of concrescence. 
This introduction of novelty amounts to the conceptual valuation of the simple physical 
feelings. Through valuation the entity produces something new, something that is not 
already contained in the simple physical feeling. Societies, living or inorganic, respond to 
external stimulus. The effect of conceptual valuation is to disrupt a mere mechanistic 
response; to allow the emergence of something original. Whitehead describes the same 
process, from a slightly different perspective, as: 
Ideals fashion themselves around two notions, permanence and flux. In the 
inescapable flux, there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence, 
there is an element that escapes into flux. Permanence can be snatched only out of 
150 
 
flux; and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by its submission 
to permanence. Those who would disjoin the two elements can find no 
interpretations of patent facts. 
(PR, p.338) 
The other characteristic of the appetitive living society is quite literally appetite: the living 
society, unlike the inorganic society, requires food.128 The living society sustains its life 
through the destruction of other societies. Whitehead provides the following short 
summary of a living cell: 
(i) an extremely complex and delicately poised chemical structure; (ii) for the 
occasions in the interstitial ‘empty’ space a complex objective datum derived from 
this complex structure; (iii) under normal ‘responsive’ treatment, devoid of 
originality, the complex detail reduced to physical simplicity by negative 
prehensions; (iv) this detail preserved for positive feeling by the emotional and 
purposive readjustments produced by originality of conceptual feeling (appetition); 
(v) the physical distortion of the field, leading to instability of the structure; (vi) the 
structure accepting repair by food from the environment. 
(PR¸p.106) 
We can see clearly in this account how the high degree of complexity of the living society 
places such a strain on the structure of that society that it breaks down and needs repaired. 
The materials for these repairs come from its external environment, through the living 
society’s appetite for food, that is to say, its entering into associations with other societies. 
We can also see that life is not a property of the living cell but rather, as Whitehead puts it 
elsewhere, ‘life lurks in the interstices of each living cell and in the interstices of the brain.’ 
(PR, p.105-106) 
There is one further twist to Whitehead’s account before we arrive at the ‘living person’. 
As the living nexus is entirely dependent on its complex social environment, it cannot itself 
be considered social. It does not have what Whitehead describes as ‘the genetic power’ 
inherent to societies. Therefore, the living person requires for its immediate environment a 
living, non-social nexus. The living person endures as a ‘thread of personal order along 
some historical route of its [the nexus’] members.’ (PR, p.107) The constitution of the 
thread is the transmission of hybrid prehensions from one occasion to the next. These 
                                         
128 ‘In a museum the crystals are kept under glass cases; in a zoological garden the animals are fed.’ (PR, 
p.105) 
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hybrid prehensions are the prehension by a subject of a conceptual prehension of another 
subject. In other words, it is the prehension of novelty. This novelty, through its 
transmission, is intensified but within the limits set for it by its own genetic inheritance and 
the material organism that it is dependent on. An unlimited novelty would be 
unsustainable, it would destroy itself; the nature of novelty being, fundamentally, 
destructive as well as creative. Through this process the social is recovered, life becomes 
society through the thread of the living person, its serial occasional (in Whitehead’s sense 
of the term) iterations. In this account, the physical and the conceptual are inseparable. The 
physical feeling is required in order to give rise to the conceptual feeling which can, in 
turn, give rise to further conceptual feelings. The resulting satisfaction, the passage into 
objective immortality, sees the conceptual reintegrate with the physical. Life is therefore to 
be understood as being both novel and immediate, while also being derived from its 
physical inheritance. As Whitehead writes in the final part of Process and Reality: 
It is by reason of the body, with its miracle of order, that the treasures of the past 
environment are poured into the living occasion. The final percipient route of 
occasions is perhaps some thread of happenings wandering in ‘empty’ space amid 
the interstices of the brain. It toils not, neither does it spin. It receives from the past; 
it lives in the present. It is shaken by its intensities of private feeling, adversion or 
aversion. In its turn, this culmination of bodily life transmits itself as an element of 
novelty throughout the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is its vivid 
originality: it is the organ of novelty. 
(PR, p.339) 
These questions of endurance, continuity, novelty and the materiality of the body constitute 
a nascent metaphysics of sociology. Whitehead, like Latour, does not limit his sociology to 
the human world – a society is simply that which endures, though as we have seen there is 
a clear hierarchy of cognition in Whitehead’s system, with conscious human beings at the 
summit – but, as Halewood notes, clearly what applies to wider modes of existence will 
also apply to, ‘what are normally considered to be human societies.’ (Halewood, 2014, 
p.140) 
We will finish this section with one more quote from PR, a long but crucial passage which 
encapsulates the exquisite sadness and sense of longing which pervades Whitehead’s work 
and imbues it with such compelling force, vigour and relevance. 
The world is thus faced by the paradox that, at least in its higher actualities, it 
craves for novelty and yet is haunted by terror at the loss of the past, its 
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familiarities and its loved ones. It seeks escape from time in its character of 
‘perpetually perishing.’ Part of the joy of the new years is the hope of the old round 
of seasons, with their stable facts – of friendship, and love, and old association. Yet 
conjointly with this terror, the present as mere unrelieved preservation of the past 
assumes the character of a horror of the past, rejection of it, revolt:  
 To die be given, or attain, 
 Fierce work it were to do again. 
Each new epoch enters upon its career by waging unrelenting war upon the 
aesthetic gods of its immediate predecessor. Yet the culminating fact of conscious, 
rational life refuses to conceive itself as a transient enjoyment, transiently useful. In 
the order of the physical world its role is defined by its introduction of novelty. But, 
just as physical feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of causality, so the 
higher intellectual feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of another order, 
where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck: ‘There shall be no more sea.’ 
(PR, p.340) 
Perception 
So far, we have considered Whitehead’s fundamental categories, the eternal object and the 
actual entity, the process of concrescence, and the process of aggregation. We will now 
turn to the question of perception, a question we considered in great depth in our 
discussion of Leibniz’s work.  
There are three modes of perception in Whitehead’s process system. The first is perception 
in the mode of causal efficacy. This is similar to Leibniz’s petit perceptions, or the 
perceptive abilities of the bare monad: it is the basic transmission of vague conformal 
feelings found in the first phase of concrescence. The second mode is the mode of 
presentational immediacy. This mode of perception is to be found in the later phases of 
concrescence and, again, can be compared to the perceptive abilities of the soul or animal 
soul monad; which is to say, a sophisticated mode of perception but lacking in causal 
efficacy. The third and final mode of perception is the mode of symbolic reference. This is 
the mode into which human perception falls. The basis for perception in the human body, 
and the body of most organic beings, is the perception of the various bits of that body 
which transmit and enhance their experiences to one another and, ultimately, up, as it were, 
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to the living regnant nexus and the living person. The parallels with Leibniz’s system are 
clear, yet, Whitehead’s account is more sophisticated. He borrows from the study of 
electromagnetism the notion that the human body ought to be seen as a ‘complex amplifier’ 
(PR, p.119), and this brings to mind the ‘buzzing world’, though here we have the buzzing 
body, each actual entity transmitting to the dominant occasions and, ultimately, being 
integrated within the enduring personality. What is inherited, is what Whitehead describes 
as: ‘feeling-tone with evidence of its origin: in other words, vector feeling-tone.’ (PR, 
p.119)  
Returning to the three modes of perception, the first is straightforward enough but the 
second and third require further explication. Beginning with the second, there are two 
metaphysical assumptions presupposed by perception in the mode of presentational 
immediacy. First of all, it is presumed that the actual world – that is, the given world of 
actual entities which have already become – provides the ‘objective content’ for each new 
actual entity and that the actual world limits and conditions the potential for novelty of 
each new actual entity. There is, therefore, a real potentiality of each actual entity that is 
conditioned by the given world, as opposed to the general potentiality of the eternal 
objects. Secondly, it is presumed that these real potentialities are ‘coordinated as diverse 
determinations of one extensive continuum.’ (PR, p.66) This is an important point and one 
that can be illuminated if we look at it from the point of view of the actual entity. The 
actual entity, like Leibniz’s monad to primary matter, atomizes the extensive continuum. 
We are now able to see the significance of this concept. The extensive continuum 
‘underlies the whole world, past, present, and future.’ (PR, p.66) There is dialectic at work 
here. On the one hand, the actual world as perceived is continuous; on the other, the actual 
world is atomic, divided as it is into definite actual entities. The process of becoming is a 
pulling to and from the continuous and the atomic. We should also say that there is a 
consequence for the definition of contemporaneousness in this. Two contemporary actual 
occasions stand in relation to one another by virtue of being coordinate points on the same 
extensive continuum but they do not contribute to one another’s datum. To put it another 
way, actual entity A does not belong to the actual world of actual entity B when the two 
entities are contemporaneous. They are, as Whitehead puts it, neighbours. Classical 
Newtonian physics has a serial view of time whereby two contemporary actual entities 
would define the one actual world. The view of relativity theory, however, corresponds to 
Whitehead’s position, that ‘no two actual entities define the same actual world.’ (PR, 
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p.66)129 Following on from this, we can say that actual entities are not divisible into other 
contemporary actual entities; therefore, all contemporary actual entities are divided from 
one another. Thinking back a few pages to our discussion of the ‘living person,’ there is a 
parallel between the logic of asocial sociality we find in the composition of the living 
nexus and the logic of asocial sociality we find in the relations between contemporary 
actual entities. But in this case the social is recovered by virtue of the fact that despite 
being divided, contemporary actual entities atomize the same extensive continuum. As a 
process, we can imagine this as the fleeting emergence of the particular from the general, 
the flicker of the individual before it remerges into the mass. Crucially, however, it is a 
changed mass as a result of that flicker of individuality, of novelty. The atomization of the 
extensive continuum is also the temporalization of the extensive continuum. We can see 
here a potential metaphysical underpinning for Latour’s notion of periodization. Whitehead 
writes:  
The extensive continuum is that general relational element in experience whereby 
the actual entities experienced, and that unit experience itself, are united in the 
solidarity of one common world. The actual entities atomize it, and thereby make 
real what was antecedently merely potential. The atomization of the extensive 
continuum is also its temporalization; that is to say, it is the process of the 
becoming of actuality into what in itself is merely potential. The systematic 
scheme, in its completeness embracing the actual past and the potential future, is 
prehended in the positive experience of each actual entity. In this sense, it is Kant’s 
‘form of intuition’; but it is derived from the actual world qua datum, and thus is 
not ‘pure’ in Kant’s sense of the term. It is not productive of the ordered world, but 
derivative from it. 
(PR, p.72) 
Perception in the mode of presentational immediacy then is the perception of the extensive 
continuum. In other words, it takes the vague and imprecise data of perception in the mode 
of causal efficacy and gives it clarity and definition, yet, it can only do so in an atomised 
form and is therefore akin to a burst or flicker of perception which is temporally isolated. 
                                         
129 Whitehead notes that: ‘the differences between the actual worlds of a pair of contemporary entities, which 
are in a certain sense ‘neighbours,’ are negligible for most human purposes. Thus the difference between 
the ‘classical’ and the ‘relativity’ view of time only rarely has any important relevance.’ (PR, p.66) 
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Time is atomic, ‘nature knows no such thing as an instant without thickness.’ (Stengers, 
2011, p.193)130 
Both perception in the mode of causal efficacy and perception in the mode of 
presentational immediacy are forms of primitive perception. The third mode is a mixed 
mode of perception and is akin to what we think of when we think of the experience of 
perception. Perception in the mode of symbolic reference is the bringing together of the 
two primitive modes of perception, and this operates as follows: 
[S]ymbolic reference, though in complex human experience it works both ways, is 
chiefly to be thought of as the elucidation of percepta in the mode of causal efficacy 
by the fluctuating intervention of percepta in the mode of presentational 
immediacy. 
The former mode produces percepta which are vague, not to be controlled, heavy 
with emotion: it produces the sense of derivation from an immediate past, and of 
passage to an immediate future; a sense of emotional feeling, belonging to oneself 
in the past, passing into oneself in the present, and passing from oneself in the 
present towards oneself in the future; a sense of influx of influence from other 
vaguer presences in the past, localized and yet evading local definition, such 
influence modifying, enhancing, inhibiting, diverting, the stream of feeling which 
we are receiving, unifying, enjoying, and transmitting. This is our general sense of 
existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world. … The 
percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy have the converse 
characteristics. In comparison, they are distinct, definite, controllable, apt for 
immediate enjoyment, and with the minimum of reference to the past, or to future. 
We are subject to our percepta in the mode of efficacy, we adjust our percepta in the 
mode of immediacy. But, in fact, our process of self-construction for the 
achievement of unified experience produces a new product, in which percepta in 
one mode, and percepta in the other mode, are synthesized into one subjective 
feeling. For example, we are perceiving before our eyes a grey stone. 
(Whitehead, PR, pp.178-179) 
The synthesis of perception in the mode of symbolic reference, in simple terms, allows us 
to see an object and locate it in the contemporary world, while also perceiving it as an 
                                         
130 For Latour it is not the instant that is thick but the text: There is no tool, no medium, only mediators. A 
text is thick. That’s an ANT tenet, if any. (2005, p.137) 
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object which persists, which has a future and a past. This is where Whitehead’s rejection of 
Humean empiricism is most evident. Whitehead effectively views Hume’s position as one-
sided; one which only takes into account perception in the mode of presentational 
immediacy and thus one which cannot allow for any causal dependence between actual 
entities. In other words, presentational immediacy is a ‘cross-section of the universe’ which 
tells us nothing of the past or the future. (PR, p.168) Perception in the mode of causal 
efficacy brings causation, or more precisely, causal influence back in. In the mode of 
symbolic reference there is an interplay, an interpenetration of the modes of causal efficacy 
and presentational immediacy. This interplay is necessarily interpretive, hence the fact that 
symbolic reference is found in the later stages of concrescence. It is interpretative because 
it requires the recognition of some element in common between the objects of the two 
modes of perception in order for those prehensions to be brought into a unity of feeling. 
This, therefore, introduces the possibility of error in human perception. Indeed, Whitehead 
remarks that, ‘error is the mark of the higher organisms, and is the schoolmaster by whose 
agency there is upward evolution.’ (PR, p.168)  
Furthermore, there is a necessary connection between the two modes by virtue of the 
ingression of some common eternal object in both. This commonality, however, can only 
be uncovered by perception in the mode of presentational immediacy, coming, as it does, 
in the later stages of concrescence. Presentational immediacy is therefore, in Whitehead’s 
words, ‘the enhancement of the importance of relationships which were already in the 
datum, vaguely and with slight relevance.’ (PR, p.173) In other words, the primary fact of 
perception is causal efficacy with presentational immediacy emerging as an ‘outgrowth’. 
Ultimately, both causal efficacy and presentational immediacy rely on the same datum and 
it is this which provides the ‘common ground’ for symbolic reference.  
So, what we have is a reversal of Hume and Kant’s assumption that presentational 
immediacy is primary. Whitehead holds instead that it is causal efficacy that is primary. In 
terms of practical example, Whitehead gives the following account of perception in the 
mode of causal efficacy: 
But animals, and even vegetables, in low forms of organism exhibit modes of 
behaviour directed towards self-preservation. There is every indication of a vague 
feeling of causal relationship with the external world, of some intensity, vaguely 
defined as to quality, and with some vague definition as to locality. A jellyfish 
advances and withdraws, and in so doing exhibits some perception of causal 
relationship with the world beyond itself; a plant grows downwards to the damp 
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earth, and upwards towards the light. There is thus some direct reason for 
attributing dim, slow feelings of causal nexus, although we have no reason for any 
ascription of the definite percepts in the mode of presentational immediacy. 
(PR, pp.176-177) 
An example of pure perception in the mode of presentational immediacy – a mode which is 
only to be found in the higher organisms – would be a hallucination or an illusion, in other 
words a perception without reference in the settled world of actual entities.131 We can see 
then how the interplay of the two primitive modes of perception through symbolic 
reference results in what we recognise as ordinary perception. Take sight, for example. 
When we see a stone we perceive in the mode of presentational immediacy the image of 
the stone (that is, visual sensa) and the slight straining of the eye inherent in any act of 
sight. This second aspect of perception in the mode presentational immediacy provides a 
locus of perception. However, without the vague perception of the antecedent settled world 
of actual entities (that is, the immense presence of the past) we cannot perceive the stone as 
anything other than a burst or flash of grey, a vague shape or outline. The two intermingled 
and interpreted through symbolic reference provide us with a perception of the stone as an 
object located in spatial relation to ourselves that has both a past and a future. Thus, 
Whitehead describes perception as ‘the catching of a universal quality in the act of 
qualifying a particular substance’. (PR, p.158) 
Of course, this account has significant consequences in terms of our understanding of 
consciousness. In the philosophy of organism, the subjectivist principle defines the nature 
of consciousness; that is, that consciousness emerges from experience rather than being the 
foundation of experience. Or, as Stengers puts it, ‘the mind is no longer “the ultimate,” but 
that which obliges us to think.’ (2011, p.221) The subjectivist principle is ‘that the whole 
universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects. 
Process is the becoming of experience.’ (PR, p.166) Again, as is often the case with the 
philosophy of organism, this is only one side of the coin. The other is the objectivist 
principle, which is that the datum for experience (that is, the actual entities which have 
passed into objective immortality) constitute objective content. Thus, Whitehead avoids 
slipping into solipsism. Furthermore, in contrast to the philosophy of substance of 
                                         
131 Whitehead insists that this sort of occurrence is real, in the mode of presentational immediacy at least. We 
cannot be mistaken in our perception of a hallucination; we really do perceive it. Our mistake comes at 
the point of symbolic reference. Whitehead therefore rejects the notion of the human being as a rational 
being. He writes, ‘It is said that ‘men are rational.’ This is palpably false: they are only intermittently 
rational – merely liable to rationality. The intellect of Socrates is intermittent: he occasionally sleeps and 
he can be drugged or stunned.’ (PR, p.79) 
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Descartes (and of Aristotle and most Western philosophy), the philosophy of organism 
does not begin with a subject that then comes upon some datum. In Whitehead’s system, 
the datum comes first.132 As a result, and as we have stated above, the creation of the 
‘thinker’, the conscious being, in the end result of the process, not the beginning. Put 
simply, the datum gives rise to feeling which results in thought which produces the thinker. 
* * * 
The philosophy of organism, the philosophy of process, is one of movement: and as Marx 
wrote in The Poverty of Philosophy, ‘There is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the 
movement – mors immortalis.’ (p.119) Whitehead captures this shift from the 
understanding of the world as a world of things which interact with one another, stuff 
which is set in motion; to a world where stuff is motion, where movement is the basic stuff 
of reality. ‘We speak of the subject of the experience in necessary and useful abstraction 
but there is, in the final synthetic unity, only the movement itself.’ (Pomeroy, p.54) Here 
we have a philosophy which is truly in step with the physics of relativity, which seeks to 
explain the world in all its complexity; unlike the positivist and analytic philosophers who 
seek to explain the complexity away, to explain all in terms of the philosophy of substance. 
Whitehead writes: 
The Cartesian subjectivism in its application to physical science became Newton’s 
assumption of individually existent physical bodies, with merely external 
relationships. We diverge from Descartes by holding that what he has described as 
primary attributes of physical bodies, are really the forms of internal relationships 
between actual occasions, and within actual occasions. Such a change of thought is 
the shift from materialism to organism, as the basic idea of physical science. 
In the language of physical science, the change from materialism to ‘organic 
realism’ – as the new outlook may be termed – is the displacement of the notion of 
static stuff by the notion of fluent energy. Such energy has its structure of action 
                                         
132 Latour writes that, ‘One of the key discoveries of Stengers’s Whitehead is that an emphasis on 
perspective, far from celebrating the point of view that a given subject ‘‘has on’’ some state of affairs, is 
rather a telling witness of what perception offers to the living organism. … Thus, perspective is no longer 
a proof of subjectivity but a proof of the grasp of reality of what Whitehead calls ‘‘the passage of 
nature’’: ‘‘The passage is neutral, the point of view does not belong to you, except that you occupy it, but 
it is much more accurately described as what keeps you busy rather than what you own’’. There are many 
more interesting questions to ask about science than that of its degree of certainty.’ (Latour, p229) 
Stenger’s tease out this aspect of Whitehead’s thought admirably but this understanding of perspective is 
readily apparent in Process and Reality itself and indeed the notion is developed so as not to simply be 
‘what keeps you busy’ but a complex threefold mode of perception as described in this chapter. With that 
in mind, the last sentence in the Latour quotation here reads as something of a non sequitur.  
159 
 
and flow, and is inconceivable apart from such structure. It is also conditioned by 
‘quantum’ requirements. These are the reflections into physical science of the 
individual prehensions, and of the individual actual entities to which these 
prehensions belong. Mathematical physics translates the saying of Heraclitus, ‘All 
things flow,’ into its own language. It then becomes, All things are vectors. 
Mathematical physics also accepts the atomistic doctrine of Democritus. It 
translates it into the phrase, All flow of energy obeys ‘quantum’ conditions. 
But what has vanished from the field of ultimate scientific conceptions is the notion 
of vacuous material existence with passive endurance, with primary individual 
attributes, and with accidental adventures. Some features of the physical world can 
be expressed in that way. But the concept is useless as an ultimate notion in 
science, and in cosmology. 
(PR, p.309) 
Michael Epperson describes it as both ‘fortunate and remarkable’ that Whitehead’s 
metaphysical scheme ‘so precisely mirrors the hypothetical deductions and inductions 
made by the physicists who have contributed to the development of the event-ontological, 
‘historical process’ interpretations of quantum mechanics.’ (2004, p.xiv) 
After all, the role of metaphysics, as Whitehead argues, is to investigate the generic 
principles under which the specific principles of science fall, with the role of science being 
the investigation of particular species. (PR, p.116) The problem is, as we know, the 
bifurcation of nature implied by substance philosophy; in other words, most post-Lockean 
modern philosophy. As Latour himself point outs, ever the keen critic of modernism, it is 
impossible to ascribe to a living organism the notions of primary and secondary qualities; 
the separation is absurd as there is an endless blurring of the two in any living organism. 
(2005b, p.227) The question then is how to develop a metaphysics which can 
accommodate the organism. Indeed, the very concept of the organism poses once more the 
necessity of metaphysics itself. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, by uniting the 
subjectivist and objectivist principles within the organism, frees scientific activity from, in 
Latour’s words, ‘the rather absurd choice of having to choose between ‘being of this 
world’ and ‘being of another world.’ Rather, science adds its knowledge to the world, 
folding itself, so to speak, into it one more time.’ (2005b, p.231) 
Of the three monadologists – Leibniz, Tarde and Whitehead – Whitehead presents the most 
complex and challenging system of metaphysics. Leibniz provides a suite of concepts, a 
history, and the monadic principles, but he belongs safely to the past and can be 
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paraphrased, mutilated, employed metaphorically – there is no contemporary Leibnizism to 
speak of and there are few Leibnizists to object. Tarde’s work is similarly malleable and 
plastic, coming at the tail end of the era of Newtonian physics, grasping towards the 
alternative but finding it just out of reach. Recall that he has to embrace philosophy of 
possession because he cannot find a satisfactory opposite to ‘becoming’. The dialectical 
being-becoming, the subject-superject and the concept of valuation, of positive and 
negative prehension; all allow for the radical relationality, the folding and unfolding, loss 
and acquisition that Tarde was looking for.  
Whitehead, on the contrary, inhabits our own world. His philosophy of organism, as 
presented in Process and Reality, is rigorous, exhaustive, intricate. It is not easily 
understood except as a whole; much as a piece of music cannot be explained note by note. 
This is not to say that Whitehead presents in Process and Reality the last word in 
speculative philosophy. But, for our era at least, it is the first word.  
What ties Latour so tightly to Whitehead is a shared preoccupation; namely, the resistance 
of the bifurcation of nature and a commitment to a non-hierarchical ontology. For both 
Whitehead and Latour, God, human beings, telephones, stones, ideas and so on have the 
same ontological status. Recall the quote from earlier in this chapter that begins, ‘There is 
no going behind actual entities to find anything more real.’ It continues:  
They [actual entities] differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the 
most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are 
gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which 
actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual 
entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and 
interdependent. 
(PR, p.18) 
However, Actor-Network theory runs the risk of reinforcing the very bifurcation it seeks to 
resist by committing the sin that Whitehead warns us of so often, the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. As Weber notes, with Actor-Network Theory:  
As a method of tracing networks of relations becomes a metaphysical principle, it is 
severed from its pragmatism and empiricism and becomes an instrument in the 
service of a bifurcation, treating other forms of explanation as mere illusions, 
obstructions to a greater reality. The bifurcation has been turned on its head: now, 
instead of primary qualities as real and secondary qualities as mere appearances, 
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ANT institutes relations as primary and transforms stable entities into secondary 
phenomena. (pp.523-524) 
Recall Whitehead’s warning in Science and the Modern World: ‘You cannot think without 
abstractions; accordingly, it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising 
your modes of abstraction.’ (p.36) This is the distinction which leads Stengers to claim that 
Whitehead is a constructivist, but not in the sense that things are ‘mere constructions’. 
(2011, p.18) The abstract and the concrete are inextricably intertwined – more than that, 
they are utterly dependent on one another. As Pomeroy writes, ‘All being, top to bottom, 
simultaneously subject and substance, simultaneously conceptual and material. All being 
relational. All being life and movement. All being free.’ (p.18) It is in this way that 
Whitehead’s metaphysics can sidestep the charge of being totalizing in the manner of 
Hegel: ‘It is thus not a unifying vision of the world that is proposed with the organism, but 
what Whitehead designates as a new mode of abstraction, capable of reconciling science 
and philosophy.’ (Stengers, 2011, p.130) 
The many become one and are increased by one. Stengers unfolds this refrain admirably, 
writing:  
The being-world, a veritable Leibnizian monad, a producer-product enjoying the 
adoption-of-a-position that has actualized “its world,” can no longer be the 
syntactic subject of a process, since every process corresponds to a becoming-
determined. Definition, the soul of actuality, has been produced. Henceforth, being 
what it is, the occasion perishes qua subject-superject, qua subjective immediacy, to 
become a “that which”: that which others will feel. 
(2011, p.296) 
The result is the solidarity of the universe; as Whitehead describes in Modes of Thought: 
In fact, the world beyond is so intimately entwined in our own natures that 
unconsciously we identify our more vivid perspectives of it with ourselves. For 
example, our bodies lie beyond our own individual existence. And yet they are part 
of it. We think of ourselves as so intimately entwined in bodily life that a man is a 
complex unity – body and mind. But the body is part of the external world, 
continuous with it. In fact, it is just as much part of nature as anything else there – a 
river, or a mountain, or a cloud. Also, if we are fussily exact, we cannot define 
where a body begins and where external nature ends. 
(p.21) 
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And it is this question of solidarity that so concerns Latour. In his Spinoza Lecture at the 
University of Amsterdam in 2005, titled What is the Style of Matters of Concern?, Latour 
told the audience: 
In a nature that as bifurcated, it’s in vain that the nightingale sings: the singing is 
entirely in our mind, or even in our brain. If we could look directly at nature, it 
would be soundless: the throat of the nightingale would simply agitate the air, the 
waves of which will strike our eardrums triggering some electric effects in our 
neurons, and somewhere in the auditory folds of our cortex a pure invention will 
emerge which has no correspondence whatsoever with anything of a similar tone in 
nature: the song of the soundless nightingale. 
(p.11) 
The bifurcation of nature, the separation of primary and secondary qualities, of the why 
and the how, the concrete and the abstract, is not a scholastic question but fundamental to 
our understanding of the world and fundamentally conditions our social and political 
environments. ‘Meaning without reality’ or ‘reality without meaning’ (Latour, 2008, p.26) 
– such is the choice offered by a bifurcated nature. Using this concept of bifurcation allows 
Latour to pose the question, ‘how come we have, for three centuries, discounted what is 
given to us through experience and replaced it instead with something never experienced 
that philosophers have nonetheless the nerve to call “empirical” and “matters of fact[ual]”.’ 
(2008, p.35)  
The other key synergy between Whitehead and Latour is, of course, the refusal to draw any 
a priori distinction between the human and non-human. This flows from Whitehead’s 
depsychologized experience, which for Latour affords an existentialism extended to all 
things. It is the granting of historicity – inherent in the notion of the occasion – to all things 
that is key here.133 Without Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, Latour has no means of 
resisting the distinction between human and non-human, nature and society without a mere 
sociological explanation (as in, for example, the account of the hotel room key); in other 
words, there is a reliance on the very methodology he seeks to overturn. He acknowledges 
as much, writing in Do Scientific Objects Have a History: 
                                         
133 Once again, it is quite extraordinary to think that Whitehead, by all accounts, never read Hegel; although 
it is likely that, through F.H. Bradley, he would be familiar with Hegel’s system. Harry K Wells’ laments 
in his preface to Process and unreality: A criticism of method in Whitehead's philosophy that ‘Whitehead 
should have gone directly to Hegel, himself.’ (1950, p.viii) 
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Whitehead's metaphysics allows us to help the philosophy of the history of science 
– blocked for some time on the question of the role that ought to be given to 
nonhumans – to take a small step forward. It is perfectly possible to reconcile 
scepticism and realism, provided historicity be thoroughly granted to nonhumans as 
well. A little historicity spawns relativism, a great deal engenders realism. 
(p.91) 
Finally, in Whitehead’s very system we can see the monad in action. Like God and the 
‘most trivial puff of existence’ the concept too has an ontological status; one that is 
explored, as we will soon see, further by Latour. A concept as an actual occasion, or more 
precisely, as a society of actual occasions, is characterized, like any Whiteheadian society, 
by the genetic relatedness of its members. The monad has come a long way from Leibniz 
but Whitehead shows us that it cannot but be remade, reassembled every time it is picked 
up and used by another philosopher. Like everything else the concept of the monad in all 
its instantiations belongs to the world of settled fact, waiting to be taken up by the next 
subject on ‘its adventure of self-formation.’ (PR, p.308) 
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Chapter 4: Latour 
And do I have a metaphysics? No, I don’t think I have a metaphysics, that’s the 
problem. 
(Latour, 2011, p.46) 
Leibniz gives us a concept, the monad, from which a torrent of ideas gush forth; like water 
surging through the mills that powered early modernity.134 Tarde’s Monadology and 
Sociology reads like the fever dream of someone on the cusp of 20th century modernism; 
while Whitehead diagnoses the cancer at the heart of that modernism, the bifurcation of 
nature. Latour tells us we have never been modern after all, all the while sketching a body 
of work which, in its self-effacing modesty, its warm sarcasm, evades canonisation – its 
very essence rebukes the notion.  
Bruno Latour is, as he writes in The Pasteurization of France, ‘Christian, philosopher, 
intellectual, bourgeois, male, provincial, and French’ (1988, p.163). He trained first as a 
philosopher then as an anthropologist, before combining the two approaches in his first 
book with Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life. Associated from the outset with Science and 
Technology Studies, by the 1990s he was best known for his work on a controversial new 
set of social theories and practices, termed Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Ignored by 
philosophers and reviled by sociologists, ANT was slow to produce a school of thought; 
there was Actor-Network Theory, but beyond Bruno Latour, John Law, and Michael 
Callon, there were few actor-network theorists. Even they were reluctant to promote ANT, 
with Latour in 1996 himself writing a paper titled, The Problem with Actor-Network 
Theory (1996b).135 In it he addresses some of the ‘misconceptions’ stemming from the term 
‘network’136 and its various uses, particularly in relation to the internet, and reminds 
                                         
134 Recall from the Monadology: ‘If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, 
and have perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter 
into it, as one enters into a mill.’ 
135 Published in English as, On actor-network theory. A few clarifications plus more than a few 
complications. 
136 Schmidgen explains that in Latour’s view, ‘the openness and accessibility of the Web invalidated in the 
long term the notion of the network as developed together with Callon and others: 
At the time, the word network, like Deleuze’s and Guattari’s term rhizome, clearly meant a series of 
transformations – translations, transductions – which could not be captured by any of the traditional 
terms of social theory. With the new popularization of the word network, it now means transport 
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readers of ANT’s ‘quaint ontology,’ but by 1999 he announces his rejection of the term 
‘ANT’ entirely, writing, ‘there are four things that do not work with actor-network theory; 
the word actor, the word network, the word theory and the hyphen! Four nails in the 
coffin.’ (1999, p.15) But one cannot be an actor network theorist while also holding that 
one has the power to simply dispose of an entire theory. By 2005, Latour writes 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, where he 
systematically presents what ANT had been attempting to do, in the process making peace 
with the term itself:  
Why not use actor-network? I know this expression remains odd because it could 
mean just the opposite as well, namely a solution to the actor/system quandary we 
have just rejected. But we have the word already at hand, and it’s not that badly 
designed in the end. 
(2005, p.217) 
What he presents is the bundling together of an array of concepts that had been developed 
and explored over seventeen years of study and observation. At its heart is the insistence 
that when we talk about something being ‘social’ – as in, teenage pregnancy is a social 
problem, as opposed to how to stop a building from falling down which is a problem for 
science – we are designating a ‘stabilized state of affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may be 
mobilized to account for some other phenomenon.’ (Latour, 2005, p.1) This is not 
necessarily a problem, provided that what has been designated ‘social’ has been properly 
assembled, without any assumptions as to the nature of the material used in the assembly.  
However, sociologists and social scientists do not use the term ‘social’ in the sense of a 
‘movement137 during a process of assembling’ (2005, p,1) but rather as a term to designate 
a particular kind of material. By separating the social from everything else, the social 
scientist is able to provide ‘social explanation’ of something else. Latour argues that while 
this has clearly had its uses, it is long past its best and now serves to obscure the 
                                         
without transformation, an instantaneous, unmediated access to every piece of information. That is 
exactly the opposite of what we meant. (On Recalling ANT, p.15) 
137 Movement is an important part of Latour’s thinking, being the very lure to enquiry: ‘When a famous 
soprano says, ‘It is my voice who tells me when to stop and when to begin’, how quickly should the 
sociologist jump to the conclusion that the singer offers here a ‘typical case’ of ‘false consciousness’, 
artists being always too ready to take what is of their own making as the fetish that makes them do 
things? Is it not abundantly clear that this singer should not be listened to but instead ‘freed from her own 
delusion’ by the courageous exposition of her lies. Down with Muses and other undocumented aliens! 
And yet, the soprano did say that she shared her life with her voice that made her do certain things. Are 
we able to treasure this odd way of speaking or not? It was very precise, very revealing, very telling, and 
also very moving. Is not being moved, or rather, put into motion by the informants exactly what we 
should mean by an enquiry? (2005, p.48) 
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assemblage of multifarious materials in the process of assembling the social; that the social 
is to be explained rather than provide the explanation. This leads to ANT’s most famous 
claim, that both the human and the non-human have to be taken into account in the 
composition of a social world. It is not, as Latour points out, ‘the establishment of some 
absurd ‘symmetry between humans and non-humans’,’ but rather, ‘simply means not to 
impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a material 
world of causal relations.’ (2005, p.76) 
It is these sort of views, and the sometimes wilful misreading of them, that has landed 
Latour in trouble over the years; most notably during the so-called ‘science wars’ of the 
1990s when he became one of Alan Sokal’s prime targets. Latour writes in The 
Pasteurization of France,  
"Science" -in quotation marks-does not exist. It is the name that has been pasted 
onto certain sections of certain networks, associations that are so sparse and fragile 
that they would have escaped attention altogether if everything had not been 
attributed to them. 
(1988, p.216) 
It is not difficult to see what bothered Sokal, and earned the approval of the social 
constructivists. Yet the irony is, Latour rejects both modernists and post-modernists with 
equal scorn and vigour. He is an empirical philosopher and a realist, no more believing that 
everything can be reduced to signs, representations or language than the most hard-headed 
positivist. But he reserves equal scorn for those who simply want the opposite: to excise 
semiotics, representation, language from the natural world, to bifurcate nature and place 
the natural in one pile, and the social in another. Far from being a social theory or 
philosophy of technology, ANT is an Actant Rhizome Ontology. We will discuss this term 
in due course, but for now it is worth making absolutely clear, as Latour does, that; 
[Y]ou can provide an actor-network account of topics which have in no way the 
shape of a network—a symphony, a piece of legislation, a rock from the moon, an 
engraving. Conversely, you may well write about technical networks—television, 
e-mails, satellites, salesforce—without at any point providing an actor-network 
account. 
(2005, p.131)    
This final chapter returns to the work of Latour to find the monad reassembled as the 
‘actor-network’. It will describe and detail his ontological scheme – as presented primarily 
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in Irreductions, We Have Never Been Modern, and Reassembling the Social – presenting 
the actor-network (or actant-rhizome) as a reiteration/renewal of the monad and an 
ontology that itself demands to be renewed each and every time it is deployed. The chapter 
closes with the argument that, firstly, Latour pays insufficient heed to Whitehead’s 
understanding of abstraction with the result that, despite Latour himself developing the 
through his work, he fails to fully embrace the ontological reality of the abstract. Secondly, 
that this in turn leads to his preference for litany over critique and results in a philosophy 
with a great deal of descriptive power but little or no transformational power. Finally, the 
thesis concludes arguing that the ‘compositionist’ politics that emerge from Latour’s Actant 
Rhizome Ontology are ambiguous and utopian, and that Latour’s democratization of the 
monad must be extended to include its radicalization, to move beyond explanation toward 
transformation, to rediscover critique. 
The approach in this chapter is consistent with that taken throughout the thesis. It is an 
empirical and hermeneutic approach, in the spirit of ANT itself.  
What makes Latour’s work stand out is his style of doing ‘empirical philosophy’. 
Like Peguy’s Clio, Latour “applies that of which he speaks”. Concepts are 
introduced as tools and discarded when more useful ones are found; precursors in 
philosophy and social science are pragmatically introduced to help convey the 
message. When writers with better ideas and concepts are found, former ones are 
kindly invited to leave the stage. 
(De Vries, 2016, p.20) 
Similarly, John Law writes, 
And ANT? I think we might imagine that, like its objects of study, ANT cannot be 
told. Cannot be told as a single narrative. As an overall story about the growth of a 
centred network with its successes and reverses. And instead imagine that it can 
only - and best - be represented as a set of little stories, stories that are held together 
(if they are) by ambivalences and oscillations. In which case, as representatives, we 
might then embrace an art of describing, an art of describing the patterns and 
textures that form intellectual patchwork. 
(2003c, p,8) 
That is precisely what we are attempting here: not the construction of a metaphysics – as 
per the chapter’s opening quotation – but the art of describing the patterns and textures of 
Latour’s intellectual patchwork. 
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Irreducibility 
Latour’s metaphysical system is launched with the words, ‘Nothing is, by itself, either 
reducible or irreducible to anything else’ (Latour, 1988, p.158). So begins the second part, 
titled Irreductions, of his The Pasteurization of France. Encountered on its own and at first 
glance, this text appears as a slightly anachronistic work of speculative metaphysics; we 
might conceive of it as a Leibnizian philosophy in the language of Nietzsche – the 
entelechy rendered synonymous with force, the monad with weakness, all set out in 
numbered paragraphs. It is in fact much stranger than that. Punctured with literary 
biographical digressions Latour labels ‘interludes’ – ‘It was a wintry sky, and a very blue. I 
no longer needed to prop it up with a cosmology, put it in a picture, render it in writing…’ 
(1988, p.163) – it follows a painstaking account of Pasteur’s discovery of the microbe. 
This first section, titled War and Peace of Microbes, is an attempt at an ‘anthropology of 
the sciences’: an account of this history of microbes that includes all of the actors involved, 
including the microbes themselves. Along with the obvious reference in the title, Latour 
quotes Tolstoy’s War and Peace early in this first section in what can be read as a 
something of a Latourian cri de coeur: 
So long as histories are written of separate individuals, whether Caesars, 
Alexanders, Luthers or Voltaires, and not the histories of all – absolutely all – those 
who take part in an event, it is impossible not to ascribe to individual men a force 
which can compel other men to direct their activity towards a certain end. And the 
only conception of such a kind known to historians is the idea of power. 
(Latour, 1988, p.14; Tolstoy, 1952, p.679) 
It is the histories of all – of absolutely all – that must be accounted for if we are to 
understand any given event. While Tolstoy was writing about men, Latour takes him at his 
word when he says, ‘absolutely all’; and so we have a history titled The Pasteurization of 
France that is as much about ‘hygienists, drains, Agar gels, chickens, farms, insects of all 
kinds,’ not to mention scientific instruments, medical journals and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, as it is about Pasteur himself. This is a radical new way of seeing the world 
which requires a systematic philosophical reorientation. Irreductions, far from being a 
peculiar appendix to a history of science book, provides that reorientation; it is Latour’s 
attempt to provide a philosophical basis for this new way of looking at the world, where 
every actor, human and nonhuman, has to be taken into account, where belief is no longer 
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distinct from knowledge, where we have never been modern, and where nothing is 
reducible to anything else.  
Graham Harman identifies four key principles138 to Latour’s Irreductions era metaphysics 
(Harman, 2009, pp.14-15) but there is in fact one key principle from which a further three 
are derived. That principle is the principle of irreduction - ‘Nothing is, by itself, either 
reducible or irreducible to anything else’ (Latour, 1988, p.158). We have already found 
something similar in Whitehead – ‘There is no going behind actual entities to find anything 
more real’ (PR, p.18) – and a striking feature of the four monadologies under discussion in 
this thesis is the way in which each unfolds from a fundamental principle or set of 
principles, and the fact that the very concepts themselves behave in accordance with the 
laws of the world they seek to describe – from the monad a universe unfolds; much as, for 
Leibniz, from the concept of the simple substance an entire universe of concepts – that is, 
the monadology – unfolds. This unfolding is of a different character to the logical 
progressions we find in, for example, Descartes Meditations. Cogito ergo sum contains 
almost nothing – it is, as Milan Kundera remarks, the words of an intellectual who has 
never experienced toothache.139 It merely states that there exists a thinking subject. 
Nothing follows from this, hence the need for Descartes to make a leap and carve the 
world in two – the ‘out there’ and the ‘in here’. There is no need for such a leap for 
Leibniz, Tarde, Whitehead, or Latour. Leibniz’s monad contains the world, albeit as a 
reflection. Tarde’s contains the world quite literally, or rather it has the world.140 
Whitehead’s actual entity is the feeling, the prehension, of the settled world of fact. Latour, 
as we will now see, has the actant.  
                                         
138 First, that the world is made up of actants; second, the principle of irreduction; third, translation as the 
means of relation; and fourth, alliance as power. (Harman, 2009, pp.14-15) 
139 ‘I think, therefore I am is the statement of an intellectual who underrates toothaches. I feel, therefore I am 
is a truth much more universally valid, and it applies to everything that's alive. My self does not differ 
substantially from yours in terms of its thought. Many people, few ideas: we all think more or less the 
same, and we exchange, borrow, steal thoughts from one another. However, when someone steps on my 
foot, only I feel the pain. The basis of the self is not thought but suffering, which is the most fundamental 
of all feelings. While it suffers, not even a cat can doubt its unique and uninterchangeable self. In intense 
suffering the world disappears and each of us is alone with his self. Suffering is the university of 
egocentrism.’ (1998, Immortality, p.225) Clearly this owes a lot to Schopenhauer but the notion of ‘I feel 
therefore I am’ has an interesting Whiteheadian ring to it. 
140 Latour makes a similar point, referencing Descartes, in his discussion of Tarde’s philosophy of having: 
‘Here goes Hamlet, as well as Descartes with his cogito, Heidegger with his Being qua Being, together 
with thousands of homilies about the superiority of what ‘we are’ above what ‘we have’. Quite the 
opposite, Tarde instructs us. Nothing is more sterile than identity philosophy —not to mention identity 
politics— but possession philosophy —and maybe possession politics?— create solidarity and 
attachments that cannot be matched.’ (Latour, 2002, p.15) 
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The Actant 
Latour’s universe of concepts unfolds from the principle of irreduction; and the first 
concept we come upon is the actant. Like Leibniz and Tarde’s monads or Whitehead’s 
actual entities, the actants are the stuff of reality. Where Latour differs from his three 
antecedents – a little less so from Tarde – is in his refusal to make any ontological 
distinction between substance and aggregate. A university, a hat, a football match, a water 
molecule, a dog – there is no a priori distinction to be made between these actants. 
Obviously, one actant may act with more force than another, be more significant or have a 
greater impact on the world of actants – a university will act with greater force than a hat – 
but none can claim any greater reality than any other. Neither can there be any distinction 
between the human and the nonhuman, as the scientist in the lab, the microscope through 
which she peers, and the cultures on the slide are all actors. Or a distinction between 
essence and accident – there is no ‘real’ you, only the you that is in the world now, ‘a force 
utterly deployed in the world at any given moment, entirely characterized by its full set of 
features.’ (Harman, 2009, pp.14-15) Such are the consequences of the principle of 
irreduction.  
If you have world of entities, none of which can be reduced to any other, then you have a 
world where Bruno Latour, the Professor at Sciences Po Paris, has the same ontological 
status as the skin cells in his writing hand or the electrical synapses firing away in his 
brain; or indeed the very concept of the actant that came into the world from the common 
endeavour of his brain and his hands – and the keyboard on which he typed, the 
conferences at which he tested his ideas, the coffee that kept his mind sharp, the cup that 
held it and so on. Bruno Latour cannot be explained by his brain activity or a psychological 
profile, his biographical history or a history of contemporary French public intellectuals – 
he is irreducible, he simply is what he is at any given moment. At the same time, a scan of 
his brain or a report on the state of his mind, a book on his childhood or an undergraduate 
seminar on We Have Never Been Modern, all of these are just as real as the man himself.  
Yet when we talk about a person or an event we constantly seek to reduce things to other 
things. Trump was elected because of the embattled, embittered middle class of rust belt 
America. The Higgs bosun was discovered as a result of the work of scientists at CERN. 
We are not wrong when we make these statements or attempt these explanations. But we 
do underestimate the amount of work they require: after all, ‘Explanation does not follow 
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from description; it is description taken that much further.’ (Latour, 1990, p.121) And this 
brings us to the next concept: translation. 
Translation and Alliance 
Translation is the process by which the – to borrow a phrase from Whitehead – the actual 
world is produced. It is Latour’s concrescence. Trump’s election is not simply the change 
in status of sociopathic businessman to sociopathic president. It is the casting of millions of 
ballots, the thousands of miles walked by canvassers, the bits of paper, the counting 
machines, the police escorted ballot boxes, the commentary on cable news, the newspaper 
headlines, the protest rallies, the FBI investigations and so on and so forth. If this looks 
like a typical Latourian litany141 it is because it is – there is simply no other way to account 
for absolutely all of those who take part in an event. The Latour litany is never long 
enough, it can never contain enough actants, because, as we have seen, the universe of 
actants is infinite – if no actant can be reduced to any other then there is no such thing as 
the fundamental substance, the building block of the universe: it’s turtles all the way down. 
However, there is a way of linking things with one another, and that is through translation. 
When Trump ‘takes office’ we have in mind the image of a man striding to a desk, sitting 
down and immediately getting to work – scribbling notes, giving orders, making phone 
calls. In reality, when Trump takes office an enormous network of actants are mobilised 
besides the man and the desk. Take the example of the infamous proposed US/Mexican 
border wall – an example which both demonstrates the power and impotence of Latour’s 
ontology in that it hinders any attempt to move beyond description and litany towards 
critique and praxis. When Trump orders the wall to be built a process of translation begins, 
one which starts with the order and may or may not end with the building of a wall. In 
between, innumerable actants acts as mediators – geographers map the proposed route of 
the wall, economists estimate costs, local communities form groups in support and 
opposition, border agencies write memos and reports on its effectiveness, NGO’s hold 
press conferences to denounce it, firms build concrete prototypes in anticipation of 
lucrative government tenders, and people hoping for a better life continue to cross the 
border where and when they can. Trump’s order is, in other words, translated. Each actant 
takes it and moves with it in a particular way. Some resist, some help it along. In the end, 
                                         
141 A term coined by Ian Bogost. On his website he has created a ‘Latour Litanizer’ which automatically 
generates lists of things using Wikipedia’s random page API: 
http://bogost.com/writing/blog/latour_litanizer/  
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when we say, ‘Trump built a wall’ or, preferably, ‘Trump failed to build the wall’, our 
statement is shorthand for a long and complicated process of translation involving a world 
of actants. Later in his thinking Latour builds on this concept with the notion of mediation.  
Alliance is the third concept to tumble from the principal of irreduction. To put it simply, 
an actant is only as strong as the alliances it constructs. There is a difference between 
Trump saying, ‘Build a wall,’ on the campaign trail and saying, ‘Build a wall,’ in the Oval 
Office. In the first instance he does not have the necessary allies to carry through his will. 
In the second he might; though, as he is finding out, building chains of alliances is not a 
simple task. The same goes for any programme of action, no matter how simple or how 
inevitable it may, in retrospect, now seem. When Latour describes the spread of hygiene in 
the first section of The Pasteurization of France, he writes:  
Although their words were marked by absolute idealism and although they always 
spoke of "progress" and "diffusion," the hygienists knew very well in practice that 
they needed to form alliances with active groups if a gesture or technique were to 
spread into every corner of French society. 
(1988, p.134) 
Progress, diffusion, science – they are not enough. Alliances need to be built, translations 
made, and actants mobilised. We can see more clearly what irreducibility entails now: an 
anti-substance metaphysics. Over time, Latour speaks more of ‘associations’ than alliances, 
the former having a more neutral less martial ring to it while also removing any hint of it 
being necessarily the work of a conscious human agent. Thus, Latour comes to define his 
own work as a ‘sociology of association’ rather than a ‘sociology of the social’, the main 
difference being that the latter takes the social as substantial while the former views it as 
being relational. Latour writes: 
[I]t is possible to remain faithful to the original intuitions of the social sciences by 
redefining sociology not as the ‘science of the social’, but as the tracing of 
associations. In this meaning of the adjective, social does not designate a thing 
among other things, like a black sheep among other white sheep, but a type of 
connection between things that are not themselves social.’ 
(2005, p.3) 
The concept of association is allied to Tarde’s notion of possession – that is, it is less to do 
with what something is and more to do with what it has. As opposed to being, with having 
‘you know neither the boundary nor the direction: to possess is also being possessed; to be 
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attached is to hold and to be held.’ (Latour, 2005, p.217) In other words, subjectivity is to 
be found in the gathering of relations; it is the ‘thing’ in its original sense, as a parliament. 
(Ingold, 2007, p.5) However, every parliament takes a particular form, has a particular 
character. Muldoon argues that: 
One of the key functions of debt is to produce subjects that are capable of 
promising and standing as guarantors of themselves as debtors. For Lazzarato, the 
production of subjectivity is one of the most important components of capitalism, 
which guarantees its ability to reproduce itself. The production of ‘indebted’ 
subjects serves a double purpose: it both creates an economic dependence in the 
subject and acts as a security mechanism by making subjects less risk averse, more 
docile and malleable, and reducing the uncertainty of their future behaviour. 
(2014, pp.68-69) 
The production of subjectivity is therefore produced in a certain way. We are not talking 
about a context that stands behind the world of actants, but rather a way or a mode of 
gathering that results in the production of a particular kind of subjectivity. It remains to be 
seen whether or not Latour’s system can accommodate this kind of analysis. 
The other difference between a substantial and a relational social is that one, the 
substantial, presumes sociality as a property, while the other, the relational, demands that it 
is accounted for. The result is that to be social is no longer a safe, static property but a 
movement which, crucially, can succeed or fragment and fail. There is no longer a 
readymade world for us to inhabit, but rather the world must be made anew each instant. 
The actant is like Tim Ingold’s ‘wayfarer’, which is defined in the following way: 
Wayfaring, I believe, is the most fundamental mode by which living beings, both 
humans and non-human, inhabit the earth. By habitation I do not mean taking one's 
place in a world that has been prepared in advance for the populations that arrive to 
reside there. The inhabitant is rather one who participates from within in the very 
process of the world's continual coming into being and who, in laying a trail of life, 
contributes to its weave and texture. These lines are typically winding and irregular, 
yet comprehensively entangled into a close-knit tissue. 
(2007, p.81) 
John Law describes it as ‘ontological choreography’, with its dance-like nature where a 
‘set of connections is made for a moment, a reality that might hold together for a time.’ 
(2003c, p.10) And as Latour wrote, ‘If a dancer stops dancing, the dance is finished’ 
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(Latour, 2005, p.37) – alliances persist only in movement, only so long as they are made, 
remade and maintained. 
Concreteness and endurance 
If nothing is irreducible to anything else then everything is absolutely concrete. But if 
everything is concrete then there can be no distinction between essence and accident or a 
substance and its qualities, as both essence and accident, substance and quality would be 
concrete. In other words, if such a distinction could be made then the accident would be 
reducible to the essence and the quality to the substance. There would then be an 
ontological hierarchy where some things are concrete and irreducible and others are not. In 
a world made up only of actants, fully deployed in the world at any given time, this cannot 
be. Instead, we have a world of actants which are wholly defined by their relations; as 
Harman puts it, ‘All features of an object belong to it; everything happens only once, at 
one time, in one place.’ (2009, p.17) What then of endurance? As for Whitehead, for Latour 
endurance is a genetic matter. A person does not persist in time as a substance to which 
things happen, things are added and taken away. A person happens ‘only once, at one time, 
in one place.’ When we refer to the persistence of a person – for example yesterday Trump 
said one thing, today he said the opposite – we are, as discussed earlier, engaging in a kind 
of shorthand. The reality is that each Trump is fully deployed in the world at each moment. 
There is nothing left over to persist. Instead, the succession of Trumps are tied together 
genetically. Again like Whitehead reality and the succession of time are atomic; just as for 
Godard the frames of a film produce truth twenty-four times a second.142 But again like 
Whitehead, and like a film, we can abstract by linking these frames together: ‘time has 
stood still, if only it could.’ (PR, p.154) Latour’s entreaty is to ensure we do the necessary 
work to trace these links and pay the necessary price. That work and that price is 
translation; without which we only have entities that are only themselves – singular and 
concrete events. As we can see, it is to Whitehead that Latour is most closely allied. As 
Harman notes, what ties Latour to Whitehead – and distinguishes him from Bergson and 
Deleuze – is his insistence that ‘entities are so highly definite that they vanish instantly 
with the slightest change in their properties’ (2009, p.6). While all four adhere to what can 
broadly be considered a process metaphysics, Bergson and Deleuze hold to the notion of 
generalized becoming, while, for Latour and Whitehead, substance must be understood 
                                         
142 ‘Photography is truth. The cinema is truth twenty-four times per second.’ Le Petit Soldat, 1963.  
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atomically. The defining nature of their difference is that Latour and Whitehead – and 
Leibniz and Tarde – adopt a monadological process philosophy as opposed to a process 
philosophy of flux. 
If we pause to consider the ontological status of Latour’s monadology itself we will see 
that: 
There is no central point in the network where we encounter the very heart of 
Latour and his philosophy. There is no inner Latour-essence wrapped in transient 
wool or chaff, but only a network of allies mobilized by his philosophy. Most of 
this network lies outside Latour’s personal control, and much of it even remains 
unknown to him. 
(2009, p.20) 
Harman understates the significance of this.  Every time Latour’s work is read, 
conceptualized, drawn-on, cited, it is created anew. Each instance of Latourian thought 
bears a genetic resemblance to Latour’s own thought which we can trace – with some 
difficulty – through a series of translations. When we talk of the power of a particular 
school of thought, we are talking about the fact that a concept has gained allies who 
translate and extend it in to the world. Therefore, when we attempt to go back to that 
thought we are engaging in historical anthropology as much as we are in philosophy – the 
thought has passed into objective immortality; it can only be reassembled, never relived. 
However, when enough actants ally themselves with an idea, a certain durability arises. 
Time is created by the alliance of actants – the time of Copernicus, of Galileo, of Newton, 
of Darwin – these actants punctuate and periodize history not by the truth of their ideas but 
the mobilization of allies. Truth itself can no longer be considered as anything other than 
one more actant among a universe of actants: 
A sentence does not hold together because it is true, but because it holds together 
we can say it is “true.” What does it hold onto? Many things. Why? Because it has 
tied its fate to anything at hand that is more solid than itself. As a result, no one can 
shake it loose without shaking everything else. 
(Latour, 1988, pp.185-186) 
And on time Latour writes: 
Each entelechy generates times for others by allying with or betraying them. 
"Time" arises at the end of this game, a game in which most lose what they have 
staked. … Is this moment before or is it after? Is it overtaken, prophetic, obsolete, 
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decadent, contemporary, provisional, or eternal? This cannot be determined in 
advance. It has to be negotiated. … Time is the distant consequences of actors as 
they each seek to create a fait accompli on their own behalf that cannot be reversed. 
In this way time passes. … 
Time does not pass. Times are what are at stake between forces. Of course, one 
force may overtake the others, but this can only be local and temporary because 
permanence costs too much and requires too many allies. 
(1988, pp.164-165) 
‘Time passes. … Time does not pass.’ Yet later Latour writes, ‘Since nothing is inherent in 
anything else, the dialectic is a fairy tale. Contradictions are negotiated like the rest. They 
are built, not given.’ (1988, p.180) How can time both pass and not pass without the kind 
of dialectic we find in Whitehead’s process philosophy? Whitehead writes, ‘Time has 
stood still – if only it could.’ (PR, p.154) But for this to be true requires the ingression of 
eternal objects, the ‘mode of taking account’ discussed in the previous chapter. Recall the 
quote from Science and the Modern World: 
Wherever such objects have ingression into the general flux, they interpret events, 
each to the other. They are here in the perceiver; but, perceived by him, they 
convey for him something of the total flux which is beyond himself. (p.151) 
Or the following passage from Process and Reality: 
Ideals fashion themselves around two notions, permanence and flux. In the 
inescapable flux, there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence, 
there is an element that escapes into flux. Permanence can be snatched only out of 
flux; and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by its submission 
to permanence. Those who would disjoin the two elements can find no 
interpretations of patent facts. 
(PR, p.338) 
Perhaps Latour is guilty of disjoining these two elements. Yet he acknowledges both 
permanence and flux by saying both that time passes and does not pass. In fact, by positing 
a metaphysics which views actants as being concrete instants, time becomes a succession 
of concrete instants but a succession that has to be ordered, negotiated, created by the 
actants themselves. This represents a democratisation of process philosophy, whereby 
reality is conceived of as the product of deliberation, negotiation, cooperation, 
compromise, and antagonism between actants. Harman argues that Latour is the ‘Anti-
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Bergson’, that ‘Latour holds that time is merely the result of negotiations among entities, 
not what makes these negotiations possible.’ (2009, p.30) He is right inasmuch as, for 
Latour, time is the result of negotiations among entities but it is not merely the result of 
negotiations among entities. If time is a result, a creation, then it is an actant like any other. 
Along with time, potentiality is also the creation of actants: 
[T]alk of possibilities is the illusion of actors that move while forgetting the cost of 
transport. Producing possibilities is as costly, local, and down to earth as making 
special steels or lasers. Possibilities are bought and sold like anything else. They 
are not different by nature. They are not, for example, “unreal” 
(1988, p.174). 
While it is no longer novel to reject the potential/reality distinction in favour of an 
alternative – like virtual/actual – it is still, three decades on, novel to do away with the 
distinction entirely. When we say, ‘this might have happened instead of that’, the idea itself 
becomes an actant, as do the sound waves if we vocalize it, the activity in our brain if we 
don’t and the words on the page if we choose to write it down. As Latour writes,  
Each word is accurate and designates exactly the networks that it traces, digs, and 
travels over. Since no word reigns over the others, we are free to use all metaphors. 
We do not have to fear that one meaning is ‘true’ and another ‘metaphorical’. There 
is a democracy, too, among words 
(1988, p.189). 
This is not simply a metaphysics of power – power is also the creation of actants. Instead, 
it is monadology is its purest form. There is no pre-established harmony, no best of all 
possible worlds; no élan vital or tiny minds; no primordial God or eternal objects. And yet 
there all these things, they are just no different from any other actant. This is a monadology 
with nothing but monads.  
The Black Box 
By the time we reach 1987’s Science in Action another concept has emerged from the 
principle of irreduction. The problem with having a universe full of actants – none of 
which can be reduced to anything beyond themselves – is we are left unable to do a lot of 
the things we take for granted. For example, before someone might say, ‘I’m just going to 
the ATM to get cash.’ But what a mistake they have made; they have forgotten their 
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Latourian litany. They are not just going to the ATM to get cash. There are a multitude of 
computer programmers, bankers, security personnel, drivers, economists, politicians, 
printers, designers – and those are just some of the human actants – all demanding to be 
taken into account; not to mention the security marks in the notes, the buttons on the ATM, 
the mile after mile of wiring along which electrical signals race, causing bank balances 
around the world to rise and fall. And this only scrapes the surface of the infrastructure that 
supports the transfer of money: money itself is the ultimate nexus of social relations, and 
the most obscure and opaque black box of them all. As Marx notes, writing on the ‘whole 
mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of 
labour on the basis of commodity production,’ it is the ‘finished form of the world of 
commodities – the money form – which conceals the social character of private labour and 
the social relations between the individual workers’. (1990, pp.168-169) 
But what a tiresome friend they would be if they had remembered their Latourian litany. 
Instead, they have swapped a multitude of actants for one: a black box. The black box 
functions as an abstraction, a container of actants and their relations – relations which have 
been assembled and reassembled over an indefinite period of time – obscuring the mind-
boggling volume of labour and stuff required to withdraw twenty pounds from a cash 
machine. Black boxes are everywhere. They are those things that appear stable in the 
world, that persist; those things that allow us to move in and make sense of the world on a 
day to day basis. They are social structures, provided we remember to treat social structure 
as a verb rather than a noun. (Law, 2003, p.8) They are above all functional. Indeed, 
functionality is of their very essence, as when the black box breaks down it breaks open, 
spilling out actants for all the world to see. When the cash machine stops working and the 
engineer arrives to fix the fault she reveals the contingency of that black box we refer to as 
the ‘ATM’. Of course, Latour is not entreating us to open up black boxes for the sake of 
drawing back the veil to reveal the truth as he does not believe there is such a thing as a 
hidden reality waiting to be uncovered. For Latour, nothing is less real than anything else 
and so his demands are quite different from Marx’s demand in The Communist Manifesto: 
‘All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to 
face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.’ Latour 
wants everything to be taken into account rather than a process of sorting things into 
opposing piles: real and unreal, true and false. Yet, Latour acknowledges the impossibility 
of trying to take everything into account all of the time. In Aramis Latour describes a scene 
where someone has effectively become unable to place things in their black boxes: 
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My mentor's behaviour worried me a little. He insisted on our doing " lab work" on 
the most ordinary machines. " We have to find the mistake," he would mutter. "A 
crime has been committed against Aramis, and we now know where to locate it: in 
the reinscription, the folding. " Carried away with this logic, he routinely thanked 
the automatic ticket machines at highway toll booths. He queried automatic tellers 
at banks about communication problems. He had long conversations with electric 
staplers. 
(1996, pp.210-211)   
Black boxes are like Heidegger’s distinction between present-at-hand and ready-at-hand: 
so long as the black box remains closed we remain unaware of its contents; we do not 
observe or theorize it but simply use it. And, it must be remembered, black boxes are 
actants themselves. In this way Latour’s thinking diverges from Tarde’s. For Tarde, the 
aggregation of entities does not result in the creation of a new entity. From the population 
of Sweden there does not arise another entity, namely, Sweden. For Latour, this is precisely 
what happens. Sweden is assembled through the trials of a multitude of actants and 
becomes itself a black box which will endure so long as the world of actants it contains are, 
as Harman puts it, ‘congeal[ed] into a stable configuration’ (2009, p.34). This endurance is 
something that has to be attained, it is not derived from any substance or substrate. (Latour, 
2000, p.49) Stir up a secessionist movement in the north or an expansionist Denmark to the 
south and cracks may begin to appear in the box. 
If Sweden is an actant just like any Swedish person then clearly we have an entity, the 
actant, capable of functioning as, at different times and in different circumstances, either 
form or matter. At a United Nations assembly, Sweden functions as matter, as a solid 
entity; to its citizens however, it is the form given to the citizenry of the country. But with 
both of these entities being afforded the same status in Latour’s democratic ontology there 
arises the question of just how these entities are related. Given that no actant can be 
reduced to any other, and therefore no actant can really be said to contain another, all 
actants must be understood as being external to one another and any divisions or 
distinctions between things must be understood as effects or outcomes. (Law, 1999, p.3) 
They are therefore only able to act on each other at a distance. This ‘action at a distance’ is 
described by Latour in the following way: 
The history of technoscience is in a large part the history of all the little inventions 
made along the networks to accelerate the mobility of traces, or to enhance their 
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faithfulness, combination and cohesion, so as to make action at a distance possible. 
(1987, p.254) 
Action at a distance is the long rhizomatic chain of transformations that are necessarily 
undertaken to solidify and stabilise a black box. For example, at the ATM numbers appear 
on the screen. The user translates their desired number into the corresponding button and 
with a tap a whole chain of series of events across a far reaching network of actants begins, 
all translating and mediating as the user’s command passes through each point in the 
network. If the customer’s chain of associations is sufficiently strong – if their bank card is 
in good condition, they have sufficient funds, their bank’s electronic infrastructure isn’t 
subject to a cyber-attack at that very moment, there is no one lurking behind them to 
swoop in when the cash appears (and, of course, with everything being contingent, all of 
these things and more have to be the case at that very instant) – they will leave with their 
twenty pounds. Of course, they may leave with twenty pounds as the result of a fault that 
coincides with their attempt to withdraw that same sum but is in no way the result of their 
actions: in a world of infinite contingency, direct causal relations are beside the point. The 
simple act of making a cash withdrawal is the result of a painstaking assembly of actants 
and is by no means a guaranteed success. And there is no central or initiating actant: the 
actants are organised rhizomatically: 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely 
alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be" but the fabric of the rhizome is the 
conjunction, "and ... and ... and..."This conjunction carries enough force to shake 
and uproot the verb "to be." Where are you going? Where are you coming from? 
What are you heading for? These are totally useless questions.  
(Deleuze, Guattari, 1987, p.25) 
Even if we want to open up the black box out of sheer curiosity as to how money can 
suddenly materialise from numbers on a screen to cash in hand, the closer we look the 
more black boxes we find: boxes within boxes within boxes.  In our dealings with the 
world we are like a delegate at an international conference who is completely reliant on 
interpreters: everything is translated. 
The concept of the black box is also inextricably linked with Latour’s notion of mediation. 
For Latour, there are two ways in which meaning and force is transported across the 
rhizome. The first is by intermediaries. There are the entities which transport meaning 
without changing it, where what you put in will determine what comes out. These 
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intermediaries are themselves black boxes – like the ATM, where pressing the button 
beside ‘£20’ results in a twenty pound note. The second is by mediators. Mediators do not 
simply transport meaning, no questions asked, they ‘transform, translate, distort, and 
modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.’ (Latour, 2005, p.39) They 
cannot be conceived of as counting just for one, like an intermediary can – even an 
enormously complex one which actually is composed of a great many actants but functions 
as though it were one, providing it is working. Instead, they count for one or many or none 
at all. One cannot predict where meaning will end up when it is being transported by a 
mediator. Latour explains: 
A properly functioning computer could be taken as a good case of a complicated 
intermediary while a banal conversation may become a terribly complex chain of 
mediators where passions, opinions, and attitude bifurcate at every turn. But if it 
breaks down, a computer may turn into a horrendously complex mediator while a 
highly sophisticated panel during an academic conference may become a perfectly 
predictable and uneventful intermediary in rubber stamping a decision made 
elsewhere. 
(2005, p.39) 
Once again we also see that the entity is not defined in the same way as a substance is – 
with properties, essential and accidental – but purely by its relations. As Whitehead wrote, 
‘life lurks in the interstices of each living cell and in the interstices of the brain.’ (PR, 
p.105-106) The other thing to note is that nothing is ever really simply an intermediary, 
though some things may appear that way. Recall, in the previous chapter, that for 
Whitehead ‘monads no longer function as intermediaries between states of the world but 
are rather the very becoming of the world itself.’ (Bell, 2012 p.135) The same is true for 
Latour and the consequence is that all of the action, all of the agency goes into the 
mediation. An intermediary transports meaning or force without changing it. With a 
mediator, all manner of unexpected things could come out the other side. To underline the 
significance of this point, along with the conceptual generative power of the principle of 
irreduction, Latour writes: 
This is what I dubbed the ‘principle of irreduction’ and such is the philosophical 
meaning of ANT: a concatenation of mediators does not trace the same connections 
and does not require the same type of explanations as a retinue of intermediaries 
transporting a cause. 
(2005, p.107) 
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Mediators relate with one another through the process of translation. This relation is not 
causal, rather it is a relation of coexistence. Mediators are engaged in ‘making do’ rather 
than causation: the relationship is one of translation, duplication and dislocation, (Latour, 
2005, p.217) and instead of having actors and causes, there are simply actors who can fold 
and unfold the whole. (Latour, 2002, p.14) Where relations appear to be causal – as in the 
case of meaning transported by an intermediary – all this tells us is that there is an 
established connection of mediators already in place ensuring that everything runs 
smoothly.  All translations leave their trace, but these associations have to be mapped and 
rendered visible, as we will discuss further on. Of course, there are some things that are so 
well established it is almost impossible to see the trace of their translations. Latour is right 
to observe that the traditional objects of philosophical discussion – the chair, the stone, the 
mug, the hammer; these things for which it is all but impossible to see as anything other 
than intermediaries of meaning, as ready-to-hand – are ‘boring, routine, millenary old 
matters of fact … that were basically things Neanderthals could have been using already.’ 
(2005, p.114) Instead of these matters of fact, we should be looking at matters of concern: 
those things that still leave traces, for example, bioengineering instead of chairs, climate 
change instead of the stone, an aircraft carrier instead of a mug or the collapse of a high 
street department store instead of the hammer. These things provide the setting for a new 
empiricism: ‘livelier, more talkative, active, pluralistic, and more mediated than the other.’ 
(2005, p.115)  
A final observation on this particular aspect of Latour’s work. Like Whitehead before him, 
Latour refuses to privilege the distance between human beings and the world and the 
distance between any other two actants. (Harman, 2009, p.51) The process of translation, 
mediation and assembly is one that can be undertaken by any actant, human or non-human. 
And it is by its very virtue a form of abstraction, though again like Whitehead, it is never 
mere abstraction. To move actants, to act on them at a distance, they must be abstracted 
from the instant of their full deployment in the world. The abstraction undertaken by 
actants is akin to the prehension of actual entities. Latour writes: 
If by 'abstraction' is meant the process by which each stage extracts elements out of 
the stage below so as to gather in one place as many resources as possible, very 
well, we have studied (and continue to study) the process of abstraction, exactly as 
we would examine a refinery in which raw oil is cracked into purer and purer oils. 
(Latour, 1987, p.241) 
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However, as we can already sense, the question of abstraction is one which sits 
uncomfortably in Latour’s system – we will return to this point later. Meanwhile, we can 
already begin to see how Latour mobilises Leibniz, Tarde, and Whitehead in ways not 
unlike the mobilization of global financial systems, networked computers and systems of 
legal tender by the ATM user. As Harman notes: 
Instead of substances, there are black boxes that are not permanent, natural, or 
durable, and are always at risk of being reopened during future controversies. And 
instead of harmless relations that affect nothing, relations are always violent 
abstractions made from actants that would otherwise be trapped in a single place 
and time. Black boxes and action at a distance will provide Latour’s answer to the 
central problem of modern philosophy. 
(2009, p.55) 
The relations between these monadologies are ‘violent abstactions’ made from concepts 
that would be otherwise ‘trapped in a single place and time’. By appealing to these 
thinkers, to the idea of the monad, Latour is constructing his own black box.  
Modernity 
What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two 
systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses. One 
reality would be the entities such as electrons which are the study of speculative 
physics. This would be the reality which is there for knowledge; although on this 
theory it is never known. For what is known is the other sort of reality, which is the 
byplay of the mind. Thus there would be two natures, one is the conjecture and the 
other is the dream. 
(Whitehead, 1920, p.30) 
Latour takes Whitehead’s bifurcation of nature and conceptualizes it as an attempt by 
modernity to cleave the world in two in an act of purification; putting on one side the 
human and on the other nature to create two realms which are not simply separate but 
actively opposed to one another. By historicizing the act of bifurcation and taking into 
account the institutions and instruments which are necessary to sustain it, Latour is able to 
develop bifurcation as a political concept; though not one he has been able to use 
effectively, as we will discuss later. However, one thing to make clear from the outset is 
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that Latour’s view of modernity – neatly encapsulated in the title of his 1991 monograph, 
We Have Never Been Modern – is not in the mould of Heideggerian anti-modernism. He is 
just as comfortable with the skyscraper as he is with the Black Forest farmhouse. For 
Latour, modernists, anti-modernists, and postmodernists all work on the basis of 
purification. Anti-modernists merely mimic the modernists in mirror image, while 
postmodernists beat a retreat to marginality, reinforcing the idea of the totalitarian centre in 
the process. As Latour notes, ‘discourse is not a world unto itself but a population of 
actants that mix with things as well as with societies, uphold the former and the latter alike, 
and hold on to them both.’ (1991, p.90) 
The irony of the failure of the moderns to cleave the world in two lies in the fact that the 
modern period has, like no other, proliferated the very entities which demonstrate its 
failure: the hybrids. These quasi-objects are the things which refuse to be categorised into 
‘social’ or ‘natural’. They are all around us but cannot be easily pinned down. As quasi-
objects – which, of course, also means quasi-subjects (1991, p.139) – they are occasions 
rather than substances. And like Whitehead’s occasions they do not endure – they are fully 
deployed in the world in an instant; specific, definite, singular. However, and again like 
Whitehead, there is a problem in accounting for the ontological status of those things that 
appear to persist through time. Harman argues that this is something Latour never resolves:  
And here is the paradox: in one sense, Latour’s objects are utterly imprisoned in a 
single instant; in another sense, they burst all boundaries of space and time and take 
off on lines of flight toward ever new adventures. 
(2009, p.65) 
Yet the word ‘adventures’ in the quote above suggests a potential resolution to this 
paradox. Latour posits the ‘trajectory’ as the thing that persists through time. Each entity is 
fully realised in a specific place and time, each moment is thoroughly novel, and there is 
no sense in which we can talk about something ‘changing’ as that would imply there is an 
enduring entity capable of undergoing change. However, when we consider a succession of 
entities we are able to discern a trajectory. Harman views this as a paradox but this is only 
the case if one views the occasion in abstraction. When properly situated in the network, 
we can see the occasion for what it really is: the configuration of that network at a 
particular point in time from a particular place. Passing into the next instant and the next 
and so on, we can see the actor-network as traversing the network of actors, creating itself 
anew with each movement but with a genetically traceable trajectory. Pluck the actor from 
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the network or try to conceptualise the network without actors and the result is the paradox 
which Harman describes. The adventures of the actor-network is like the adventures of 
ideas described by Whitehead. In a passage quoted from Adventures of Ideas in the 
previous chapter, Whitehead writes: 
Viewed in abstraction objects are passive, but viewed in conjunction they carry the 
creativity which drives the world. The process of creation is the form of unity of the 
Universe. 
(Whitehead, 1933, p.179) 
Translated into Latour’s system, the trajectory of actors is traced along the network; it is 
the network of actors that carries the creativity which drives the world. At this point, it is 
not difficult to see why Latour prefers the term ‘actant rhizome’. The term ‘network’ lacks 
the dynamism, the sense of heterogeneous multiplicity of the ‘rhizome’ – not to mention 
the sense, from its botanical origins, of something living, subterranean, moving yet hidden. 
Meanwhile ‘actor’ denotes the human, autonomous agency, the enduring entity; not the 
singularity of the actant nor the collapse of the distinction between human and non-
human.143 The title of this thesis uses the term ‘actant rhizome ontology’ to make it clear 
that this work is concerned with Latour’s metaphysics144 however, as Latour himself notes 
in Reassembling the Social, what he put into the world was ‘Actor-Network Theory’ – it 
cannot simply be recalled as a manufacturer might recall a faulty product because the 
concept itself has a status as an actant whose traces and trajectories can be rhizomatically 
mapped. All knowledge is realized in the world, not about the world. (de Vries, 2016, p.67) 
Or as Latour puts it, ‘it is all quite simple: knowledge is added to the world; it does not 
suck things into representations or, alternatively, disappear in the object it knows. It is 
added to the landscape.’ (1999c, p.104) 
Returning briefly to the actant-rhizome, the concept is characterised not just by what we 
have described so far, what John Law refers to as ‘relational materiality’ (1999, p.4), but 
                                         
143 Though as Latour notes in Reassembling the Social, there is something useful in the term:  
To use the word ‘actor’ means that it’s never clear who and what is acting when we act since an 
actor on stage is never alone in acting. Play-acting puts us immediately into a thick imbroglio where 
the question of who is carrying out the action has become unfathomable. As soon as the play starts, 
as Irwin Goffman has so often showed, nothing is certain: Is this for real? Is it fake? Does the 
audience’s reaction count? What about the lighting? What is the backstage crew doing? Is the 
playwright’s message faithfully transported or hopelessly bungled? Is the character carried over? 
And if so, by what? What are the partners doing? Where is the prompter? If we accept to unfold the 
metaphor, the very word actor directs our attention to a complete dislocation of the action, warning 
us that it is not a coherent, controlled, well-rounded, and clean-edged affair. (2005, p.46)  
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also ‘performativity’. Every actant is a performance in the world – whether that actant is 
human or not. In taking up Leibniz’s notion of the vinculum and combining it with Tarde’s 
theory that relation precedes substance, Latour argues that: 
We start from a continuous and hazardous existence … and not from an essence; 
we start from a presenting, and not from permanence. We start from the vinculum 
itself, from passages and relations, not accepting as a starting point any being that 
does not emerge from this relation that is at once collective, real, and discursive. 
We do not start from human beings, those latecomers, nor from language, a more 
recent arrival still. The world of meaning and the world of being are one and the 
same world, that of translation, substitution, delegation, passing. 
(1991, p.129) 
The performative character of this ontology, beginning with presenting, refusing to 
distinguish between meaning and the world results in a ontological system which allows 
Latour to write that ‘Modernism was not an illusion, but an active performing’ (1991, 
p.144) despite the very name of the book being ‘We Have Never Been Modern’. He writes, 
‘if we link together in one single picture the work of purification and the work of 
mediation that gives it meaning, we discover, retrospectively, that we have never been truly 
modern.’ (1991, p.91) Perhaps We Have Never Been Truly Modern would have been a 
more fitting title, given that we spent much of the last century performing as though we 
were. While we have never been truly modern, there has nonetheless been a performance 
of modernism every time someone tries to separate the social from nature.  It is a concept 
whose trajectory we can trace across the rhizome and one which, like any other concept, 
has ontological equality with every other thing in the world: car, desk, Bruno Latour, tree, 
and so on. This is why Latour is not embarrassed by Whitehead’s eternal object or 
Whitehead’s God. In Rejoicing: Or the Torments of Religious Speech, Latour writes that 
religious speech is ‘a form of speech that evokes beings who appear and disappear 
depending entirely on how they are said’ (Latour’s emphasis, 2013, pp.120-121, quoted in 
Schmidgen, 2015, p.119). God presents no problems for Latour because God is an actant 
like any other, just as Whitehead’s God is an actual entity like any other for Whitehead. 
For Latour, God is there to be enrolled, translated, substituted in the same way as the 
telephone network or the idea of freedom or the thermometer. Nothing can be reduced to 
anything else – there is nothing that sits above or at the base of the world, nothing 
essential, nothing which can be used to explain away something else. Whitehead wants to 
explain things in all their complexity rather than explaining them away like the 
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philosophers of substance, but Latour goes further. He argues that all explanation is 
description. When we add an explanation we are in fact extending the description to 
include some other actant. (Latour, 2005, p.137) Recall that Tarde asks if from the 
population of Sweden we are to add another entity, Sweden itself, and Latour says yes. But 
it is not an entity that sits above the population of Sweden – although clearly some actants, 
nationalists and the like, attempt to substitute Sweden as a homogenous entity for the 
heterogenous Swedish population – it is an entity that is performed like any other, created 
anew every time it is deployed. There is no distinction between the abstract and the 
concrete here, abstraction in its performance is concretised; just as all actual entities pass 
into objective immortality. Yet, issues arise in Latour’s account and we will return to these 
towards the end of this chapter in our discussion of concrete abstraction. 
The Modern Paradoxes 
The constitution of the moderns is defined by four paradoxical guarantees. The first is 
ontological: the moderns hold that nature is transcendent while society is immanent; nature 
is what is given, society is what we construct. The second is epistemological: nature is 
what we discover in the laboratory, that is to say, it is immanent; society consists of social 
facts to be investigated by social scientists, it is transcendent. Already these first two 
guarantees present a paradox. Nature is constructed in the laboratory but as it exists, it is as 
if we do not construct it. On the other side, while we construct society, society is as if we 
do not construct it. This is reminiscent of Engels’ letter to Lavrov on Darwin where he 
writes: 
The whole Darwinian theory of the struggle for existence is simply the transference 
from society to animate nature of Hobbes’ theory of the war of every man against 
every man and the bourgeois economic theory of competition, along with the 
Malthusian theory of population. This feat having been accomplished … the same 
theories are next transferred back again from organic nature to history and their 
validity as eternal laws of human society declared to have been proved. 
(Engels, 1875)145 
                                         
145 The full reference is: Engels, 1875. Engels to Lavrov, 12 November 1875. Available at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/letters/75_11_12.htm Last accessed February 15 
2019. 
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In a similar fashion the constitution of the moderns paradoxically declares: even though we 
construct Nature, Nature is as if we did not construct it. And a similar paradox applies at 
the other side: though we do construct Society, Society is as if we do not construct it. 
Bringing these two paradoxes together yields the third guarantee: that nature and society 
are absolutely distinct, there can be no mixing of the work of purification – that is, the 
ontological and transcendent status of nature and society – and the work of mediation – 
that is, the construction of nature in the laboratory and the construction of society through 
social activity. (Latour, 1991, pp.32-33) Latour warns against perceiving too perfect a 
symmetry between the two sides of the paradox; there is a fourth guarantee which allows 
one or other side to gain the upper hand. The fourth guarantee removes God from the 
construction of nature and society whilst, simultaneously, keeping him in reserve to be 
used in an emergency. This is the crossed out God, rejected but present, just in case. God is 
transcendent, and thus infinitely distant; but even still, it is a transcendence to which we 
can appeal.  
He disturbed neither the free play of nature nor that of society, but the right was 
nevertheless reserved to appeal to that transcendence in case of conflict between the 
laws of Nature and those of Society. Modern men and women could thus be atheists 
even while remaining religious. They could invade the material world and freely re-
create the social world, but without experiencing the feeling of an orphaned 
demiurge abandoned by all. 
(1991, p.33) 
The ‘forked tongue’ of the moderns allows them to hold that nature is governed by a set of 
laws, discoverable by us but fixed and certain; and that society is wholly the creation of 
human activity. At the same time, the moderns, afraid of their impotence in the face of a 
transcendent nature and terrified of their freedom in society, simply reverse this 
formulation without acknowledging any contradiction. Nature becomes tameable, 
exploitable, something that can be measured and known; whereas the social becomes 
obscure, social laws proliferate, social relations are objectified, and, as Marx reminds us, 
our very creativity, our labour-power, is objectified and becomes a commodity like any 
other.146 Thus, nature is both remote and central to social relations, while the social is 
                                         
146 In her book on Marx and Whitehead, referred to in the previous chapter, Pomeroy provides an excellent 
account of this process, of the subjective objectified in the process of exchange: 
The sad fact of the matter is that, in order for the exchange to take place, the person selling labour-
power had to be treated as a non-living, noncreative thing. Otherwise the exchange could not have 
taken place because there would be no commensurability. There would be no commensurability 
because there can, in reality, be none: there cannot be a quantitative measure of creative activity. 
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constructed at the same time as being subject to exactly the same kind of absolute laws that 
govern nature. It is only the moderns who believe that something cannot be both 
‘constructed’ and ‘real’ – a notion rendered ridiculous when one speaks of ‘a ‘well 
constructed’ house, a ‘well designed’ software, or a ‘well sculpted’ statue.’ (Latour, 2005, 
p.90) Whitehead writes of ‘stubborn fact’ but Latour refocuses our attention on just how 
fact becomes stubborn, how the house becomes well constructed. The moderns take facts 
to be the building blocks, while ignoring the fact that even bricks have to be moulded and 
fired.  
The etymology147 itself should have made them shudder: How could a fact be that 
solid if it is also fabricated? As the shortest inquiry in the most primitive laboratory 
shows, and as Ludwik Fleck proved long ago, facts are about the least primitive, 
the most complex, the most elaborated, and the most collective makeup there is! 
(2015, p.112) 
Latour writes that ‘By separating the relations of political power from the relations of 
scientific reasoning while continuing to shore up power with reason and reason with 
power, the moderns … have become invincible.’ (1991, p.38) The result is that science 
becomes politics by other means. (1991, p.111) Of course, the problem remains of how to 
keep the two poles, nature and society, apart. The proliferation of quasi-objects makes this 
                                         
There is no, can be no “common” measure of the activity as such because the activity as such is 
always unique, always just this activity. It obtains even its temporal duration only in retrospect. The 
moment the labour was offered up for exchange, it compromised its essence. The moment the 
exchange took place, the creativity of that labour was handed over gratis to the capitalist who, while 
greedily snatching this offering keeps repeating her or his mantra: “the exchange was equal, the 
exchange was fair.” 
Unfortunately, once the exchange has taken place, the cards are dealt. Once the human being has been 
purchased, his or her use-value belongs to the purchaser. Yet the heart of what is essential to all human 
labour processes is the productivity above and beyond mere self-reproduction. The use-value for the 
capitalist of the being that has been purchased is precisely this excess creativity, this creative novelty. 
Within the capitalist production process, capitalist labouring activity produces value. 
…  
Here then is the critique of capitalist labour from the standpoint of labour. It is not that the labourer is not 
being fairly compensated for his or her labour; it is that persons cannot be fairly compensated for their 
labour if such “compensation” involves exchange for money as the universal medium of commodity 
exchange. The sale and purchase of labour within capitalism is where the injustice takes place and must 
take place and it is the general feature of the creativity of labour which makes this case. This is why any 
discussions of better of fairer wages or appropriation of surplus value by the proletariat miss the mark. 
Such measures certainly may help to decrease the suffering occurring within capitalism. … At the same 
time, we need to be aware that the implementation of these measures does not constitute the overcoming 
of capitalism itself or of the fundamental injustice of the sale and purchase of labour power. The essence 
of its, and hence our, contradiction lies in the exchange of labour for objectified value. It is such exchange 
that must be eliminated for capitalism to be overcome. (2004, pp.97-99) 
147 As early as 1979 Latour’s is reminding us of the word’s etymology: ‘a fact is derived from the root facere, 
factum (to make or to do).’ (1979, p.174) 
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all but impossible. Modernism views time as the journey from ignorance to enlightenment. 
In actual fact, this journey is one of purification: sorting the things from the signs, the 
natural from the social. But as the moderns keep working according to the four guarantees 
of the modern constitution, they keep producing the very quasi-objects that defy 
categorisation. The result is the emergence of two lines of a trajectory: one points up and is 
labelled progress; the other points down and is labelled decadence. (1991, pp.71-72)  
 The crisis this contradiction provokes in the moderns leads to the emergence of the 
postmodernists who celebrate and entrench the contradiction. Latour writes, ‘I have not 
found words ugly enough to designate this intellectual movement – or rather, this 
intellectual immobility through which humans and nonhumans are left to drift. I call it 
'hyper-incommensurability'. (1991, p.61) For Latour, the postmodernists repeat the 
mistakes of the moderns by accepting the absolute division between the material world and 
the ‘linguistic play of speaking subjects,’ (1991, p.61) even though they prefer, unlike the 
modernists, the latter to the former.  
Transcendence 
Latour’s solution to the modernist paradox is to rethink immanence. He writes, ‘Who told 
us that transcendence had to have a contrary?’ (1991, p.128) Unlike the moderns, we do 
not have to construct or deconstruct immanence. Instead, our existence is traversal, 
processual – it is in the movement, the passage, the interstices: as Ingold observes, 'relation 
has to be understood quite literally, not as a connection between pre-located entities but as 
a path traced through the terrain of lived experience.’ (2005, p.90) Latour terms this 
transcendence without contrary ‘delegation.’ This is what it means to start from the 
vinculum itself; it is to start from difference rather than identity, as Tarde would have said; 
to admit that the world of being and the world of meaning are the same world. What 
happens as a result is that we cease to look for essence –Whitehead’s substance-quality – 
and begin looking for the mediators, the translations and substitutions that give our world 
of quasi-objects meaning. We still have immanence but it is no longer the contrary of 
transcendence; in other words, we have immanence as transcendental immanence, as 
inseparable, indivisible processes. (Williams, 2010, p.102) Deleuze explores a similar 
concept in Pure Immanence where he writes about a ‘wild and powerful’ transcendental 
empiricism where ‘transcendence is always the product of immanence’ (2001, p.31), where 
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the transcendental field is defined by the plane of immanence.148 For Latour, to speak of 
immanence without transcendence has no meaning – all immanence is produced through 
delegation: ‘The utterance, or the delegation, or the sending of a message or a messenger, 
makes it possible to remain in presence - that is, to exist.’ (1991, p.129) The modernist 
attempt to construct only immanence is effectively an attempt to cut the lines of 
communication. Instead, we must accept that we are in those lines, that we are in the 
delegation. As Latour says, ‘Of course it is not a thing, but things are not things either.’ 
(1991, p.138) Ontologically, this is more akin to the interconnectedness of this thing than 
the interconnectedness of all things, but that is entirely in keeping with a metaphysics 
which takes nothing for granted and demands that, ‘The full cost of every connection is 
now entirely payable. If a site wants to influence another site, it has to levy the means.’ 
(Latour, 2005, p.174) In this way Latour can maintain that reality is composed of lines 
rather than surfaces – though as we will see, the space between the lines is filled in when 
we come to the concept of plasma – where every connection can be traced. This is why 
Latour is so opposed to the notion of totality. A net can never truly cover a surface, there 
will always be spaces in between. Transcendental immanence – like the interconnectedness 
of this thing – also suggests that each actant has its own metaphysics and the job of the 
actant rhizome ontologist is to trace and render visible its associations with other actants: 
to ‘deploy actors as networks of mediations’. (Latour, 2005, p.136)149  
If we call metaphysics the discipline inspired by the philosophical tradition that 
purports to define the basic structure of the world, then empirical metaphysics is 
what the controversies over agencies lead to since they ceaselessly populate the 
world with new drives and, as ceaselessly, contest the existence of others. The 
question then becomes how to explore the actors’ own metaphysics. 
(2005, p.50) 
By exploring the hinterland beyond the metaphysics of the actant, that is, the world of its 
associations, we shift from metaphysics to ontology, to a world of beings from the singular 
                                         
148 Ideas Latour is well acquainted with. In a footnote to Reassembling the Social he quotes from Deleuze’s 
book on Leibniz, The Fold: ‘As Deleuze said, ‘Relativism is not the relativity of truth but the truth of 
relation.’ (2005, p.95) 
149 Even if it may remain obscure to the actant itself and exceedingly difficult for the ontologist – as Latour 
says:  
Agency is about the most difficult problem there is in philosophy. How could enquirers listen to a 
housewife, a clerk, a pilgrim, a criminal, a soprano, and a CEO and still succeed in following what 
they express if they had no Hegel, no Aristotle, no Nietzsche, no Dewey, no Whitehead to help 
them? (2005, p.51) 
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world of the actant. Thus, ‘to raise again the question of what the real world is really like’ 
(2005, p.117) is to avoid falling back into solipsism or idealism. 
For Latour, as opposed to the moderns, ‘the work of producing a nature or producing a 
society stems from the durable and irreversible accomplishment of the common work of 
delegation and translation.’ However, ‘at the end of the process, there is indeed a nature 
that we have not made, and a society that we are free to change; there are indeed 
indisputable scientific facts, and free citizens.’ (1991, p.140) In this sense Latour can be 
seen to be in agreement with Dewey when the latter wrote: 
It is not that there is no public, no large body of persons having a common interest 
in the consequences of social transactions. There is too much public, a public too 
diffused and scattered and too intricate in composition. 
(1946, p.187) 
Latour offers to ratify the first two guarantees of the moderns but only on the basis that 
they are not separated. The transcendence of nature and the immanence of society is now 
the result of mediation, not separation. As for the third and fourth, they are for the scrap 
heap. In their place are two new guarantees. First, a commitment to the ability to combine 
our associations without having to split the world in two: between nature and society, 
modern and archaic, global and local, relative and universal. Second, a commitment to the 
visibility of the hybrids: to bring them out of the shadows, ‘to replace the clandestine 
proliferation of hybrids by their regulated and commonly-agreed-upon production.’ (1991, 
p.141)  
Relational realism 
Like Leibniz, in his correspondence with de Volder, Latour’s monad is always embodied; 
and like Whitehead, Latour is a realist. However, Latour’s commitment to irreducibility 
means that there is, unlike most realisms, no final substance, no building block of reality. 
Every actant-rhizome is composed, every black box can be opened. Yet, this does not rule 
him out as a monadologist because at the same time every actant is as real as any other: 
Sweden is as real as each of the citizens who compose it who are, in turn, as real as the 
cells and sinews of their body. Open one black box and you will always find another: it is 
the monad as infinite matryoshka doll. When a black box is deployed it becomes a quasi-
object; in other words, it functions as an object even though it is actually the result of 
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complex composition, a composition that can fall apart without the necessary effort to 
maintain it. As we are always able to open up the black box there is no sense in which we 
can meaningfully talk about a substance having essential and accidental properties; there is 
simply nowhere for the essence to go. In this way Latour’s actants are always public 
(Harman, 2009, p.72), and since actants are always public, the Kantian Ding an sich makes 
no sense: how can there be things in themselves that are independent of observation when 
everything is observable, everything is public? But there is a further reason why Latour’s 
actants cannot be things in themselves, and it is that the very nature of any entity is to be 
found in its relations, in its vinculum. Latour’s realism is therefore a relational realism. 
In epistemological terms, the relation also assumes primary importance. As Latour writes 
in Pandora’s Hope: 
It is hardly surprising that philosophers have been unable to reach an understanding 
on the question of realism and relativism: they have taken the two provisional 
extremities for the entire chain, as if they had tried to understand how a lamp and a 
switch could “correspond” to each other after cutting the wire and making the lamp 
“gaze out” at the “external” switch. 
(1999b, p.73) 
We gain access to truth through the chains of translations linking one actant with another. 
When these chains break down, something becomes less true and vice versa when the 
chains hold under pressure. To say something is true is akin to saying, ‘downtown 
expressway moving smoothly this morning’ (Latour cited in Harman, 2009, p.76-77). Truth 
can also be understood through the Whiteheadian concept of ‘proposition’. Things are not 
true or false in and of themselves; rather an actant can propose itself to other actants to 
become translated into a new entity. (de Vries, 2016, p.134) 
Those who talk of synthetic a-priori judgments deride the faithful who bathe at 
Lourdes. However, it is no less bizarre to claim that a conclusion lies in its premises 
than to believe that there is holiness in the water. 
(1988, p.176) 
There remains the question of the relation itself. Relation is always mediated; in other 
words, there is always a third actant that links the two which stand in relation to one 
another. Harman refers to this as ‘local occasionalism’ (2009, p.77) but it could just as well 
be understood as a form of ingression in the Latourian concrescence. The key difference 
with Whitehead’s concept of ingression is that for Latour the eternal objects are simply 
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other actual entities; they have no distinct ontological status.150 There is support for this 
view in Pandora’s Hope when Latour argues that, ‘Each element is to be defined by its 
associations and is an event created at the occasion of each of those associations.’ (1999b, 
p.165) Each element is therefore a moment of becoming and perishing. Where this view 
differs from Harman’s is on the question of occasionalism in both Whitehead and Latour. 
For Harman, the fact that the ingression of eternal objects in the process of concrescence is 
essential for the becoming and passing into objective immortality of the actual entity, and 
the fact that those eternal objects are to be found in God, means that Whitehead is an 
occasionalist as God intervenes in each and every concrescence. Following that logic, 
Latour is also an occasionalist though an occasionalist who has no God. Harman terms this 
‘secular occasionalism.’ 
Bruno Latour is the first secular occasionalist: the founder of what I have called 
vicarious causation. Any entity is able to form the link between others that 
previously had no interactions at all. Latour also concedes that local causes may fail 
in their efforts: an interesting tragic side of causation that was always denied, for 
obvious reasons, to God. Joliot might succeed in linking politics with neutrons, or 
like Pouchet he might end his days as a discredited flop. Links are not easy to 
create, even though they happen everywhere all the time. 
(2009, p.115) 
We can agree that any entity is able to form the link between others and that links can fail. 
However there are problems with both terms: ‘secular occasionalist’ and ‘vicarious 
causation.’151 Firstly, Whitehead is not an occasionalist. God does not simply intervene in 
                                         
150 There is another interpretation which is worth mentioning at least in passing. Schmidgen argues that the 
third entity takes on a McLuhan-esque character: in other words, the mediator is the message. Drawing on 
Serres he argues:  
[F]or Serres noise is by no means a background phenomenon but a central dimension of every act of 
communication: without noise, no signal; without chaos, no order. It is this idea that at the end of 
the book [The Parasite] carries over into a theory of the collective. At its centre is the concept of a 
“quasi-object,” which in turn refers to a central point. Serres explains this using the model of ball 
games: “the game doesn’t need persons,” he says with sports like rugby or football in mind; it is not 
the players who control the game but the ball. When it circulates among the subjects in a game, “the 
ball isn’t there for the body; the exact contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball; the subject 
moves around this sun.” In his view a similar central position is taken up by the role of the third 
entity – the interference in communication. (2015, pp.71-72) 
 One suspects these are the words of someone who has never played or seriously watched football. By 
taking a similar position to Harman in privileging the mediator over the mediated one loses the 
democratic ontology Latour works so hard to establish. The point is that the ball is both there for the body 
and the body there for the ball.   
151 Harman, as he himself acknowledges, is dependent on this interpretation as foundational for his object-
oriented ontology: ‘Thanks to Latour, an object-oriented philosophy has become possible.’ (Harman, 
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every prehension. God is just as much produced by the world as the world is produced by 
God (see Chapter 3): Whitehead’s God is simultaneously prior to, contemporary with, and 
consequent to the temporal world of actual entities. As we also argued in the previous 
chapter, Whitehead’s God is itself already secularized. God is not the being to whom one 
may say “Thou,” or the being that is hidden out of sight, like the ‘crossed out’ God Latour 
finds in modernism. Overstating the role of God in Whitehead also ignores the importance 
of the past, a past that is given to each occasion as ‘an actual world … [that] must be 
conceived not as a passive inheritance, but as superjects who are dynamically acting in a 
subsequent subject.’ (Henning, 2000, p.155)   
Similarly, for Latour, the entity that forms the chain, the mediating actant, is itself an 
actant. It is as much mediated as mediator. It does not intervene in the classical 
occasionalist sense as something that transcends the actual. ‘Vicarious causation’ just as 
problematically suggests that the links between entities are caused by the mediating entity. 
What Harman is trying to do here is rescue the object from Latour’s relational reality, to 
isolate the actant from the rhizome. By abstracting the role of the mediator he is attempting 
to objectify the relation, to claim that the object must precede the relation. As we have seen 
from Whitehead, Tarde, and even Leibniz to a degree (even if he relies on his ‘audacious 
fudge’), relation comes first. This is what holds these three thinkers together with Latour, 
who is the relativist relativist (1991, p.113) par excellence. Transforming mediation into 
vicarious causation removes any agency from the actant-rhizomes themselves and turns 
them into the passive subjects of the mediating object. The result would be a weakening of 
Latour’s democratic ontology. 
A final word on Latour’s relational realism: a dual understanding of time results from it; it 
is not sufficient to view time as simply linear progression. There is also a sedimentary time 
where each actant can be deployed over and over, made anew on each occasion. Caesar 
crossed the Rubicon in 49BC but the event is produced over and over again each time it is 
deployed as an actant in the present world. And each time it is deployed it is changed. The 
crossing of the Rubicon is a point of no return – it has perished like any other moment. But 
for Latour, time can be reversible. Time is not a ‘fine laminary flow’ but ‘a turbulent flow 
of whirlpools and rapids.’ (Latour, 1991, p.73) He writes: 
[N]o interaction is synchronic. The desk might be made of a tree seeded in the 
1950s that was felled two years ago; the cloth of the teacher’s dress was woven five 
                                         
2009, p.228) A critique of ‘OOO’ is beyond the scope of this thesis but clearly any doubts about the 
foundations has consequences for the structure built on top. 
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years ago, while the firing of neurons in her head might be a millisecond old 
[etc.] … Time is always folded. So the idea of any synchronic interaction where all 
the ingredients will have the same age and the same pace is meaningless. 
(2005, p.200-201) 
When Latour writes about the discovery of lactic yeast in 1858, he reminds us that the 
lactic yeast of Pasteur and the lactic acid bacteria of today have to be viewed through the 
lens of both linear and sedimentary time. Viewed as such we can understand time as 
something which is produced by the actants themselves.152 Linear time is carved out from 
sedimentary time by actants who are attempting to ‘create irreversible situation[s]’ (Latour, 
1988, p.50). In other words, we cannot explain the movement of actants in terms of times 
and dates; instead we ought to explain time itself on the basis of the translations conducted 
by those actants. 
[W]hereas the temporal framework merely registers after the event the victory of 
certain agents. If we really wanted to explain history, we would have to accept the 
lesson that the actors themselves give us. Just as they made their societies, they also 
made their own history. The actors periodize with all their might. They give 
themselves periods, abolish them, and alter them, redistributing responsibilities, 
naming the “reactionaries,” the “moderns,” the “avant-garde,” the “forerunners,” 
just like a historian – no better, no worse. 
(1988, p.51)  
This is how Latour can answer the question, ‘Did the microbe exist before Pasteur?’ with 
‘It did not.’ (1988, p.80) The point is not that before Pasteur there were nothing where now 
there are microbes. Rather, the point is that, in Latour’s own words: ‘To discover is not to 
lift the veil. It is to construct, to relate, and then to “place under”.’ (1988, p.81) Pasteur 
does not discover the microbe any more than Christopher Columbus discovers America. 
The microbe is produced in the laboratory as much it is found in nature. Human awareness 
of the microbe and the designation of the microbe as such does not conjure the microscopic 
organism into existence but it does produce it as a ‘microbe’. It is not a microbe to a dog 
                                         
152 We can see a trace here of Péguy, who writing on the storming of the Bastille suggested that it was 
effectively a spontaneous event that was without cause: 
The Bastille had never done anything to them [the French people]. The storming of the Bastille … 
was actually a party, it was the first celebration, the first commemorative ceremony and the first 
anniversary, so to speak, of the storming of the Bastille. (Cited in Schmidgen, 2015, pp.16-17) 
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because a dog does not divide the world up in that way; but a dog’s stomach teems with 
microbial flora just as does a human’s.  
What prevents this from collapsing into a purely epistemological point is the primacy of 
relation. The monadological account insists that the monad is a relational entity while at 
the same time having an ontological status in its own right. Harman argues that this is a 
form of ‘verificationism’, but again this might be conceived as an attempt to bring in 
objects by the back door. He argues that Latour’s position amounts to the assumption that 
‘the reality of a thing is defined by the ways in which it is registered by other entities.’ 
(2009, p.112) But this presupposes that the ‘thing’ pre-exists its relations. Rather, the thing 
is not defined by its relations with other entities, it is its relations with (or rather its 
translations of) other entities – it is an actant-rhizome, not an actant that also happens to be 
part of a rhizome. The problem is that Harman reads Latour as being of the view that 
everything is relational which, of course, is akin to saying that everything can be reduced 
to its relations. For a philosophy of irreduction this simply cannot be. In Latour and 
Harman’s debate at the LSE in 2011, Latour says, ‘[Y]ou say that I associate myself with 
the doctrine that “everything is relational.” And that I don’t get, I simply don’t get.’ (2011, 
p.43) Each entity is an irreducible singularity, but one that is fully deployed in a network of 
associations, associations that have to be built through the process of mediation. This is 
why Latour is not a relativist; rather he is a relationist.153  
We can put it one more way, perhaps less elegantly but more suited to the present thesis: 
monadologism. The monad, singular yet enveloped in relations, is the model for the actant-
rhizome, not a philosophy of occasionalism. Harman writes, ‘Whitehead’s ontological 
principle denies that we can pass beyond concrete entities when explaining anything and 
this element of the Whiteheadian program is one from which Latour never veers.’ (2009, 
p.127) But the notion that everything can be reduced to its relations, as Harman suggests of 
Latour’s position, and the proposed solution, that for every relation there exists a third 
entity that effects the link, passes beyond concrete entities in their explanations, the first by 
reducing the reality of things to relations, the second by introducing an ontological 
distinction between the entities that are mediated and the entities that do the mediating and 
insisting that the object precedes the relation. The other point is that to view Latour’s 
theory as simply being a form of verificationism is to miss the point that epistemology and 
ontology go hand in hand: to know reality it must first be made visible – ‘doing science 
                                         
153 ‘Relativist relativism – or, to put it more elegantly, relationism – … will become one of the essential 
resources for relating the collectives that will no longer be targets for modernization [i.e. bifurcation].’ 
(Latour, 1991, p.114) 
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means being engaged in both epistemological and ontological work’ (de Vries, 2016, p.36) 
– and ‘[a]n invisible agency that makes no difference, produces no transformation, leaves 
no trace, and enters no account is not an agency.’ (Latour, 2005, p.53) Any attempt to 
separate epistemology from ontology is doomed to failure. As Latour writes, 
‘Epistemologists, like generals, are always one war too late.’ (1988, p.6) 
Plasma 
We must now say a few words about an under-discussed concept in Latour’s actant-
rhizome ontology. Absent from his Irreductions and not introduced until Reassembling the 
Social, plasma plays a similar role to primary matter in Leibniz’s monadology and the 
datum of Whitehead’s process philosophy.154 Like primary matter and datum, plasma 
cannot be accessed directly yet is required for the production of the actual world at any 
given instant. It is, as Latour puts it, ‘the strange figure … which takes the bottom out of 
any bottom line when accounting for action.’ (2005, p.50) However, it is from Tarde that 
the concept is derived. Tarde maintains, as we discussed in Chapter 2, that the ‘big is an 
amplification but also a simplification of the small.’ (Latour, 2005, p.243) In other words, 
the state is both the sum of its citizens – for example, Sweden can exert more force and 
influence that one solitary Swede – and the reduction of that aggregate of diverse citizens 
to a homogenous identity – that is, Swedish. In that sense, Sweden is not the entity that 
encompasses all Swedes; but an individual Swede is a multiplicity of irreducible 
singularities, some of whom will lend a façade of themselves to construct a provisional 
whole, in this case Sweden. However, other parts will make up other wholes, in much the 
same way as one could be Swedish, a Malmö FF supporter, a vegetarian, and so on. In this 
way, the whole emerges from the part – it is encompassed by the part, not the other way 
around. These irreducible singularities provide the landscape, the canvas for action. The 
aggregates and the wholes emerge from them and return to them. They are the missing 
masses, those things not yet accounted for or allied with. Latour explains: 
How big is it? Take a map of London and imagine that the social world visited so 
far occupies no more room than the subway. The plasma would be the rest of 
                                         
154 Recall that for Leibniz, primary matter is to the entelechy what resistance is to motion, the entelechy is not 
made of primary matter but rather folds it, and with Whitehead’s datum, only an aspect of it can be felt 
through prehension. 
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London, all its buildings, inhabitants, climates, plants, cats, palaces, horse guards. 
(2005, p.244) 
Plasma is that which has not yet been brought into the social world. It is not hidden behind 
reality, but rather in the space between the actants we have associated with. This is how 
Pasteur can ‘discover’ the microbe, it is what leads the authors of the Revue to declare 
‘“There are more of us than we thought.”’ (Latour, 1988, p.35) It is less a discovery than a 
socialisation or a making visible – much as map must transform a terra incognita into 
something visible in order to be of use. (2016, de Vries, p.11) It is like the shift in focus 
that is required to pick out the drops of water that form the wave, like placing a microscope 
over the petit perceptions in order to bring them into conscious relief. The plasma is a ‘vast 
hinterland providing the resources for every single course of action to be fulfilled, much 
like the countryside for an urban dweller.’ (2005, p.244) And it is not just a resource for 
humans to exploit, it is the means by which all activity is translated and interpreted. Latour 
describes it as an outside but it is only an outside in the sense that there is an inside and an 
outside to the Leibnizian fold. It is there, it is part of the fabric of the universe; it just has 
not been enveloped yet. There is not balance sheet of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ with an addition 
to one necessitating a subtraction from the other; rather multiplying our connections with 
the outside gives us a richer understanding of the inside. (Latour, 2005, pp.215-216)  In the 
same way, the notion of a hidden reserve of actants is not quite right, it is more akin to 
what Foucault is describing here:  
For a long time one has known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is 
hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that is to say, to make evident 
what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that because of that we 
do not perceive it. Whereas the role of science is to reveal what we do not see, the 
role of philosophy is to let us wee what we see. 
(Foucault, 1994 cited in de Vries, 2016, p.4)    
Plasma is not hidden; or if it is, it is hidden in plain sight. Latour writes: 
Why do fierce armies disappear in a week? Why do whole empires like the Soviet 
one vanish in a few months? Why do companies who cover the world go bankrupt 
after their next quarterly report? Why do the same companies, in less than two 
semesters, jump from being deep in the red to showing a massive profit? Why is it 
that quiet citizens turn into revolutionary crowds or that grim mass rallies break 
down into a joyous crowd of free citizens? Why is it that some dull individual is 
suddenly moved into action by an obscure piece of news? Why is it that such a stale 
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academic musician is suddenly seized by the most daring rhythms? Generals, 
editorialists, managers, observers, moralists often say that those sudden changes 
have a soft impalpable liquid quality about them. That’s exactly the etymology of 
plasma. 
(2005, p.245) 
And further he adds, ‘To every action I have described so far, you have to add an immense 
repertoire of missing masses. They are needed to balance the accounts, but they are 
missing.’ (2005, p.245) There is an account of activity in here that does to agency what 
James did to experience. There is an unknown quantity in activity and it is not simply a 
matter of its discovery by a conscious social actor: activity is assembled from the world – it 
is distributed155 and ‘not done under the full control of consciousness; [but rather] felt as a 
node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly 
disentangled.’ (2005, p.44)  
Latour writes, ‘Hermeneutics is not a privilege of humans but, so to speak, a property of 
the world itself.’ (2015, p.245)156 And it is in this way that plasma is the strange figure that 
takes the bottom out of any bottom line; in the same way that Tarde’s innumerable monads 
are each themselves greater than the whole to which they lend an aspect of themselves. 
Without plasma there can be no movement, no change, and no activity: in other words, 
plasma provides the grounds for novelty and is the indistinct, undetermined yet real mass, 
the primary matter of the actant-rhizome ontology. It functions as Whitehead’s eternal 
objects do, providing a lure for feeling.  
Concrete abstraction 
In Irreductions Latour writes:  
It has often been said that "capitalism" was a radical novelty, an unheard-of rupture, 
a "deterritorialization" pushed to the ultimate extreme. As always, the Difference is 
                                         
155 Latour writes: ‘Action is overtaken or, as one Swedish friend transcribed this dangerous Hegelian 
expression, action is other-taken! So it is taken up by others and shared with the masses. It is mysteriously 
carried out and at the same time distributed to others. We are not alone in the world. ‘We’, like ‘I’, is a 
wasp’s nest; as the poet Rimbaud wrote: ‘Je est un autre’.’ (2005, p.45) 
156 There is an emphasis on hermeneutics as being embedded in things throughout Latour’s work. For 
example, in his essay on Pasteur, Latour describes a text as ‘a little machine for displacing interests, 
beliefs, and aligning them in such a way as to point the reader, almost inevitably, in a particular 
direction.’ (1988, p.19) 
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mystification. Like God, capitalism does not exist. There are no equivalents; these 
have to be made, and they are expensive, do not lead far, and do not last for very 
long. We can, at best, make extended networks. Capitalism is still marginal even 
today. Soon people will realize that it is universal only in the imagination of its 
enemies and advocates. (1988, p.173) 
It is true that capitalism does not exist in the same way it is true to say that we have never 
been modern. But it is also true to say that capitalism is just as much of an active 
performing as modernism is. Capitalism is not a totality but capital seeks to totalize, even 
if, ultimately, it fails – in this sense Latour is right when he argues that ‘no place dominates 
enough to be global and no place is self-contained enough to be local.’ (2005, p.204) 
However, as an actant like any other it traverses far more of the rhizome than most; 
enrolling here, translating there. In other words, whenever and wherever there is a 
performance of the capitalist mode of production, that performance extends further through 
the network than, say, a performance of some obscure druidic ritual by an enthusiastic 
group of modern pagans. As an actant, capital has many more allies than the monument at 
Stonehenge. As a black box it is voracious in its attempts to enclose and envelope. As a 
trajectory it has burned its trace across the rhizome; as Harman writes, ‘An actant is an 
instantaneous event, but also a trajectory that outstrips any given instant.’ (2009, p.68)  
Latour’s rejection of critique, taken to task by Noys in his essay, The Discreet Charm of 
Bruno Latour, is a step back from Latour’s commitment to the concrete abstract; the 
ontological equality of the world of meaning and the world itself. Marx is not a figure 
Latour has much time for, as demonstrated in the following passage from We Have Never 
Been Modern: 
The invincible moderns even found themselves able to combine the two critical 
moves by using the natural sciences to debunk the false pretensions of power and 
using the certainties of the human sciences to uncover the false pretensions of the 
natural sciences, and of scientism. Total knowledge was finally within reach. If it 
seemed impossible, for so long, to get past Marxism, this was because Marxism 
interwove the two most powerful resources ever developed for the modern critique, 
and bound them together for all time (Althusser, 1992). Marxism made it possible 
to retain the portion of truth belonging to the natural and social sciences even while 
it carefully eliminated their condemned portion, their ideology. Marxism realized - 
and finished off, as was soon to become clear - all the hopes of the first 
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Enlightenment, along with all those of the second. 
(1991, p.36) 
However, as Noys points out, Latour’s understanding of critique is as a ‘melange of 
Enlightenment reductionism, Marxist economism, and Nietzschean barbarity.’ (2011, p.4) 
It is telling that Latour references Althusser rather than Marx himself in the quote above; 
but it was Althusser’s structural Marxism that turned a generation of French intellectuals 
against Marx, many of whom were Althusser’s former students, including Foucault, 
Derrida, and Rancière. The problem with Latour’s account is that while it is exemplary in 
terms of tracing small scale networks – think of the classic ANT projects on the Aramis 
personal rapid transit programme or Michael Callon’s work on the scallops of St. Brieuc 
Bay – it struggles to account for something like the capitalist mode of production. In We 
Have Never Been Modern, Latour writes: 
Could the macro-actors be made up of microactors (Garfinkel, 1967)? Could IBM 
be made up of a series of local interactions? The Red Army of an aggregate of 
conversations in the mess hall? The Ministry of Education of a mountain of pieces 
of paper? The world market of a host of local exchanges and arrangements? 
(1991, p.121) 
No doubt the Red Army is an aggregate of conversations in the mess hall, but only in one 
aspect, and the examples Latour gives are not themselves isolated from each other, when 
Trump imposes tariffs on Chinese steel, a link between a host of local (and not so local) 
exchanges and the Red Army comes into being. In Reassembling the Social Latour rows a 
little way back from this, writing:  
It’s true that in most situations resorting to the sociology of the social is not only 
reasonable but also indispensable, since it offers convenient shorthand to designate 
all the ingredients already accepted in the collective realm. It would be silly as well 
as pedantic to abstain from using notions like ‘IBM’, ‘France’, Maori culture’…’ 
(2005, p.11)157  
                                         
157 We will take Latour at his word when he describes the sociology of the social as indispensable but one 
cannot help but suspect he is being slightly generous here as elsewhere he writes: ‘This does not mean 
that the sociology of the social is useless, only that it might be excellent for studying baboons but not for 
studying humans.’ (2005, p.70) And later in the same text he concludes that, ‘social theory has failed on 
science so radically that it’s safe to postulate that it had always failed elsewhere as well. Social 
explanations cannot be ‘extended’ to science, thus they cannot expand anywhere else.’ (2005, p.94)  
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Instead we must look to the ‘situations where innovations proliferate, where group 
boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account fluctuates’ 
(2005, p.11) to deploy our actant rhizome ontology. Latour is correct when he says that 
IBM can be a convenient shorthand, but when is IBM ever not a situation where group 
boundaries are uncertain or the range of entities to be taken into account is constantly 
going up and down? The clue to resolving this problem is to look to actant rhizome 
ontology itself – and its own intellectual genealogy – to conceive of the ‘social shorthand’ 
as an actant itself, rather than simply a methodology that we can pick up and put down. In 
this sense, Latour’s break with traditional sociology is not sufficiently clean. He still wants 
the sociologists to be able to go around counting, measuring and dividing things up 
because it means that we can still say things like, ‘stopping smoking is good for you and 
for the NHS’ or ‘we can help stop climate change by cycling to work’. But of course 
neither of these things are strictly true and Latour has allowed us to clearly see why. 
Neither statement has paid the necessary cost. Even if they were backed up by years of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence, they still would not be true as neither have taken into 
account the full range of entities involved in the situation. There are plasmatic missing 
masses – tobacco companies, medical bodies, lab technicians, fields of tobacco, 
government policy, corporate taxpayers, lawyers, and so on in the first example for 
instance – everywhere. Indeed, Latour makes much the same point – leading one to 
question why he privileges the shorthand of the sociologists as ‘indispensable’ when it 
comes to the social over the shorthand of anyone else: 
Statistical aggregates obtained from a questionnaire and given a label—like A and 
B types in the search for the causes of heart disease—are as concrete as ‘my red-
faced sanguine neighbor who died last Saturday from a stroke while planting his 
turnips because he ate too much fat’. To say ‘culture forbids having kids out of 
wedlock’ requires, in terms of figuration, exactly as much work as saying ‘my 
future mother-in-law wants me to marry her daughter’. 
(2005, pp.53-54) 
Sociologists will be sociologists but the question is do we have to rely on their 
methodology to talk about IBM, France or Maori culture, or can we use these shorthands 
and talk about these things on the basis of them being contingent, fragile black boxes or 
power plays by a gang of actants regardless of whether they are accepted in the collective 
realm or not. In this way we see the sociologist of the social as just another actant trying to 
build alliances, thus ‘any study of any group by any social scientist is part and parcel of 
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what makes the group exist, last, decay, or disappear’ (2005, p.33) – while retaining the 
ability to talk meaningfully about capital, or the state, and so on.        
Where Latour makes a further mistake, other than on relying on Althusser for an 
understanding of Marx, is to conceive of capitalism as necessarily being a universal, all-
encompassing totality, while at the same time only being willing to account for small-scale 
local networks of commodity exchange and economic relation. The challenge for Latour is 
that in order to be able to fundamentally reconcile the natural and the social, to bring about 
his compositionist programme and the parliament of things – that meeting place of quasi-
objects – he has to find a way to be able to extend these small scale networks beyond the 
workings of a particular transportation system or fishing community to understand the 
commonality and the relation, albeit at a great distance (in other words, action at a 
distance), between going to work in exchange for a wage in a bakery in Paris and going to 
work for a wage in a call centre in India, or handing over a ten pound note in exchange for 
a haircut in Glasgow and transferring several hundred million pounds to acquire a new tech 
company in California. Otherwise, the only change that can be effected is a local change 
which, in the language of an actant rhizome ontology, will lack the necessary allies to 
persist. Latour criticizes the sociologists for setting scale in advance, arguing that instead 
we ought to see scale as something actors achieve. (20015, p.184) In introducing the notion 
of emptiness, a prerequisite for his discussion on plasma, Latour writes that ‘a connection 
leaves empty most of what is not connected, as any fisherman knows when throwing his 
net in the sea.’ (2005, p.132) But as any fisherman also knows, a net can only hold so many 
fish. The fisherman decides what they want to catch – and in this respect the fish still set 
the scale – and select their net accordingly. The point here is that at times Latour seems to 
suggest that we go out in the world – notebook in one hand, Dictaphone in the other – and 
simply wander around, following actants as they traverse the rhizome. But not even the 
actant rhizome ontologist stands outside the network: we bid for allies, translate, substitute 
and delegate just like the rest. All actants want the world to be a certain way. The nuclear 
power plant wants a strong state with a security apparatus, as Langdon Winner points out 
in Do Artifacts Have Politics, just as much as the neo-con security hawk. In other words, if 
we are to ‘deploy’ rather than merely describe surely we can choose what to deploy and 
how, and with an aim in mind without being accused of ‘totalizing’ or ‘explaining away’. 
What it comes down to is that despite the price that needs to be paid to establish a 
continuous relation, despite the fact that, more often than not, we do not have the means to 
foot the bill; there is still what Whitehead describes as ‘the obvious solidarity of the world’ 
(PR, p.7) 
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Indeed, when we talk about totality we ought to be speaking of the interconnection of all 
things – an idea present, even essential to Leibniz, Tarde, and Whitehead – not the absolute 
totality Latour is thinking of when he writes: 
What is to be done, then, with such sleek, filled-in surfaces, with such absolute 
totalities? Turn them inside out all at once, of course; subvert them, revolutionize 
them - such was the strategy of those modernists par excellence, the Marxists. Oh, 
what a lovely paradox! By means of the critical spirit, the moderns have invented at 
one and the same time the total system, the total revolution to put an end to the 
system, and the equally total failure to carry out that revolution - a failure that 
leaves them in total postmodern despair! 
(1991, p.126) 
Of course, Latour’s criticisms regarding the failure of twentieth century Marxism are 
perfectly astute, but only because most Marxists have held, to one degree or another, to the 
caricature of critique that Latour is criticising. Yet this is not a reason to abandon critique, 
nor is it a reason to believe that capitalism is sufficiently marginal to be of concern only to 
its enemies and its advocates.  
Those who were frantically emphasising the plurality and dispersion of capitalisms 
now seem happy to invoke a singular capitalism, qua global system, when it 
requires saving. Georg Lukàcs noted that: ‘in periods when capitalism functions in 
a so-called normal manner, and its various processes appear autonomous, people 
living within capitalist society think and experience it as unitary, whereas in periods 
of crisis, when the autonomous elements are drawn together into unity, they 
experience it as disintegration.’  In fact, we could argue that the appearance of 
‘autonomous’ sub-systems characterises the kinds of analysis we have been tracing, 
which were paradoxically dependent on the ‘unity’ of capitalism. In this period of 
global capitalist crisis we now face a unity that appears as the disintegration of the 
life-world – no longer the ‘happy’ disintegration of autonomous systems and 
‘difference’, but rather the more ‘unhappy’ disintegration of catastrophic collapse 
and withdrawal. In this case the everyday ‘emergency’ state of capitalism is 
revealed as its normal state through the extremity of crisis. 
(Noys, 2011, p.20) 
What Noys and Lukàcs describe is effectively a black box, and one that operates in 
accordance with Latour’s own ideas: it is a concrete abstraction, it relies on invocation, and 
it is thoroughly performative. Indeed, Marx’s key concepts – money, capital, value, 
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commodity – are all performative and all multiplicitous. When Latour maintains that far 
from abandoning ‘power and domination’ he is simply insisting that they ‘have to be 
produced, made up, composed’ (2005, p.64), it is entirely consistent with the processual 
nature of Marx’s philosophy. As is his insistence that power and domination are not some 
‘mysterious container that holds inside of it that which makes the many participants in the 
action move.’ (2005, p.83) Consider the following from the Grundrisse: ‘Capital exists and 
can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as their 
reciprocal interaction with one another.’ (1973, p.414) Or this longer passage: 
When we consider bourgeois society in the long view and as a whole, then the final 
result of the process of social production always appears as the society itself, i.e. 
the human being itself in its social relations.  Everything that has a fixed form, such 
as a product etc., appears as merely a moment, a vanishing moment, in this 
movement. The direct production process itself here appears only as a moment. The 
conditions and objectifications of the process are themselves equally moments of it, 
and its only subject are the individuals, but individuals in mutual relationships, 
which they equally reproduce and produce anew. The constant process of their own 
movement, in which they renew themselves even as they renew themselves even as 
they renew the world of wealth they create. (p.712) 
The emphasis on process, on relation and interaction, on reproducing and producing anew; 
these ideas demonstrate that both Marx and Latour start with the vinculum158, as does 
Whitehead, hence Pomeroy’s sterling efforts to bring the process philosopher together with 
Marx. When Latour writes in Reassembling the Social, ‘It might be time to put Marx’s 
famous quote back on its feet: “Social scientists have transformed the world in various 
ways; the point, however, is to interpret it”’ (2005, p.42) he does himself and his work a 
disservice. The patient reassembly of chains of associations, the list of hybrids, the tracing 
of trajectories, the privileging of description over explanation; these are not neutral acts. 
They enter the world as actant-rhizomes in their own right. De Vries writes:  
Redescriptions are translations too, that is, ontological moves, passes in the world. 
They re-order; they establish or strengthen links, or weaken them to unite knots. 
                                         
158 In some ways, Marx is the very architype of an actor-network theorist, what with those long hours spent in 
the British Library piecing together the workings of the capitalist mode of production, all the while 
wishing he was somewhere else writing about his beloved Balzac. Even Latour concedes this grudgingly, 
writing, ‘Even Karl Marx in the British Library needs a desk to assemble the formidable forces of 
capitalism’. (2005, p.175) He would also have concurred with Latour’s approving statement that Tarde 
believed that ‘economics had to be remade from top to bottom instead of being used as a vague metaphor 
to describe the calculation of interests.’ (2005, p.13) 
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Redescriptions do not just provide interpretations or knowledge about the world, 
they are moves in the world; they change us, as well as the world that is addressed. 
(2015, p.199) 
They correspond, in other words, exactly to Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach – they 
have not just interpreted the world in various ways, but changed it.  
We can also think back to our earlier discussion on abstraction in Whitehead’s work. In the 
previous chapter we presented Whitehead as being a thinker for whom the critique of 
abstraction was at the heart of his philosophical method. He is not one who ‘knows no 
critique’ but one who ‘cannot think without abstractions’. The connection between critique 
and abstraction is indissoluble. Critique simply cannot be carried on without abstraction as 
it involves valuing and discarding. It is an inherently destructive and, at the same time, 
creative act. Latour cannot accept the destructive aspect of critique – he likens critique to a 
hammer, forgetting that hammers can be used to build and construct too (Noys, 2011, p.20) 
– and so denies that anything can be discarded: everything must be taken into account. But 
by insisting that nothing can be discarded we end up overwhelmed by the sheer plenitude 
of actants across the vast writhing mass of rhizomes, paralysed and immobile, incapable of 
action while we carefully count and describe an infinite number of actants, their relations 
and their trajectories.159 
With critique, you may debunk, reveal, unveil, but only as long as you establish, 
through this process of creative destruction, a privileged access to the world of 
reality behind the veils of appearances. Critique, in other words, has all the limits of 
utopia: it relies on the certainty of the world beyond this world. By contrast, for 
compositionism, there is no world of beyond. It is all about immanence. 
(Latour, 2010, p.474-475) 
This is not necessarily the case. Critique does not have to be a lifting of the veil, it can see 
the world as it is and act on it to recompose it just as much as Latour’s compositionism 
                                         
159 Which is not to say that being careful, that taking care, cannot be a radical step itself. To demand an 
explanation is to take care. Schmidgen writes: 
The position that Latour takes up in each new study is neither that of an education professional nor a 
popularizer. It is in fact quite similar to the position described by Isabelle Stengers, following 
Deleuze, as that of the “idiot.” Stengers says that the idiot is neither stupid nor a malcontent nor 
crazy. In the history of philosophy the idiot is frequently someone who doesn’t understand Greek. 
Thus the “conceptual persona” of the idiot is the one who takes a stand against the consensual way 
that a situation and its inherent logic is presented. … “The idiot demands that we slow down, that 
we don’t consider ourselves authorized to believe we possess the meaning of what we know.” 
(2015, p.135) 
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can. Even Latour admits the existence of ‘structuring templates’ (2005, p.196) which, 
while they do not ‘hide behind’ reality, they nonetheless circulate through channels 
effecting action at a distance. Is capitalism, as a mode of production, not a structuring 
template; one with an extensive reach despite never realizing its need for totality? Is it not 
an actant like any other that takes on ‘increasing ontological weight, growing increasingly 
‘universal’ through extensions of the scale and reach of networks and alliances between 
humans and nonhumans.’ (Tresch, 2013, p.302) The crucial difference with Latour’s 
compositionism is that critique, through abstraction, can both read the world as it is and 
envisage an alternative, though the success of the alternative is in no way assured. Latour 
is correct that there is no certainty beyond this world but intellectual thought is by its very 
nature reflective: the movement to and from the mental and the physical pole – as 
described in the previous chapter – is necessarily a movement to and from the abstract and 
the concrete within the moment of the subject/superject, or in Latour’s words, the quasi-
object, becoming and perishing. Without the capacity for abstraction there is no connection 
between past, present and future: there is no means by which one moment could follow 
another. Latour uses the notion of plasma, of the missing masses, to account for the change 
in state of relations but these entities require mobilization, articulation and translation. The 
entity that provides the link between two actants is itself an actant: the mediator is also 
mediated. The present does not contain the future as potential – clearly it cannot if we hold 
that nothing can be reduced to anything else – nor does the past contain the present. Only 
the actants of the present can produce the present but in order to do so there must be some 
means of grasping160 the past, some lure to the future; some means of charting the 
trajectory, getting our bearings and anticipating where we want to go. Harman claims that: 
Latour … cannot explain change. The problem is not that [he] defend[s] the actual 
over the potential, but that [he identifies] the actual with the relational. Only a non-
relational version of actuality … can explain change or movement. 
(2009, p.130) 
The relational aspect of Latour’s ontology is not the issue. The problem is his decision to 
discard the dialectical movement at the heart of Whitehead’s monadology, the mental and 
physical pole of the actual entity and the notion of ‘real potentiality’ which unites the 
                                         
160 Meant very much in this sense: ‘Graspings: things whole and not whole, what is drawn together and what 
is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue 
from the one.’ (Heraclitus, Fragments, B10) 
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actual world with the creative urge.161 This is only possible through relation: ‘viewed in 
abstraction objects are passive, but viewed in conjunction they carry the creativity which 
drives the world.’ (Whitehead, 1933, p.179) Harman is wrong to claim that only a non-
relational version of actuality can explain change, where objects can stand independent of 
their relations – on the contrary, it is only through relation that we get the very creativity 
that drives change. As Harman himself acknowledges, ‘A thing changes by enrolling other 
actors, not by unveiling a pre-existent interior.’ (2009, p.128) The actants produce their 
present by virtue of their relations with each other; and the actual world they produce is 
‘active with its inherent creativity’ (1933, p.179).  
Another difficulty with Latour’s insistence on the concrete abstract is not its concreteness 
but rather the fact that its concreteness destroys its ability to function effectively as 
abstraction. For Whitehead, the abstract, like everything else, must exist somewhere but it 
is first and foremost an intellectual operation that is concerned with assigning value. As he 
writes in Science and the Modern World, in a passage quoted in the previous chapter but 
well worth repeating here: 
In regard to the aesthetic needs of civilized society the reactions of science have so 
far been unfortunate. Its materialist basis has directed attention to things as opposed 
to values. The antithesis is a false one, if taken in a concrete sense. But it is valid at 
the abstract level of ordinary thought. This misplaced emphasis coalesced with the 
abstractions of political economy, which are in fact the abstractions in terms of 
which commercial affairs are carried on. Thus all thought concerned with social 
organisation expressed itself in terms of material things and of capital. Ultimate 
values were excluded. 
(SMW, pp.202-203) 
Once value is assigned it congeals in the object of valuation; in other words, it becomes 
concrete. But what is missing for Latour but present in Whitehead is the space in which 
                                         
161 To be clear, we are not talking about reestablishing a dialect between the social and material world but 
rather a dialectic between the concrete and abstract, physical and mental poles of each entity. It is not 
what Latour has in mind when he quite correctly writes:  
To get the right feel for ANT, it’s important to notice that this has nothing to do with a 
‘reconciliation’ of the famous object/subject dichotomy. To distinguish a priori ‘material’ and 
‘social’ ties before linking them together again makes about as much sense as to account for the 
dynamic of a battle by imagining a group of soldiers and officers stark naked with a huge heap of 
paraphernalia—tanks, rifles, paperwork, uniforms—and then claim that ‘of course there exist some 
(dialectical) relation between the two’. One should retort adamantly ‘No!’ There exists no relation 
whatsoever between ‘the material’ and ‘the social world’, because it is this very division which is a 
complete artefact. (2005, pp.75-76) 
211 
 
valuation and abstraction can take place; there is no ‘mental pole’ to the actor-rhizome like 
there is for the actual entity, the subject-superject of Whitehead has been replaced by the 
quasi-object/subject.  
The phrase ‘ultimate values’ opens a space for a consideration of alternative values and 
systems of valuation, unlike systems which alienate and obfuscate like capitalism. 
Marx’s analysis reveals the complexity of what we take for granted as, precisely 
‘objects’, deflated into our ‘concrete’ experience. In fact, ‘objects’ take on value 
only in relation to other objects, and we treat this ‘value’ as a natural or, dare we 
say, psychological fact. The result is that ‘things take on a life of their own’ 
(Heinrich, 2012, p. 73) but not in the sense Latour supposes. This is because this is 
a ‘real’ situation, one not generated by us or by the objects but by the form of value 
that inheres in them. Therefore, our interactions with the world are not illusory but 
formed in social processes which constitute a social reality and necessity which 
dominates us. Therefore, contra Latour, it is social relations that produce the 
reification of capital, which is nonetheless real for all that. We can’t wish away or 
dismantle these relations by the fiat of network analysis but rather have to grasp 
capitalism’s constitution of itself as ‘automatic subject [automatisches Subjekt]’ 
(Marx, 1976, p. 255). (Noys, pp.205-206) 
What Noys describes here captures the play between the concrete and the abstract, aversion 
and adversion, the spectral and the real, all that is at the heart of Whitehead’s metaphysics. 
Latour appears to be interested in only one half of this metaphysics: the concrete, 
adversion, the real. Whitehead also writes that ‘the notion of complete abstraction is self-
contradictory. For you cannot abstract the universe from any entity ... so as to consider that 
entity in isolation’ (PR, 28). Here we again see the nuance of Whitehead’s metaphysics and 
his determination to account for the subtle interplay of subject and object within each 
entity through a dialectical logic rather than Latour’s tendency towards a one-sided ‘taking 
the world as it is’ empiricism. For Latour, the dialectic is a fairy tale. ‘Contradictions are 
negotiated like the rest. They are built, not given.’ (1988, p.180) But what is a negotiation 
if not a dialectical process: a pulling to and fro followed by a settlement, even if the 
settlement lasts but an instant. 
In one sense Latour is absolutely right to insist that, for the most part, there is a universe of 
discontinuities that must be patiently assembled; a price must be paid to bring them into 
continuity for sure, but sometimes Latour overestimates the cost. Without the ability to 
value – as violent, arbitrary and obfuscating an act as that can be – we are unable to 
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account for the ease with which a few taps on a keyboard in the office of a large financial 
institution can result, only a few short months later, in the destruction of several hundred 
hectares of Amazonian rainforest. While Latour carefully traces the steps162, most of us are 
quite willing to take shortcuts. When he describes the shift to ANT being like the lazy car 
driver trying to climb a mountain, with no running or jumping allowed till they reach the 
top (2005, p.221), he underestimates how quickly we are capable of picking things up, of 
sorting the important from the unimportant, as Whitehead says: of making leaps. Latour 
writes in Reassembling the Social that: 
If what is to be assembled is not first opened up, de-fragmented, and inspected, it 
cannot be reassembled again. It does not require enormous skill or political acumen 
to realize that if you have to fight against a force that is invisible, untraceable, 
ubiquitous, and total, you will be powerless and roundly defeated. It’s only if forces 
are made of smaller ties, whose resistance can be tested one by one, that you might 
have a chance to modify a given state of affairs. To put it bluntly: if there is a 
society, then no politics is possible. 
(2005, p.250) 
But this presumes that politics is a technical problem – like a faulty connection in the 
wiring of a car or a leak in some pipework – rather than a question of value. This is why 
                                         
162 Here are the ‘missing masses’ involved even in the very first step of pressing a key on the keyboard:  
The keyboard sends an electrical signal, called a scan code, to the computer saying that a button was 
pressed. 
The keyboard controller interprets the scan code and determines that the letter pressed was an "M". 
It stores this "M" in a special memory location until the processor is ready to deal with it. 
The controller sends a signal to the processor, called an interrupt. An interrupt tells the processor 
that some part of the computer has information for it to process and wants its attention.  
The processor services interrupts based on their priority. When it is time to deal with the keypress, 
the processor routes it to the program for the operating system that you are using. 
The operating system software decides which window you pressed the key in and sends a message 
to that window telling it a key was pressed. 
The window decides what to do with the keypress. [If] in this case it's your word processor window, 
and the key you pressed was an ordinary letter, the word processor will add that letter to its working 
area for the file you have open. The letter will take one byte of your computer's memory (RAM).  
The window will then call the operating system to display the letter on the screen. 
The operating system will display the letter on the screen by adding it to your video card's video 
memory. 
The next time the video card refreshes your monitor the letter will appear on the screen. Most video 
cards refresh the monitor between 60 and 100 times per second. 
(http://www.pcguide.com/intro/works/exampl-c.html Last accessed February 13 2019) 
As Latour remarks, ‘Even the most modest study of the humblest scientiﬁc practice is enough to show the 
bewildering steps necessary to obtain reliable information through a cascade of transformations. Quite a 
steeple-chase!’ (2009c, p.472) 
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Whitehead insists that, ‘Apart from transmutation our feeble intellectual operations would 
fail to penetrate into the dominant characteristics of things. We can only understand by 
discarding’ (PR, p.251), and later in the same text ‘intellectuality consists in the gain of a 
power of abstraction. The irrelevant multiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is 
laid on the elements of systematic order on the actual world’ (p.254) If we cannot eliminate 
the ‘irrelevant multiplicity of detail’ then for all the analytical, descriptive, democratic 
power of Latour’s actant-rhizome ontology, it remains unable to move beyond litany. For a 
theorist so adept at dismantling and reassembling social agency, there is a striking lack of 
agency in terms of the Latourian political programme. In the Politics of Nature Latour 
suggests we ask for a ‘tiny concession’, to extend democracy to non-human actors. (de 
Vries, 2016, pp.146-147) But to whom do we address the request? If all translations are 
local, if we are to abandon all talk of capitalism and capitalists, who will grant these 
concessions? And what if you can find someone to ask and they say no? To speak of 
concessions is to admit that social explanation, while transforming the world through 
description and redescription, is not enough; it is not adequate to, ‘[a]s Marx did with 
Hegel’s dialectics, … put social explanation back on its feet.’(Latour, 2005, p.64) 
Latour is right when he calls for the ‘regulated and commonly-agreed-upon production’ 
(1991, p.141) of hybrids, for the extension of democracy to things themselves; but without 
any means of bringing this about Latour’s politics remain effectively apolitical and 
hopelessly utopian. 
In The Compositionist Manifesto Latour writes: 
The thirst for the Common World is what there is of communism in 
compositionism, with this small but crucial difference: that it has to be slowly 
composed instead of being taken for granted and imposed on all. Everything 
happens as if the human race were on the move again, expelled from one utopia, 
that of economics, and in search of another, that of ecology. Two different 
interpretations of one precious little root, eikos, the first being a dystopia and the 
second a promise that as yet no one knows how to fulfil. How can a liveable and 
breathable “home” be built for those errant masses? 
(2010, p.488)    
In the age of Trump, Brexit, the sixth mass extinction, runaway climate change, millions of 
human beings forced to flee their homes from war, torture and famine in Syria, Yemen, 
Libya, soaring inequality, antibiotic resistance, and all of the other developing horrors of 
the twenty-first century, and despite having at our disposal more wealth, more resources, 
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more technology than ever before in human history; in light of the crisis of liberalism, of 
climate, of capitalism surely we can take some things for granted and impose a common 
world on some, namely those who benefit most from the present state of affairs. Latour 
insists we take care, that we look forward rather than fleeing from the past while 
continuing to look at it, and that the promise of the Common World is one that we do not 
yet know how to fulfil. The following anecdote from Irreductions perfectly sums up the 
danger of trying to take short cuts, of trying to create an ‘irreversible situation’ without the 
necessary actants: 
In the canteen we discussed the forthcoming elections. As long as there are only 
opinion polls, we can argue about the relative position of the Socialists and the 
Communists until the cows come home. These polls do not count. Like Dietrich's 
rats, their samples are too small. What is needed is a truly grand experiment in 
which all the votes are counted and everyone can see that everything is above 
board. Only then will we know whether the Communists are two percent weaker 
then the Socialists. 
(1988, p.223) 
But this does not necessarily lead to the compositionist insistence on compromise. (Latour, 
2010, p.478) And it need not entail us getting down on our hands and knees to slowly, 
cautiously piece together the actants who infuse our buzzing world, those missing masses; 
surely instead we remember the Leibnizian interconnectedness of all things, Tarde’s 
insistence of having, Whiteheads valuing and abstraction and develop an actant rhizome 
ontology fit to both interpret and change the world. Latour reminds us that interactions are 
not isobaric: some participants push harder and speak louder. He also cautions that: 
…to insist that behind all the various issues there exists the overarching presence of 
the same system, the same empire, the same totality, has always struck me as an 
extreme case of masochism, a perverted way to look for a sure defeat while 
enjoying the bittersweet feeling of superior political correctness. 
(2005, p.252) 
To casually say that the cause of both the war in Iraq and climate change is capitalism is 
clearly the kind of political correctness that Latour has in mind; and there is little doubt of 
the prevalence of this form of political correctness, as the decline of the political Left over 
several decades has shown. But just because many of those who repeat it as dogma hold it 
to be true does not mean that it is necessarily false. It is reasonable to hold that the interests 
of the same actors are at play in both, presuming you are able to demonstrate how – and 
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presuming you leave the door open to new actors. The demonstrating how is important as it 
results not in undefeatable totality and hegemony, but in the exposure of the fragile 
multifarious heterogeneity of the ‘same system, the same empire’ and its dependence on its 
associations. We can then exploit the ‘weak ties’ without having to ‘genuflect before the 
Total’. (2005, pp.252-253) Issac Marrero-Guillamón demonstrates how this can be 
achieved in his discussion of the Can Ricart social movement in Barcelona, where ANT’s 
‘certain obsession for understanding how things happen in minute detail, rather than why’ 
(2013, p.406) can help produce an effective social movement. 
In his discussion on climate change, Telling Friends from Foes in the Time of the 
Anthropocene, Latour writes about Frank Luntz’s memo to the Republican party: “Should 
the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global 
warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of 
scientific certainty a primary issue.” Latour comments, ‘His success speaks volumes about 
the mass of money spent to foster climate deniers but it also speaks to the fragility of the 
immunological system of those who use the science-versus-politics repertoire.’ (2013, 
p.149) There are two parts to this statement – a vast amount of money is spent on 
promoting climate change denial; and the science-versus-politics dichotomy is a false one, 
a bifurcation of nature – but Latour focusses on the second part, not pausing to ask why a 
mass of money is spent fostering climate deniers or who is spending the money. The result 
is a philosophically idealist politics, where change can literally be thought into existence, 
where a conceptual shift is sufficient to effect a political shift. Of course, the conceptual 
and the political – in other words, the theory and the activity – are two sides of the same 
coin: even Leibniz’s monads, as we have seen, are embodied, engaged in both mental 
activity and movement. Latour, however, leads us to a position where only one side of the 
coin is taken into account. He himself acknowledges as much when he writes that 
persuading people of the reality of climate change would constitute ‘a pedagogical gain — 
not a political one.’ (2013, p,152) But no alternative is offered beyond the conceptual shift. 
And here we find a tension at the heart of Latour’s politics: on the one hand, all of his 
actants are fully deployed in the world at every instant, all abstraction is concrete, all 
transcendence immanent, there are no worlds beyond this one, no veils to be lifted, 
everything must be taken into account. On the other, his actants are paralysed by the 
crushing weight of the relations they all bear, the consequence of a relational materialism 
that leaves no room for forms, modes, for the abstract valuation and characterisation of 
social and material forces in the service of some hypothesis, a desire for the world to be 
other than it is. As Noys says: Latour seems 
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…incapable of grasping the particular form of capitalism, which precisely lies 
between immanence and transcendence. The result is that while agency seems to 
become possible, this inflation of ‘local’ agency is bought at the cost of an inability 
to change or challenge any of the terms of the game. Capitalism seems to remain as 
an ‘untranscendable horizon’, contra Sartre’s famous remark about communism. 
(2011, p.15) 
Latour lays the foundation for a radical democratic ontology but, fed-up with the 
intellectually bankrupt Stalinism of the left, is unwilling to engage in the sort of valuation 
and abstraction which would allow him to transform ANT into an effective political tool; 
even though he himself proposes precisely what that could look like at the end of 
Reassembling the Social: 
Our distinctive touch is simply to highlight the stabilizing mechanisms so that the 
premature transformation of matters of concern into matters of fact is counteracted. 
ANT argues that it should be possible to clarify this confusion, to distinguish the 
two tasks of deployment and unification, to spell out the procedures for due 
process, thus modifying what it means for a social science to be more politically 
relevant and more scientific. 
(2005, p.261)    
In 2018, Latour once again turns to the question of politics in the age of crisis, with his 
essay Down To Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime. In it he moves yet closer to a 
critical analysis of capitalism, identifying three historical strands to the post-Cold War 
period: deregulation; explosion of inequalities; denial of climate change. However, his 
analysis stops short of critique. His historical account of the post-Cold War period is in fact 
thoroughly ahistorical and presents a Whiggish view of history as being solely determined 
by the decisions of the ruling class of the period. He writes: 
From the 1980s on, the ruling classes stopped purporting to lead and began instead 
to shelter themselves from the world. We are experiencing all the consequences of 
this flight, of which Donald Trump is merely a symbol, one among others. The 
absence of a common world we can share is driving us crazy. (2018, p.2) 
This presupposes that the post-1945 period of social democracy in Western Europe and the 
United States was an enlightened choice by an enlightened ruling class, rather than the 
result of a complex combination of the perceived threat of the Soviet Union, the strength of 
domestic labour movements and the long economic boom afforded by the decimation of 
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global industry and, indeed, the global population during the Second World War – a 
phenomenon characterised by Marx in the Grundrisse as the ‘violent destruction of capital 
not by relations external to it, but rather as a condition of its self-preservation.’ (1973, 
p.667) And it presupposes that the retreat from post-war social democracy was simply a 
crisis of leadership.  
Latour takes a similar approach to the question of globalisation, emptying the term of its 
crucial semantic content and – rather than understanding it as a complex of cultural, 
economic and social colonisation which brings both progress and regression – instead 
casting it as a mode of thinking: to ‘think’ globally or ‘think’ locally. He defines a ‘good’ 
globalisation against a ‘bad’ globalisation (what he terms globalisation-plus and 
globalisation-minus), and a ‘good’ local against a ‘bad’ local (local-plus and local-minus), 
but in doing so fails to move beyond the conception of politics as something which only 
really takes place in the mind. Again, this is a failure of abstraction, a failure to see the 
‘wood for the trees’; a result of his insistence that the defining problem of social theory is 
the opposite, the failure to see the ‘trees for the wood’, when a more fruitful course would 
be to find a way to mediate between the two. This would allow an understanding of both 
globalisation and the local as being inherently plus/minus, as having a contradictory 
dipolar character, where the movement between the two poles and the intensity of each is 
determined by the historical circumstances of the moment. 
Latour writes,  
Trump presides over the country that had the most to lose from a return to reality. 
Its material infrastructures are the most difficult to reorient quickly; its 
responsibilities in the current climatic situation are the most crushing. Most 
enraging, it possesses all the scientific, technological, and organizational 
capabilities that could have led the "free world" to take the turn toward the third 
attractor. (2018, p.38) 
The analysis is sound as far as it goes but, as ever, it fails to go far enough. The notion of 
the ‘third attractor’ lays the ground for the familiar call: that ‘[e]verything has to be 
mapped out anew, at new costs.’ (2018, p.33). This process is fleshed out some sixty pages 
later: 
What to do? First of all, generate alternative descriptions. How could we act 
politically without having inventoried, surveyed, measured, centimeter by 
centimeter, being by being, person by person, the stuff that makes up the Earth for 
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us? Without doing this we could perhaps utter astute opinions or defend respectable 
values, but our political affects would be churning in a void. Any politics that failed 
to propose redescribing the dwelling places that have become invisible would be 
dishonest. We cannot allow ourselves to skip the stage of description. No political 
lie is more brazen than proposing a program.’ (2018, p.94) 
However, this is the only stage outlined by Latour. He may argue that the next steps will 
emerge from the first stage of description but, given the likelihood that surveying the 
infinite ‘stuff that makes up the Earth for us’ would itself take an infinity, it seems logically 
impossible for us to ever move beyond the descriptive stage. This would not necessarily be 
a problem if we could take description to be a generative act, an act of creation, as well as 
an act of valuation, an act of critique; if description could include Hegel’s judgement 
alongside comprehension. But this cannot but lead to the proposing of programs; critique 
would be a pointless exercise if it did not. 
The limitations to Latour’s political analysis stem from both the philosophical problems 
with his actant rhizome ontology – still the prevailing mode of thought employed in Down 
To Earth, despite being published five years after the unveiling of his alternative research 
protocol in An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence – but also the narrowness of his political 
horizons. Because critique is beyond the pale, there is no sense in which society can look 
anything other than, more or less, how Western European society has looked since the end 
of the Second World War. Latour’s Left and Right is limited to the European tradition of 
competing traditions of Social as opposed to Christian Democrats. He holds the European 
Union aloft, writing, ‘It is by the intricacy of its regulations, which are attaining the 
complexity of an ecosystem, that it shows the way. Exactly the sort of experience that one 
needs to approach the ecological mutation that is straddling all borders.’ (2018, p.101) He 
maintains that ‘Europe is again taking up the question of universality, but this time it is not 
rushing to impose its own prejudices on everyone else.’ (2018, p.105) The ‘way of seeing’, 
to borrow a phrase from John Berger, that this represents is the very mode of politics that 
has both presided over the period of crisis we now find ourselves in and demonstrated 
itself incapable of finding a way out. With only description and composition, without 
valuation and critique, without according abstraction its proper role such that it allows us 
to grant what Badiou describes as the ‘communist hypothesis’, which is to say the dream of 
the common world beyond the horizons of our unhappy present, actant rhizome ontology is 
condemned to endlessly chasing actants, tracing associations, mapping the present without 
taking heed of the past or the unfolding future; in other words, reciting litany in the face of 
219 
 
global ruin in much the same way as Pope Gregory I decreed in 590 in desperate response 
to the horrors of the plague, and with much the same effect. 
 
* * * 
 
The point of this thesis has not been to prove that Latour is a Leibnizian or a Tardean or a 
Whiteheadian – though none of these philosophers have schools to speak of – nor was it to 
point out contradictions and slip-ups, to take Latour to task for suggesting that the actant is 
a monad, or Tarde is the grandfather of ANT, or Whitehead is an actor-network theorist – 
though in our encounters with these thinkers we have peeked in the black box Latour 
constructs each time he makes such claims. Rather, the point is to place four monadologies 
together in the same text, to let them speak for themselves – while, of course, always 
speaking through them – in the service of finding our way to an ontology fit for the myriad 
existential crises of the present.  
We have suggested that a radical democratic ontology is now required to take Latour’s 
democratic revolution one step further. To this end, the pressing question is how we can 
deploy such an ontology in not just our understanding of the composition of climate 
change or antibiotic resistance or global inequality, or, indeed, capitalism; but our attempts 
to choose an alternative path. Like Ingold’s wayfarer, and in keeping with Latour’s 
ontology, the path is necessarily composed as we move along it, not a predetermined route 
but the laying of a trail. This thesis has suggested that in understanding the actor-network 
as monad, while reintegrating Whitehead’s conceptual valuation, we are able to overcome 
the idealism and inadequacy of Latour’s compositionism. But we must remember that 
knowledge is always in the world, not of the world. And so we can go back in to the world 
with our renewed actant rhizome ontology but this time without Latour’s agnosticism and 
instead with a hypothesis, or rather, the hypothesis of the common world. ‘When the 
centaur of classical metaphysics is mated with the cheetah of actor-network theory, their 
offspring is not some hellish monstrosity, but a thoroughbred colt able to carry us for half a 
century and more.’ (Harman, 2009, p.5) This thesis has attempted to accomplish that very 
union, although in a completely different way to Harman, and with a very different 
intention. The offspring is no colt. It increasingly looks like we do not have the luxury of 
another half century or more. Instead another union is needed to bring together the 
metaphysics of Leibniz, Tarde, Whitehead and Latour – in other words, a monadological 
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ontology – with the political economy and philosophy of Marx. As Pomeroy notes, ‘We 
will not be done with Marx until we are done with capitalism’ (2004, p.21), but the 
complexity of contemporary capitalism is impossible to understand without the descriptive 
power of an actant rhizome ontology – though description is no longer enough, as Sartre 
wrote in Search for a Method, ‘it is not enough to describe the working of capital or the 
system of colonization.’ (1963, p.180). In the age of crisis, the Latour litany increasingly 
resembles the religious supplication to which the term ‘litany’ alludes – the plea of an 
imperilled multitude to a mythological being of their own creation. In the face of 
compounding crises, we do not have time to painstakingly assemble and reassemble the 
actants, in the hope that in their reassembly we compose something new, something better. 
We must be able to critique, to conceptually value our actants – to situate our description 
and redescription in the context of the struggle against capitalism without using the infinite 
heterogeneity of that interminably complex system as a means of obscuring those actants 
who are most to blame for our present perilous state and muddying those sites of struggle 
which hold the greatest promise for finding a way out of that peril. This thesis is intended 
as preparation for that project: to truly harness the power of description as redescription to 
quench our thirst for the solidarity of one common world.
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